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    On teaching and learning, undergraduate style

    Today is the first Thursday I've had to myself since 14 February. I have been teaching 115.108 "Organisations and Management", a first-year paper at Massey University. This was my first teaching experience in an undergraduate environment, so I didn't really know what to expect. Would the students engage? Would they just sit there? Would they even turn up?

    Fast forward to today. The semester is complete, save the final examinations. Having now completed the assignment, I've learnt a lot—about myself, the students and the learning environment—so thought a few reflections would be in order:
    • Most young men and women are committed learners—if you encourage them, show them trust, and treat them as adults. The natural learning style of most adults is to share ideas and ask questions, a style I adopted this semester. In my experience, if you ask people questions, they will answer—surprise, surprise. In contrast, the standard modus operandi in a university context seems to be to lecture—a one-way transfer at best. I continue to be amazed that universities operate on the basis of broadcasting information in a lecture format. Is this conducive to effective learning?
    • I was stunned at the drop-off in attendance as the semester progressed. Attendance dropped by 50% over the course of the semester. Other Tutors said this was normal, and not to be alarmed or critical of my own effectiveness. I can't help but be alarmed. Were some students inappropriately enrolled at the beginning of the semester? Did the course and delivery not suit the learning preferences of the class? Were there timetabling clashes? Did the students get lazy? I don't have any answers to this one, but suggest university councils treat this as a real concern, as they grapple with their goals and seek to allocate limited resources effectively.
    • The ability of the class to think critically was well below what I expected. Our modern world is complex. We need leaders who think critically and make smart, informed  choices. I wonder whether the NCEA system, which dumbs down topics by separating the holistic subjects into parts, is to blame?
    • The assignment forced me to adopt a weekly rhythm, to ensure material was available and I was "ready to go" each week. But it was fun. I enjoyed working with a great group, most of whom were just embarking on the tertiary and professional careers, but can't see myself full-time in a university environment. The pace is too slow!
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    On vision, core purpose and related matters

    What role does "vision" have in the modern organisation? Is such a thing still relevant and, if so, who should "own" it? The question of vision has been a bit of a hobby-horse of mine for over a decade now, particularly when I've been asked to help with strategic planning. A discussion on the Institute of Directors group page over at LinkedIn brought the issue to the surface again this week.
     
    I must admit to being a doubter when the wave of books, seminars, consulting engagements promoting the vision and mission statements first flowed across the business community in the 1990s. While considerable money and effort was expended on the creation of some quite wonderful statements, many of which were printed and displayed for all to see, the gains in productivity and business performance were questionable in most cases.

    Vision is typically expressed as some aspirational sense of what an organisation seeks to achieve (a big goal, if you will). It addresses "what", a key question that all stakeholders need answered. But people don't get behind things or targets, they get behind causes. It should come as no surprise therefore that vision "leaks", and that staff are naturally sceptical, particularly when vision statements are too ambitious as many are. 

    Vision alone is not sufficient however. For sustained effort, people need to know "what" and "why". Core purpose is much better, because it addresses both questions. Core purpose incorporates the vision (what) and the underlying driver/cause (why). A good statement of core purpose is succinct, self-evident and realistic. It should be developed by the Board because, ultimately, the Board is responsible for the purpose of the organisation, on behalf of the shareholders. The core purpose should be owned by everyone. Notwithstanding this, the challenge of motivating the people and aligning their effort to move the organisation towards the core purpose is no easy task. I guess that's one reason why good CEOs are paid so much! 
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    Should convicted directors be stripped of their honours?

    There was a development in the long-running Lombard Finance collapse saga today that has the potential to send shock waves throughout the establishment, in New Zealand and throughout the Commonwealth. Reports are emerging that Sir Douglas Graham, esteemed politician, Treaty of Waitangi negotiator, company director and knight of the realm may be stripped of his knighthood following a conviction associated with the collapse of Lombard. This is huge.

    Should honours recipients that are subsequently convicted through a judicial process have their honour stripped? On one hand, I applaud the New Zealand Government for considering measures to protect the status and sanctity of the New Zealand honours system. On the other, the knighthood related to Sir Douglas' services to New Zealand, rendered over many years, as I understand it, prior to the Lombard debacle. 

    UPDATE 31/May: Yesterday, when I first posted, I fence-sat on this issue. Today, having read several commentaries and thought more deeply, my view has firmed in favour of stripping the honour. One is stripped of rank as a consequence of guilt in a military system, both as a punishment and to defend the honour of the rank. The civilian system is constructed on the same principle. Guilt and consequences should go together—always—lest justice no longer be consistent, fair and blind. What do you think?
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    The Independent Chair: what is going on?

    I'm a strong believer that function trumps form, especially in matters of governance. However, I maintain a close watch on trends in research and practice, because things can change, and one needs to maintain an open mind. A case in point is that of the Independent Chair, a trend that has been developing over the last decade or more (actually, since the 1992 Cadbury Report), which appears to have hit a speed bump recently.

    This week, an article published on the Pensions and Investments website reported that, in America, support for Independent Chairmen had declined in 2013, despite a "bumper crop of calls" for independent chairs. I was somewhat flummoxed by the information presented in the article. How can increased demand lead to fewer appointments? Is this a new trend, or just a one-off blip? Who is in control, or, more directly, who actually has the power?

    Corporate governance in America, as in other jurisdictions, appears to be awash with power games. Calls to separate the Chair and CEO roles appear to be founded on concerns that too much power is concentrated with one person. Yet that very power seems to hold sway. It's as if holding on to the 3P's (position, power, prestige) is more important than a fourth P—the one that actually matters —performance. When will Boards and shareholders wake up and act?
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    Should non-executive directors own company shares?

    I've often pondered the question posed in the subject line—not only from a personal perspective, but also from an independence/critical thinking perspective. This is a vexed topic, because many owners wish to occupy a seat in the boardroom themselves, either to influence company growth and development (a healthy motivation), or simply to keep an eye on their asset (not so good).

    The key issues to be grappled with when considering the question are influence and independence. Will the holding of shares influence the director to make certain decisions differently than if they did not own shares? The owning of company shares (by directors) is probably advantageous to engagement and commitment—so long as independence in decision-making is preserved, and decisions are made in the best interests of the company. However, if the answer is "yes" or "maybe", then the best answer to the topic question is probably "no". Either the non-executive director should not own company shares, or if they wish to continue to own company shares, they should consider resigning their position.

    The reasoning for my conclusion is as follows. Directors are required to act in the best interests of the company (in New Zealand, at least). In so doing, a primary task of a director is to make decisions. If a director was to make a different decision based on their ownership of shares, then clearly their decision-making is influenced (and potentially conflicted) by that ownership. Arguably, they are no longer acting in the company's best interests, but those of the shareholder, of which they are one. In such cases, the director is no longer meeting the legislative requirement. I wonder how many directors, particularly of smaller companies, inadvertently find themselves in this position?
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    Boards of directors: is form or function more important?

    Much has been made in the business press in recent weeks of the possibility of splitting the Board Chair and CEO roles at JP Morgan. Arguments for and against have been made, and now a non-binding shareholder vote is imminent. I can't help but feel disappointed by all this rhetoric, because arguments about Board form (structure) miss the point.

    For the last 40 years or more, researchers and practitioners have searched for "the ideal Board structure" through which high performance will occur. Despite considerable effort, attempts to produce an ideal structure, or explain how Boards contribute to business performance, have failed to produce definitive results. If we pause and reflect, this lack of clarity should not be a surprise. Governance is a complex, socially dynamic phenomena, not a predictable closed system or a mass of separable attributes. As such, empirical knowledge (of the past, or of form) cannot be used to credibly predict future performance.

    Rather than continue to argue over form (that is, argue over structural variables including Chair/CEO duality, gender diversity, non-executive directors), attention needs to move to the holistic consideration of governance itself, and what Boards do (how they function). Then, and probably only then, will we start to gain a clear understanding of how Boards actually contribute to business performance. But is that asking too much of the JP Morgan Board and other Boards? I guess time will tell.