Accountability - Peter Crow | Helping boards govern with impact

Published on: 30 September 2016

On the cusp of something big?

The last five years of my life have been dominated by research—the goal being to begin to understand how boards influence firm performance through their contributions in the boardroom. It's been a tough journey at times, but the end is now in sight—and thank goodness because a groundswell of interest in how my research might be applied to real situations is starting to become apparent. People in Australia; the UK; Europe; USA; South-east Asia; the Middle East; and, New Zealand have been in touch with questions and requests.

While the research is yet to be published, enquiries are arriving from many quarters including invitations to write an editorial for a leading magazine; speak at the Governance Institute of Australia National Conference; participate in a multi-city (Europe and Asia) speaking tour in 2017; prepare a webcast; and, write a book for practicing directors. These are on top of confirmation from the prestigious Leadership and Organization Development Journal that an article of mine will be published soon (Vol 37, Issue 8), and earlier commitments to deliver a webinar to a world-wide audience; tailor a governance development programme for members of an industry association; and, facilitate several workshops to help companies refine their corporate purpose, strategy and governance frameworks.

That so many people have begun to question 'conventional' corporate governance thinking (that the board and management must be kept separate; that particular board structural configurations lead to better firm performance; and, that the term 'governance' can be widely applied including beyond the boardroom) has caught me somewhat by surprise. However, my commitment to serve boards and directors who are intent on exerting influence from the boardroom in pursuit of an agreed corporate purpose is a matter of public record. So respond I shall (and happily so).

If you want to ask a question or toss around some ideas, please get in touch. I look forward to the discussion.

Published on: 4 September 2016

Making an impact on performance, from the top

One of the great challenges all business leaders face is the question of how to make an impact on the overall performance of the firm they lead. Boards are no exception. Effective boards are comprised of capable people who assess situations, make strategic decisions, and oversee management to ensure goals are achieved.

The challenge of leading well and making an impact on business performance is very real, especially in today's environment of fluid work patterns and declining levels of employee loyalty. Boards are responsible for company performance, yet they do not run companies directly (that is the job of the chief executive). How might boards respond to ensure firm performance goals are actually achieved?

Here are some considerations:

Boards need to accept that responsibility for overall business performance lies with them, not the chief executive.
The overall purpose of the business (i.e., its reason for being) must be both clearly defined (board responsibility) and well communicated (chief executive responsbility).
A carefully crafted strategy (to achieve the purpose) needs to be developed (ideally, by the board and management, together) and implemented.
Business systems and processes need to be optimised to expedite effective collaboration; teamwork; and, ensure the information that people need to do their job effectively is available when they need it.

The importance of this last consideration should not be underestimated: if employees cannot collaborate effectively because crucial information is missing or hard to access, overall performance will suffer—period. The impact on employee morale, productivity and the bottom line is likely to be very significant.

The board needs to know how the business is performing relative to the agreed strategy, and the whether expected outcomes and associated benefits are being achieved (or not). Financial reports only tell part of the story. Employee engagement is an important though often overlooked indicator. If your board isn't sure whether employees are fully engaged, it needs ask the chief executive some probing questions; request a staff engagement survey; seek regular updates from senior managers (in addition to the chief executive); or, pursue some combination of these and other options (*). If employee engagement is low or any inconsistencies are discovered, weak information flows or ineffective collaboration within the company and/or with customers are likely to be contributing factors—a starting point for further investigation and subsequent decision-making.

(*) Boards that lack direct expertise to actively pursue these suggestions themselves should seek independent advice from a seasoned expert, to help them understand what might be possible, establish benchmarks and inform future board decisions. A long-time colleague of mine, Michael Sampson, is one such person. He is an expert in the fields of workforce collaboration, teamwork and new approaches to work. Michael also speaks at conferences around the world and has written several books. I commend him to you.

Published on: 1 September 2016

Corporate governance in the UK: What is the real problem?

When Theresa May went on record recently, the key message for boards was that they needed to pull their socks up lest additional structural measures including employee directors become a requirement for UK companies. Much of the commentary was aimed at the boards of publicly-listed companies, in an attempt to curb (perceived and real) corporate excess in the form of excessive remuneration; hubris; and, a flagrant disregard of some stakeholders.

Today, ICSA: The Governance Institute announced that it had written to the Prime Minister calling for the boards of privately-held companies to be held to the same levels of accountability and disclosure as publicly-listed firms. This request seems perfectly reasonable, especially as the UK Companies Act 2006 applies to all companies.

The UK statute is clear: directors (actually, boards because it is boards that make decisions) are required to consider the long-term consequences of their decisions and the impact on employees and the community. Good practice suggests that boards should, amongst the things, keep shareholders informed (through the board's annual report to shareholders) of its activities.

ICSA is right to raise the issue, but will enforced compliance with codes of practice fix the problem?

If boards act within the law and in accordance with codes of practice as they pursue business objectives, then letters such as the one written by ICSA should not be necessary. But they don't. Some directors and boards take liberties. Enough examples have come to light in recent years (e.g., HSBC, FIFA, Volkswagen, Fonterra, Solid Energy, Toshiba and, most recently, BHS) to suggest that some boards knowingly run close to or beyond boundaries defined in law. But where does the real problem lie? Is it with the law, the principles-based codes of practice; the directors themselves; or, something else entirely?

Consider this: The road toll has not declined as a direct result of increased enforcement measures but rather a change of behaviour—drivers choosing to driver safer vehicles more carefully. Are boards any different? If boards are analogous to drivers, probably not. Unless and until boards make a conscious decision to embrace company performance as an important priority, and to do so in accordance with both established law and published codes of practice, I suspect the media will continue to be gainfully employed.

Finally, shareholders have an important and oft overlooked contribution to make. Recent experience suggests that greater care is needed in the appointment process, to ensure only suitably capable directors who are intent on acting in the best interests of the company are appointed to boards. In addition, shareholders should not overlook their right to hold directors to account including dismissing those who fail to discharge their legal duties or exercise requisite care and attention.

Published on: 30 August 2016

Building board capability: London, in September

How time flies. In just two weeks' time (14–20 Sept), I will be back in London again—this time to attend the Organizations with Purpose conference at the London Business School (thank you for the invitation), and to continue discussions with ICSA: The Governance Institute and others intent on building board capability. To serve boards and directors in the UK is truly an honour—I am looking forward to sharing ideas with colleagues and clients, and to meeting new acquaintances as well.

While my diary is filling fast, I have room for a few more discussions. Please get in touch if you want to discuss emerging board practice trends, explore the possibility of me speaking at an event or with your board, or learn how to use my latest research findings to improve board practice and business performance. I'd be delighted to hear from you and look forward to scheduling a meeting (daytime or over dinner, whatever is best for you).

Published on: 26 August 2016

Come hither employee directors?

British Prime Minister, Theresa May caught the attention of many recently when she raised the possibility of requiring companies to reserve positions on company boards for employee directors. This proposal, which was suggested amongst other measures as a means of curbing perceived corporate excess in the UK, has received a mixed response, including support from the Institute of Directors and wonderment from others.

Increased diversity has been associated with improved decision quality, so including employee directors at the board table should be to the organisation's advantage, shouldn't it? On the surface, yes. However, experience tells us that one of the very real challenges of reserving places on boards, be it via a gender-based quota mechanism (e.g., Norway) or to provide a voice for an interest group (e.g., parent representatives on school boards), is that people bring baggage. Representation is a problem: candidates appointed because they meet the representation criteria often struggle to act in the best interests of the organisation when they take their position at the table.

The conflict (of interest) that employee directors face is even tougher to manage because it is directly personal. On one hand, employee directors are paid to perform work and implement strategies, while on the other they are expected to make decisions in the best interest of the company. Decisions made in the boardroom may not be to the employees advantage (e.g., to close a loss-making division, resulting in job losses). To expect an employee director to subordinate their personal and collegial interests in favour of what might be best for the company is likely to be a tall order; it may not even be realistic.

Yet the German experience (one of the most successful economies since World War II) suggests that the inclusion of employee directors can be made to work. But the German system of corporate governance is framed on the notion of two-tier boards, and employee directors sit on upper (supervisory) board not the executive board where the important strategic decisions are made. Also, supervisory boards normally only meet a few times each year, meaning the focus is more directly one of oversight, in a manner not dissimilar to an annual general meeting of shareholders in the unitary system.

If the corporate excess that May has called out is to be corralled (as it should be), the underlying basis of corporate governance (the means by which companies are directed and controlled) should be reviewed. A holistic review is needed to ensure the addition of specific measures (e.g., representative positions) does not inadvertently introduce other problems like suboptimal decision-making. Any review needs to extend beyond board structure and composition to the behaviour of directors and the activities of boards. Directors themselves also need to take responsibility for their actions; invest time understanding the business of the business; and, take their commitment to act in the best interests of the company seriously. I've written and spoken about this many times in the past. If directors embrace these suggestions, enforced structural provisions (e.g., representative groups) may no longer be required. But this relies on directors behaving well and doing 'the right thing', a reliance that has a chequered history.

Published on: 9 August 2016

Poor corporate governance or plain fraud? Where's the line?

South Africa's flag carrier, South African Airways, has hit turbulence. Severe turbulence. The airline, which is in financial trouble as a result, most probably, of some poor decisions in the past, has been negotiating a debt refinancing package. However, the package reportedly contains some unusual characteristics (read: extremely high fees). Now, a staff member has blown the whistle; the board has been called out; and, the matter is being investigated.

Even a cursory inspection suggests that something is amiss, and badly so. Problems that seem to stem from poor decision-making at the top of the organisation appear to be endemic. Whether the underlying driver is greed, hubris, corruption, ineptitude or something else remains to be seen. Regardless, South African Airways is in trouble. The board appears to be missing in action and the 'corruption' word has been mentioned making situation very messy, to say the least.

Sadly, SAA is not an isolated case. Recently, Sir Philip Green fell from grace; and, it was not that long ago that FIFA, Toshiba and Volkswagen suffered 'setbacks'. It's little wonder that hard working people have any time for boards of directors. The sources of governance failure are well-storied. However, the natural response—hard law—has done little to improve things (because people who want to generally find their way around things that inhibit them). Different measures are required, perhaps starting with culture, values and purpose. Board appointment processes also need to change. Unless and until 'bad eggs' are exorcised from boardrooms and held to account, the actions of a few will, no doubt, continue to make life hard for the rest of the director community.

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