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    ICGN'15: The demands on boards in the future

    The second panel discussion of the third (and last) day of the ICGN conference looked to the future. The topic brought together many of the discrete threads from earlier conversations. Here are some of the takeaways:
    • Directors' expectations of themselves are climbing. About 30 hours per board per month is now considered to be average. The trend towards much higher levels of involvement and accountability is well established.
    • There appears to be a significant difference between the amount of time that the directors spend working on the boards of publicly-listed companies and private-held firms. PLC boards tend to be 'low touch' with a monitoring and compliance emphasis, whereas PHF boards tend to be 'high tough' and the focus is on strategy and business performance. 
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    • Boards need to get far more involved with the consideration of strategic options than most do now (cf. my research, which suggests that an active involvement in strategy development is crucial).
    • Most shareholders and institutional investors 'know' that boards need to be involved in strategy development (per the survey result below), yet precious few boards actually take the task of strategy development and strategy management as seriously as the survey suggests is required.
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    • Directors need to be fully informed on all material matters. Suggested channels included formal due diligence; asking probing questions of rhe chair executive during board meetings; eliciting information from multiple sources; asking for information to be presented in a particular format.
    • Boards need to be high-trust environments, whereby directors are free to debate the issues (heatedly sometimes) in the pursuit of an agreed company purpose and strategy.
    • One panel member took the position that expecting that 'board involvement in 'strategy' might be expecting too much from directors (even though directors have a duty of care to make enquiries and become adequately informed.
    These takeaways demonstrate that boards are starting to thinking about future business performance. However, there is much work to do, both by boards to determine an appropriate division of labour between the board and management, and by shareholders to express their wishes more clearly than perhaps now is the case.
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    ICGN'15: On global governance reform

    Sophie L'Helias, Senior Fellow, Governance at Governance Board chaired a very interesting panel discussion. The panel was asked to discuss whether corporate governance had progressed or regressed over the last twenty years (since ICGN was formed). The opening observation was that much had changed, yet much remained the same:
    • Investors hold more power now than they did twenty years ago. Shareholders—institutional investors in particular—now know they can exert influence and many are starting to take this role quite seriously.
    • While activism brings its own challenges (including battles during proxy season), the notion of trying to hold a company and its board accountable for company performance is something institutional investors and smaller shareholders are increasingly aware of.
    • Transparency, accountability, fairness and responsibility are four key principles that feature more often now than in the past. However, the application of such principles is by no means universal.
    • The conceptualisation of corporate governance remains, in the main, one of a policy framework within which shareholders seek to exert influence over performance and outcomes. [note: In this regard, the investor community seems to be some distance behind the research that suggests corporate governance is far more than a structure or a process or a policy framework.]
    • Calls for 'responsible investing' and responsible use of the three capitals—financial (money), human (people) and natural (environmental)—are much more prevalent than ever before.
    This first panel session of the conference provided an interesting opening play, upon which later discussants could build (or otherwise!). The main takeaway for me was that shareholders and boards need to 'grow up'. Looking over the fence at each other (and, in some cases, simply ignoring each other) is not a healthy context for either productive ownership or effective control. Boards were created to bridge between owners and managers, yet many boards seem to be far more interested in pursuing their own interests and priorities (than acting in the best interests of the company or the shareholders). While we appear to have come far, we still have much to learn.
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    ICGN'15: Is it time for a holistic review of financial market regulation?

    The topic of the first plenary of Day #2 of the ICGN conference was whether the time had arrived for an holistic review of the financial market regulatory framework. This question was timely because most of the standard 'hard law' responses (to failure) have done little more than to increase the compliance burden that companies needed to deal with. The panel was quick to acknowledge this. It suggested that an holistic review was needed, and warned that genuine change would only occur if several desirable behaviours (I'd call them 'social commitments') were embraced alongside the hard law responses. The following social commitments were discussed:
    • Trust (between all participants)
    • Ethics and integrity
    • A social compact (to behave well)
    • A positive culture
    This discussion was as interesting as it was disappointing. To the average man in the street, an holistic framework incorporating hard rules and social commitments makes good sense. The disappointment was that the discussion was even needed. Clearly, some boards remain reluctant to make (let alone embrace) the social commitments. Given this, it is little wonder that 'big business' has such a poor reputation amongst the general populace.
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    ICGN'15: A timely call to action

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    Robert AG (Bob) Monks is a experienced shareholder activist and pioneer in corporate governance. The tall octogenarian has spent a lifetime influencing boards and board performance, especially in corporate America. Monks was invited to deliver the keynote address the ICGN conference.
    Monks, a gifted orator, spoke from the heart, and he had the gathered delegates enthralled as he did so. Reviving memories of the wartime leader Winston Churchill, Monks reminded delegates that, while they had come far, they were not at the end (ie. 'arrived') nor were they at the beginning of the end. They were, he said, "at the end of the beginning". He went on to suggest:
    • Boards and shareholders (particularly institutional investors) had barely started on the journey of convincing management that an engaged shareholder more likely to be helpful than a hindrance. I suspect this was a wake-up call for many, particularly those that think they 'do' corporate governance well and that shareholders should be kept at arms' length.
    • Too many chief executives and executive teams had autocratic control of the levers of power. They were feathering their own nest and allocating resources in favour of short-term outcomes—and boards were allowing chief executives to get away with such behaviours. Thus, chief executive accountability is largely a myth.
    • Much of what actually happens in boardrooms is not corporate governance or even an approximation of corporate governance. Rather it is a shadow play, orchestrated to give he appearance of the board doing the things that it should be doing. The statement that corporate governance is a high-profile smokescreen was as telling as it was damning. 
    Monks continued by offering several recommendations to the audience (comprised largely of institutional investor representatives but also other participants in the corporate governance community including academics and advisors). He said that shareholders need to be genuinely engaged (by specifying what they want from their investment); that integrated reporting is crucial (to provide clarity around actual business performance); and, that all publicly-listed companies need to have real (identifiable) owners (to satisfy the engagement challenge.
    Monks received a standing ovation from some of the delegates, such was the power of his oratory and the high esteem in which he is held. One surprise: neither value creation or strategy was mentioned. I wonder what Monks thinks about these activities and the board's role therein. Rather than guess, I'm going to ask him. Congratulations to the conference organisers for securing Bob Monks' contribution to the debate.
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    ICGN'15: Inside the boardroom black box

    For many of us, the boardroom is an opaque structure, whereby those on the outside can only but guess what might (or might not) happen on the inside. And that's the way many directors like it: strong norms of privacy and claims of confidentiality are held up as defences against such things as professionalism and accountability. While many boards try to do their job well, some directors are victims of hubris, arrogance, laziness and, in some more extreme cases, a perception of being above or beyond the law (the slippery slope that often leads to fraudulent activity). It's little wonder that the level of distrust (of directors) is at an all-time high.
    The second plenary of the second day of the ICGN conference tackled the topic of what does (well, should) happen in boardrooms. The panel prized open the corner of the blackbox.Here's some of the takeouts from the discussion:
    • Directors, you need to think about who you represent (Clue: the constituency that put you there is not the correct answer).
    • Many boards focus on risk (at the expense of future performance, value creation and shareholder wishes) far too much.
    • All boards have a culture, but not all board cultures are aligned with corporate culture.
    • Groupthink is an ever-present problem for boards. Diversity can help.
    • The highest standards of integrity and probity are crucial, and especially so for the chairman. If either of these are compromised or perceived by others to be compromised, then the director concerned needs to leave the board, immediately.
    • High levels of trust between directors and with the chief executive are crucial, to provide a suitable foundation for vigorous debate to occur.
    • Boards need reliable / accurate / unfiltered information to make informed decisions. That which is received via the chief executive is, often, biassed in some way. The panel thought board–staff conversation was to be encouraged (within an agreed framework or protocol) as a means of eliciting a more complete picture.
    • "What happens in the boardroom stays in the boardroom".
    My experience, both as a serving director and as a silent observer is that the characteristics listed above are probably necessary to board effectiveness. However, they are by no means sufficient  nor do they necessarily guarantee business performance outcomes will be achieved.
    I was surprised that little attention was paid by the panel to time splits (compliance / monitoring / forming future strategy) or to the importance of strategy as a board agenda item. This would have been useful guidance for serving directors. However, it is probably a touchy subject. Most directors 'know' how much time they perhaps should spend on strategy (and they'll 25–40 per cent if asked), whereas most boards actually spend far less time on this activity (typically five per cent). Perhaps this discrepancy is a source of embarrassment to directors and, therefore, it does not get discussed. Notwithstanding this, this discussion as probably the most useful of the conference to date—because it was about boards and what boards [should] do (ie. corporate governance).
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    ICGN'15: integrated reporting update

    The 20th ICGN conference is underway. While the annual meeting and official welcome signalled the start of the conference, ICGN committee meetings and lunchtime panel discussions were scheduled, to fit everything into the thee-day window. Claudia Kruse chaired a very interesting lunchtime panel discussion on integrated reporting. The IIRC's Corporate Reporting Dialogue (CRD) was launched twelve months ago, and it was the panel's purpose to discuss the progress made and to solicit feedback from the gathered members.
    ICGN has bee an active proponent of 'tidying up' reporting. The aim of integrated reporting is to provide a representative view of how the company is actually performing. After a brief summary provided by the panel, the time was turned over to attendees, to ask questions and discussion:
    • The panel acknowledged the perennial chestnut, of who wants IR was briefly mentioned. Panel members indicated a dichotomy exists whereby some think IR is an investor-led initiative, and others think it is (or should be) management-led. While the question was not opened fully, I found the possibility that any group other than the shareholders or the board might initiate anything. Yet boards hardly rated a mention during the entire conversation. This, despite the board being a proxy representative of shareholders!
    • I found it interesting that 'value creation' was offered as a key driver for integrated reporting, and that "proper reporting leads to better corporate governance". Really?
    While I am a strident fan of transparency and straightforward reporting, I couldn't help but think that the approach the IIRC and ICGN is following has missed the boat somewhat. Integrated reporting has been conceptualised as being management-led activity, and that "proper reporting leads to better corporate governance. Yet the elephant in the room (if I can mix metaphors) is that integrated reported has been conceptualised by the ICGN team as being a management activity. The board was mentioned rarely during the entire panel discussion, even though the board is supposed to be accountable for company performance. Another challenge for the ICGN working group is that the focus is almost entirely on publicly-listed companies. I asked the question and, for my troubles, may have 'volunteered' to working out if and how integrated reporting might apply in a privately-held company context. 
    Notwithstanding these challenges, the fact the ICGN is asking the question and looking for ways to bridge between the different reporting requirements of different jurisdictions is good, really good. I look forward to future updates and, possibly, to contributing the the 'privately-held' part of the discussion.