Tags

  • Published on

    Mundane May: half-time

    Boardcraft Integrity Mundane May Performance Rules

    May 10–16th: Life on the road, in a proud republic.

    To see earlier pictures: May 1st–2nd, May 3rd–9th.

    May 10: Rush hour… late morning in autumnal Melrose Estate

    Image description

    May 11: Watching or hiding—or both?

    Image description

    May 12: Growing ambitions.

    Image description

    May 13: Up or down?

    Image description

    May 14: Uber travel, for point-to-point movements.

    Image description

    May 15: Move—yes, but what, where, and when?

    Image description

    May 16: A colourful interlude, en route home.

    Image description
  • Published on

    Is what you see what it is?

    Artificial Intelligence Boardcraft Chairman Complexity Decision Making Performance Strategy
    Image description

    I have been based in Johannesburg this week, working with boards and directors in both South Africa and neighbouring countries. What has struck me is their entrepreneurial spirit: their ambition to realise the full potential of the companies they govern. That most are looking beyond compliance-based orthodoxy, for clues to help them get ahead, has been refreshing.

    While conversations have been wide-ranging—from board structures and compositions, to enquiries about the Strategic Governance Framework, corporate governance codes, board pack designs and board meeting frequency—one topic has stood out: artificial intelligence.

    On AI, everyone wants in it seems, but not necessarily to deploy AI tools and agents directly in the boardroom (although some are). Instead, having heard of my involvement with AI since 1984 (I studied the topic and built an ‘engine’ at university), they wanted to hear my perspective on several macro issues—especially how companies might gain, and possibly even sustain, competitive advantage.

    My responses to directors have been fairly candid:

    • Maintain an open mind.
    • Technical advances are racing along. What was bleeding edge yesterday, may well be mainstream soon, or even passé.
    • Don’t try to become an expert—learn to ask great questions of experts.
    • Ensure projects that incorporate AI tools are tested against corporate strategy for alignment. A good question to ask is something like, “How will this project advance our strategic ambitions?”
    • The business case to secure efficiencies and improve effectiveness within business operations, and in the preparation of board reports and administration of board materials, is fairly strong.
    • Encourage staff to try stuff, but in your capacity as a director, be vigilant. Ensure the outputs produced by the AI tools (agents) being trialled are reliable and consistent before committing capital. If reliability is questionable, the likelihood of the board making high-quality decisions is low.
    • Judgement, reasoning and intuition remain, exclusively, human capabilities.
    • Any policies developed need to be policies, not procedures dressed as policy.
    • Be cautious of inflated claims and overzealous consultants and sales people!

    The appeal is great, but so is the hype, so keep Wittgenstein’s aphorism close:

    From it seeming to me—or to everyone—to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

    These are my thoughts, this week. As I listen, read, and learn, I may change my mind. How do you see the so-called ‘AI-opportunity’ emerging?

  • Published on

    Who’s looking at you?

    Accountability Boardcraft Corporate Governance Effectiveness Leadership Monday Muse Performance Research Speaking Engagements Value Creation
    Image description

    Have you ever wondered who is looking at your website, and why? My new website was published seven days ago (well, a very similar website), so I decided to look at the analytics, to get an idea.

    To my astonishment, some 40,600 total visits (page hits) have been recorded over the past seven days, from just over 8500 unique visitors. Extrapolated, that points to over two million page hits per year.

    This sounds impressive. I’m not convinced, and closer inspection shows the numbers are not quite what they seemed at first glance. When ‘include Crawlers/Bots’ is de-selected, a clearer picture emerges: the total visitor count drops to 10600-odd. That about three quarters of the traffic to petercrow.com is not by or from real people is good to know. That they are AI-tools and other systems, hoovering around collecting data justifies our investment in appropriate security. That one-in-five visits is from a mobile device suggests our selection of a tool that provides desktop-, tablet-, and mobile-friendly display options—automatically—was a good decision too.

    Turning to the ‘real visitors’ now. If one-in-four Unique Visitors are not bots, about 2100 people visited the some part of the site over the past seven days. Some (most?) will have been curious about the new site. But others looked at one or more Musings articles; and some have checked some other aspect of the capabilities and credentials material.

    Even if one or two per cent of these ‘real people’ are genuinely interested (20 per week), and ten per cent of these get in touch, my decades-long quest (to provoke candid conversations to help boards can govern with impact) has, probably, been worthwhile. Onward.

  • Published on

    When time is up, act

    Accountability Corporate Governance Effectiveness Leadership Performance
    Picture
    These past few weeks, I have been acting as an envoy of sorts—a go-between to help tackle some problems that, ultimately, seem to come down to strained relations between shareholders, directors and senior management. While one case is playing out in a rapidly-growing PE-funded entity, and the other in a smaller enterprise, the situations are remarkably similar: the organisations appear to have outgrown the leadership capability of the CEO, and the board and CEO no longer see eye-to-eye.
    In one case, the leader is the founder; in the other, the CEO has led the entity for over two decades. In both, signs of Founder’s Syndrome​ are apparent. The cases are difficult because the CEOs have led well. But things have changed, and both deny they might be part of the problem, much less that leaving might be the best option for the organisation.
    The cases are proving insightful reminders for me—not only as examples of the destructive impact when behaviours turn negative, but of something most decent management and leadership courses teach: No one is perfect, and no one is indispensable.
    In contrast, consider the actions of these leaders:
    • Sir Rod Drury, founder of Xero and recently-named New Zealander of the Year, has been lauded for his entrepreneurial expertise and success. Yet he stepped away from executive leadership at Xero about a decade ago, and from the board in 2023. The business has not stalled or failed—it has grown bigger and better. 
    • George Washington, the first President of the United States, served for eight years and then retreated to Mt. Vernon, even though he was encouraged to remain President. 
    These men, both highly successful in their respective fields, knew something many chief executives and board directors miss: humility matters. When the time is up, act. Strive to leave on good terms. And, if you think it might be time, it probably is. Chances are, it might be one of the best leadership decisions you make.
  • Published on

    Towards great: governing with impact

    Accountability Corporate Governance Effectiveness Leadership Performance Sustainability
    Picture
    In 2018, before mankind was tipped upside down by a global pandemic, the chattering class had been very active, responding vociferously as news of various corporate failures and missteps came to light. Carillion plc and the Institute of Directors (both UK), Steinhoff (South Africa), AMP (Australia), and Fletcher Building (New Zealand) were topical examples. The consternation and angst was palpable.
    That seemingly strong and enduring organisations were failing (or suffering significant missteps) on a fairly regular basis concerned many; for the societal and economic consequences significant. Many commentators (primarily, but by no means exclusively, the media) responded by berating company leaders (specifically, the board and management), placing ‘blame’ squarely at their feet. This is a reasonable: ultimate responsibility for firm performance lies with the board after all.
    Fast forward to 2026, what has changed? Well, if post-Covid failures are any indication, not much. The Post Office scandal in the UK, accounting firm PwC, and Port of Auckland (New Zealand), have been in the news for all the wrong reasons. Wilko (UK), GDK Group (Australia) and Du Val Group (New Zealand) are three amongst many that have collapsed under large debt burdens. Fletcher Building has suffered again too, which suggests it may not have learned from its earlier experiences.​
    Amidst it all, calls for tighter regulation and stiffer codes abound. This, despite the geographical spread of corporate failures implying that local statutes and codes are probably not a significant contributory factor. Examples of compliance-driven responses include the King V code (South Africa), ISO 37000 standard (global), and Better Boards Act proposal (UK).
    The responses of boards I have been invited to sit with in recent months have been telling: some have circled the wagons, to defend against accusations that they may have been negligent; some have diverted blame elsewhere, such as, management or regulatory burden; and, some board directors have simply walked away, the burden too great.​ Others have decided that focussing attention on what matters (engaging strongly, in pursuit of sustainable performance), is what matters most.
    Given the chatter in business and social circles, and in the media, it would be easy to join in; to berate all and sundry. But let’s not go there. Instead, it is probably more productive to identify activities and behaviours that may have contributed to the situations, in search of learnings:
    • The role of the auditor: Most if not all of the firms mentioned above were attested by their respective auditors to have been reported accurately and operating satisfactorily. Yet, clearly, some were not. Whether the auditors were in cahoots with management, or the board; failing to discharge their duty to provide an accurate and impartial  assessment; or, even, inept, is a matter of speculation in most cases. Regardless, something in the audit world is amiss. To date, few commentators have called out the audit profession as being an accessory.
    • ​​Business knowledge: Remarkably few of the directors of the companies identified here seem to have understood the business of the business they were governing at the time. Often, directors are recruited for their technical skills (notably, legal and accounting expertise) or extant relationships. Relatively few had significant experience in the sector the business operated in. This is consistent with global research by McKinsey, which revealed one director in six possess relevant knowledge. How any board can make an informed decision when most of its directors do not understand the wider operating context well is perplexing.
    • Director engagement and behaviour: Most of the directors of the companies noted here had a classical conception of board work and engagement: They read their papers and attended board meetings, but did little else. The relationship with management was distant and aloof; directors rarely engaged with each other or the company between meetings; and they saw their most important contribution as being the hiring or firing of the chief executive—all characteristics of a board focussed on control, not governance.
    • ​Board involvement in strategy: The boards of all of the firms identified here relied heavily on management to prepare strategy. Directors backed themselves to ask questions and respond to proposals when they were presented. Some delegated strategy approval to management. While most directors appear to have been well-intentioned, the resultant outcomes tell the story. A heavy reliance on management is, clearly, unwise. What of “trust, but verify?” If the board is not involved in the development of strategy in some way, as researchers and commentators increasingly recommend, the likelihood of the board understanding what it is being asked to approve and subsequently providing adequate steerage and guidance is low.​
    If boards are to learn from the failure cases noted here (amongst others), the first and, frankly, most pressing priority is to mitigate apparent weaknesses and focus on what matters. My research suggests that sustainably high levels of firm performance are possible, but they are contingent on several factors, including:
    • Ownership: The board is the apex decision-making authority in every company, meaning it is responsible making the very biggest decisions. Consequently, if the board is to have any influence over performance at all it needs to take responsibility, directly, for the big calls.
    • Purpose: If performance is to be achieved and sustained over time, all contributors need to understand their role and why it is important. Sadly, many directors bypass the ‘why’: they do not understand (and, therefore, cannot describe) why the company exists (activity trumps reason, it seems). Even if they can, directors often do not hold one view. Agreement on why the company exists—its purpose—is crucial: it provides the touchstone against which strategy is formed, all other decisions can be made, and performance assessed.
    • Strategy: Purpose alone is insufficient. Strategy is the course of action required to achieve the agreed purpose. While no one model (of strategy development) fits all situations, the board should roll its sleeves up and get involved in the formulation of strategy, together with management.
    • Effective boardcraft: This is the biggie. My article, Towards more effective corporate governance, paints the picture.​
    Some commentators have suggested that the success of the board is entirely a matter of luck. I disagree. While outcomes are not guaranteed, my doctoral research and experience supporting boards across five continents suggests boards can exert influence beyond the boardroom, including on firm performance. However, this is contingent: they need to focus on ‘the right things’.
    Unless and until boards start taking their responsibility for the performance for the company seriously, the hope of much changing remains, sadly, dim. What is your experience?
  • Published on

    On high-performing boards: unlocking potential

    Accountability Corporate Governance Effectiveness Family Business Governance Leadership Monday Muse Performance Tough Questions
    Picture
    Have you ever stopped to wonder why so many companies fail to realise the potential they aspire to?
    When I speak with directors, the desire to operate at high levels of performance is palpable. In my experience, most say they aspire to have a great impact. But when one looks more closely, a great many boards struggle to break the shackles of average: they are constrained by confusion over the role of the board, impaired by dysfunction within the boardroom, and/or expectations are misaligned.
    A recent survey (conducted by PwC) highlights the characteristics of high-performing boards:
    • strong and effective leadership from the chair
    • strategic vision and focus
    • proactive engagement
    • culture of trust and collaboration
    • pragmatism and responsiveness
    • focus on high-performance [mindset and teamwork]
    • awareness of stakeholder expectations
    • cool in a crisis
    This is quite a list! Yes, it is. But most of these characteristics are consistent with the findings from ground-breaking board research conducted over a decade ago. That research concluded that if the board is to have any impact beyond the boardroom (especially on firm performance), three things matter: 
    • capability (what directors 'bring')
    • activity (what the board does)
    • behaviour (how directors act and interact)
    Board structure and composition is relatively less important, to the point of being insignificant. This finding (now known as the Strategic Governance Framework, see this article for a summary) emerged from a peer-reviewed long-term observation study of boards going about their work—one of a small handful conducted to date. As with studies conducted by the late Jane Goodall, my study sought to get as close as possible to the subject of interest (the board) to observe them in their 'native' habitat. That meant direct observations, for the board only exists when the directors meet.
    Since that time, the Strategic Governance Framework has shown itself to be a useful mechanism to help ambitious boards move beyond orthodoxy and box-ticking, to realise organisational potential. But the embrace of such a mechanism is not without its challenges: it means stepping away from the perceived safety of 'best practice' recommendations—a daunting prospect of some. 
    Ultimately, boards must decide: is compliance with contemporary recommendations, codes and regulations sufficient to discharge duties owed, or is more required? For those who decide more is required, the Strategic Governance Framework ​may be worthy of consideration.