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    Who’s looking at you?

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    Have you ever wondered who is looking at your website, and why? My new website was published seven days ago (well, a very similar website), so I decided to look at the analytics, to get an idea.

    To my astonishment, some 40,600 total visits (page hits) have been recorded over the past seven days, from just over 8500 unique visitors. Extrapolated, that points to over two million page hits per year.

    This sounds impressive. I’m not convinced, and closer inspection shows the numbers are not quite what they seemed at first glance. When ‘include Crawlers/Bots’ is de-selected, a clearer picture emerges: the total visitor count drops to 10600-odd. That about three quarters of the traffic to petercrow.com is not by or from real people is good to know. That they are AI-tools and other systems, hoovering around collecting data justifies our investment in appropriate security. That one-in-five visits is from a mobile device suggests our selection of a tool that provides desktop-, tablet-, and mobile-friendly display options—automatically—was a good decision too.

    Turning to the ‘real visitors’ now. If one-in-four Unique Visitors are not bots, about 2100 people visited the some part of the site over the past seven days. Some (most?) will have been curious about the new site. But others looked at one or more Musings articles; and some have checked some other aspect of the capabilities and credentials material.

    Even if one or two per cent of these ‘real people’ are genuinely interested (20 per week), and ten per cent of these get in touch, my decades-long quest (to provoke candid conversations to help boards can govern with impact) has, probably, been worthwhile. Onward.

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    On boardcraft

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    In recent months, there has been a rising level of interest in Boardcraft. Word is getting out it seems, so a précis is probably timely. Curious? Grab a coffee and read on...

    B​oardcraft is a term I coined: a governance-focused initiative help boards operate well in practice—not just describe on paper what they are supposed to do. At its core, Boardcraft is about treating board work (that is, corporate governance) as a practical craft to help boards move from a compliance mindset to a performance mindset.

    Why is this important? Many boards comply with prevailing statutes and governance codes but they, or the companies they govern, still perform poorly. The underlying problem is a barrier lying in plain sight: one cannot comply their way to performance. 

    Boardcraft offers a pathway forward for boards wanting to perform well and govern with impact. 

    The big shift is this: Effective governance is not a product of structures, policies, or independence per se; it emerges from the quality of thinking, interaction, and decision-making in the boardroom. ​What is more, Boardcraft is not something I dreamt up at a whiteboard or while driving my old car: it is the product of ground-breaking research conducted a decade ago. In essence, it helps boards understand:

    • The capabilities, activities and behaviours necessary if boards are to exert influence beyond the boardroom, especially on organisational performance
    • How to make high-quality decisions together
    • How to handle conflict and disagreement
    • How chairs can lead effective discussions
    • The board's role in shaping strategy, not just approving management's proposals

    Ultimately, Boardcraft is a mindset to help boards improve their judgement, oversight, steerage and guidance; work as a functional group and make great decisions (think: positive board dynamics); and, ultimately, drive high levels of organisational performance. In effect, to govern with impact.

    Boards and directors interested to learn about Boardcraft, the Strategic Governance Framework (the underlying foundation), and how to embrace a Boardcraft mindset in practice have several options:

    • Workshops and board development sessions (half-, full- and two-day options, fully curated)
    • Tailored coaching and mentoring for chairs
    • Governance diagnostics (to assess how well a board functions)
    • Real-world case studies, rather than textbook or theoretical models

    What to learn more? Check this article, and get in touch with your questions. I'm available globally.

    PS: The headline picture is not a photo of me; it is an AI-generated image. Pretty good eh?

  • Published on

    On founder-led businesses and governance

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    Do founder-led businesses always need governance, as many consultants, advisors, and governance professionals assert? 
    My response is straightforward: It depends.
    If, for example, the founder owns all the shares of the company, and is the only director, and runs the business day-to-day, then probably not. But, if the founder wants to grow the company further, and/or they do not want to make all the decisions themselves, and/or they lack some expertise to make good decisions, then it can make sense to gather some people around, appoint them as directors, and get the basics (of corporate governance) underway.

    I made the comments recently, during a wide-ranging conversation with Charlie Meaden, CEO of eccuity. If you are curious about where our 35-minute conversation went, grab a coffee and listen in. And, if you have any questions or feedback (critical or otherwise!), please get in touch. I would be glad to hear from you.

  • Published on

    Is an elephant [in the room] obscuring our view?

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    ​The rise of artificial intelligence capabilities over the past 4–5 decades (you read that correctly, not 4–5 months or even 4–5 years) has brought some awkward questions into stark relief.
    • How might AI enable or impair our strategic priorities?
    • Are the data in management reports to the board accurate, and conclusions credible?
    • As directors, we’re supposed to govern with impact. But what matters most amongst the many priorities in the reports from management—and how might we decide?
    • Are the so-called experts that management keeps putting in front of us actually experts, or are they just AI-junkies who have generated content that appears to be informed?
    These questions, and many others like it, highlight an overarching question that has become very real for many directors, more so as the onset of AI-generated content has started to pervade boardrooms, executive suites and beyond:
    The report behind the question brings the problem into stark relief: Many conclusions developed from academic research and peer-reviewed articles may not be reliable. Indeed, many may not be worth the paper (screen) they are written on, despite the seemingly attractive arguments put up by the authors.
    This being the case, how might directors validate the data and reporting in board packs?
    If boards are to govern with impact, they must first ensure the reports they receive are not only accurate but credible. This is a demanding expectation, but it is the baseline. Fortunately, we are not the first people to ponder this matter: This muse explores some of the core considerations.
    The elephant in the room is not AI, per se; it is the directors’ ability to distinguish between what matters and what does not—the signal and the noise.
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    When time is up, act

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    These past few weeks, I have been acting as an envoy of sorts—a go-between to help tackle some problems that, ultimately, seem to come down to strained relations between shareholders, directors and senior management. While one case is playing out in a rapidly-growing PE-funded entity, and the other in a smaller enterprise, the situations are remarkably similar: the organisations appear to have outgrown the leadership capability of the CEO, and the board and CEO no longer see eye-to-eye.
    In one case, the leader is the founder; in the other, the CEO has led the entity for over two decades. In both, signs of Founder’s Syndrome are apparent. The cases are difficult because the CEOs have led well. But things have changed, and both deny they might be part of the problem, much less that leaving might be the best option for the organisation.
    The cases are proving insightful reminders for me—not only as examples of the destructive impact when behaviours turn negative, but of something most decent management and leadership courses teach: No one is perfect, and no one is indispensable.
    In contrast, consider the actions of these leaders:
    • Sir Rod Drury, founder of Xero and recently-named New Zealander of the Year, has been lauded for his entrepreneurial expertise and success. Yet he stepped away from executive leadership at Xero about a decade ago, and from the board in 2023. The business has not stalled or failed—it has grown bigger and better. 
    • George Washington, the first President of the United States, served for eight years and then retreated to Mt. Vernon, even though he was encouraged to remain President. 
    These men, both highly successful in their respective fields, knew something many chief executives and board directors miss: humility matters. When the time is up, act. Strive to leave on good terms. And, if you think it might be time, it probably is. Chances are, it might be one of the best leadership decisions you make.
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    Towards great: governing with impact

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    In 2018, before mankind was tipped upside down by a global pandemic, the chattering class had been very active, responding vociferously as news of various corporate failures and missteps came to light. Carillion plc and the Institute of Directors (both UK), Steinhoff (South Africa), AMP (Australia), and Fletcher Building (New Zealand) were topical examples. The consternation and angst was palpable.
    That seemingly strong and enduring organisations were failing (or suffering significant missteps) on a fairly regular basis concerned many; for the societal and economic consequences significant. Many commentators (primarily, but by no means exclusively, the media) responded by berating company leaders (specifically, the board and management), placing ‘blame’ squarely at their feet. This is a reasonable: ultimate responsibility for firm performance lies with the board after all.
    Fast forward to 2026, what has changed? Well, if post-Covid failures are any indication, not much. The Post Office scandal in the UK, accounting firm PwC, and Port of Auckland (New Zealand), have been in the news for all the wrong reasons. Wilko (UK), GDK Group (Australia) and Du Val Group (New Zealand) are three amongst many that have collapsed under large debt burdens. Fletcher Building has suffered again too, which suggests it may not have learned from its earlier experiences.
    Amidst it all, calls for tighter regulation and stiffer codes abound. This, despite the geographical spread of corporate failures implying that local statutes and codes are probably not a significant contributory factor. Examples of compliance-driven responses include the King V code (South Africa), ISO 37000 standard (global), and Better Boards Act proposal (UK).
    The responses of boards I have been invited to sit with in recent months have been telling: some have circled the wagons, to defend against accusations that they may have been negligent; some have diverted blame elsewhere, such as, management or regulatory burden; and, some board directors have simply walked away, the burden too great.​ Others have decided that focussing attention on what matters (engaging strongly, in pursuit of sustainable performance), is what matters most.
    Given the chatter in business and social circles, and in the media, it would be easy to join in; to berate all and sundry. But let’s not go there. Instead, it is probably more productive to identify activities and behaviours that may have contributed to the situations, in search of learnings:
    • The role of the auditor: Most if not all of the firms mentioned above were attested by their respective auditors to have been reported accurately and operating satisfactorily. Yet, clearly, some were not. Whether the auditors were in cahoots with management, or the board; failing to discharge their duty to provide an accurate and impartial  assessment; or, even, inept, is a matter of speculation in most cases. Regardless, something in the audit world is amiss. To date, few commentators have called out the audit profession as being an accessory.
    • ​​Business knowledge: Remarkably few of the directors of the companies identified here seem to have understood the business of the business they were governing at the time. Often, directors are recruited for their technical skills (notably, legal and accounting expertise) or extant relationships. Relatively few had significant experience in the sector the business operated in. This is consistent with global research by McKinsey, which revealed one director in six possess relevant knowledge. How any board can make an informed decision when most of its directors do not understand the wider operating context well is perplexing.
    • Director engagement and behaviour: Most of the directors of the companies noted here had a classical conception of board work and engagement: They read their papers and attended board meetings, but did little else. The relationship with management was distant and aloof; directors rarely engaged with each other or the company between meetings; and they saw their most important contribution as being the hiring or firing of the chief executive—all characteristics of a board focussed on control, not governance.
    • Board involvement in strategy: The boards of all of the firms identified here relied heavily on management to prepare strategy. Directors backed themselves to ask questions and respond to proposals when they were presented. Some delegated strategy approval to management. While most directors appear to have been well-intentioned, the resultant outcomes tell the story. A heavy reliance on management is, clearly, unwise. What of “trust, but verify?” If the board is not involved in the development of strategy in some way, as researchers and commentators increasingly recommend, the likelihood of the board understanding what it is being asked to approve and subsequently providing adequate steerage and guidance is low.
    If boards are to learn from the failure cases noted here (amongst others), the first and, frankly, most pressing priority is to mitigate apparent weaknesses and focus on what matters. My research suggests that sustainably high levels of firm performance are possible, but they are contingent on several factors, including:
    • Ownership: The board is the apex decision-making authority in every company, meaning it is responsible making the very biggest decisions. Consequently, if the board is to have any influence over performance at all it needs to take responsibility, directly, for the big calls.
    • Purpose: If performance is to be achieved and sustained over time, all contributors need to understand their role and why it is important. Sadly, many directors bypass the ‘why’: they do not understand (and, therefore, cannot describe) why the company exists (activity trumps reason, it seems). Even if they can, directors often do not hold one view. Agreement on why the company exists—its purpose—is crucial: it provides the touchstone against which strategy is formed, all other decisions can be made, and performance assessed.
    • Strategy: Purpose alone is insufficient. Strategy is the course of action required to achieve the agreed purpose. While no one model (of strategy development) fits all situations, the board should roll its sleeves up and get involved in the formulation of strategy, together with management.
    • Effective boardcraft: This is the biggie. My article, Towards more effective corporate governance, paints the picture.
    Some commentators have suggested that the success of the board is entirely a matter of luck. I disagree. While outcomes are not guaranteed, my doctoral research and experience supporting boards across five continents suggests boards can exert influence beyond the boardroom, including on firm performance. However, this is contingent: they need to focus on ‘the right things’.
    Unless and until boards start taking their responsibility for the performance for the company seriously, the hope of much changing remains, sadly, dim. What is your experience?