Tags

  • Published on

    On democracy, morals and business performance

    Accountability Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Societal Wellbeing
    Image description
    As 2015 gives way to 2016, many people will be reflecting on the past and looking to the future; thinking about what was and what might have been. I'm no different. One of the books I've been reading while pondering the past and the future this week is The Servile Mind by Kenneth Minogue. A friend recommended it—he wondered whether the commentary might be applicable to directors and boards. My response, having read half of the book so far, is an unreserved 'yes'! Here's the note on the flyleaf:
    One of the grim comedies of the twentieth century was that miserable victims of communist regimes would climb walls, sim rivers, dodge bullets, and find other desperate ways to achieve liberty  the West at the same time that progressive intellectuals would sentimentally proclaim that these very regimes were the wave of the future. A similar tragicomedy is playing out in our century: as the victims of despotism and backwardness from Third World nations pour into Western States, academic and intellectuals present Western life as a nightmare of inequality and oppression.
    In The Servile Mind: How Democracy Erodes the Moral Life,​ Kenneth Minogue explores the intelligentsia's love affair with social perfection and reveals how that idealistic dream is destroying exactly what has made the inventive Western world irresistible to the peoples of foreign lands. The Servile Mind looks at how Western morality has evolved into mere "politico-moral" posturing about admired ethical causes—from solving world poverty and creating peace to curing climate change. Today, merely making the correct noises and parading one's essential decency by having the correct opinions has become a substitute for individual moral responsibility.
    Instead, Minogue argues, we ask that our governments carry the burden of soling our social—and especially moral—problems for us. The sad and frightening irony is that the more we allow the state to determine our moral order and inner convictions, the more we need to be told how to behave and what to think.
    Humbly, I commend this book to all directors who want to govern well and make a difference in 2016.
  • Published on

    Accountability. Is it too much to ask?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Performance
    History is littered with many stories of corporate successes and, sadly, almost as many failures. Why do some companies perform well over the long term while others become abject failures? Is it, as Jim Collins remarked in Good to great, a matter of luck, or is some other factor at play? While luck and environmental factors can be influential, I suspect there's more to it. A common thread that seems to weave its way through many of the success (Ford, GE, Johnson & Johnson, Xero, Facebook) and failure stories (Pan-Am, Enron, WorldCom, Satyam, and Toshiba, amongst many others) is captured in the title of this posting: Accountability.
    All directors hold, by law, a fiduciary responsibility. In Australia, New Zealand (where I live) and many other commonwealth countries, that responsibility is to the company. In the USA, it is to shareholders. Tellingly, it is never to self (despite some directors behaving as if it was!). If directors are to serve shareholders (who appoint them) and also the wider stakeholder community well, moral fortitude ​is a requirement, as is competence and engagement.
    The role of the director is one of service; of acting (read: considering information and making decisions) in the best interests of another party; and, ultimately, of being accountable for decisions made. Consequently, directors cannot afford to be asleep at the board table, nor be selfish in decision-making. Performance, accountability and ethics needs to take precedence over reputation and prestige.
  • Published on

    When is the best time for a board to ask probing questions? Now.

    Accountability Decision Making Governance Performance
    Image description
    As a director, where does 'risk' feature in your considerations? Is risk something that gets close attention only when a major proposal is being considered around the board table or when a significant and unforeseen problem occurs? Away from major events, is risk something associated with a register of items (that receives cursory attention)? And whose job is it to identify and manage risk in a company, anyway?
    Should boards rely on management to report both accurately and well, or do boards need to probe? If boards wait on management, as happened at the Christchurch Council a few years ago, the board is entirely dependent on the propensity of management to report risks both accurately and in a timely manner. If they do, well and good. If not, the consequences can be dire.
    Boards have a duty of care to ensure resources are applied well and that expected results are achieved. Verification is a crucial—to ensure projects are on track, that expected outcomes are being achieved, that material risks are being identified and that satisfactory mitigations are established. ​To monitor is insufficient.
    To remain silent and to rely on management reporting (only) is to abdicate one's responsibility. Take this current case, a project that has been allowed to run 100 per cent over budget. What got in the road of objective scrutiny? Hubris, ineptitude, incompetence or something more sinister? Might this problem have been avoided if hard questions were asked early on? Directors need to remember their fiduciary duty. The priority is to serve the company, not self. 
    Directors need to be as cunning as foxes, checking and probing from several angles, in case a problem lies in wait. The best time to ask probing questions is 'now', before it's too late.
  • Published on

    Are you onboard or overboard?

    Accountability Decision Making Governance Performance Strategy Tough Questions
    This muse is the second in an occasional series being written over the holiday period entitled Tough questions about boards. The first muse considered the question of board size. This one looks at board commitment, by asking the question:
    • How many directorships is it 'reasonable' for a competent director to hold at any one time?
    The number of concurrent board appointments is a touchy topic for some directors, especially those who think in terms of turning and contributing 'on-the-fly'. How any director can expect to make meaningful a contribution without reading reports and thinking critically about the matters at hand well in advance of the actual board meeting is beyond me. I've written about this before. Then, I suggested that four concurrent directorships (of mid-cap publicly-listed or privately-held companies) was a reasonable upper limit for any director that hoped to make a meaningful contribution to board discussions, decision-making and, ultimately, company performance.
    The feedback at the time suggested the commentary struck a nerve, and that change was coming. Now, two years on, I'm not so sure. A conversation with a colleague earlier this week leads me to believe not much has changed. The colleague recounted a conversation he had with a director who off-handedly said that ten boards was her working maximum. "Beyond that, things get a bit hectic", she apparently said. Imagine that: ten boards! She must have a big brain to hold the details of ten companies, and know something about time management that most of us don't. However, that director is not alone, ​if the stories in this article are any indication. 
    Why do boards and shareholders continue to ask busy people, including so-called celebrity directors, to join their boards when there are literally hundreds of highly competent director candidates (with sufficient space in their diary to learn the business well and make a meaningful contribution) available to choose from? Have they/we lost sight of why boards exist and of their role in value creation? On the evidence above, perhaps we have.
  • Published on

    On 'corporate governance': Is our understanding flawed?

    Accountability Decision Making Governance Performance Tough Questions
    ​One of the enduring questions of my career as a board advisor and company director is this:
    • When and how did our predeliction for the term 'corporate governance' emerge?
    ​My father was a company director, of a large processor in the dairy sector for fifteen years. He hadn't heard of the term until six months before he retired in 2001, when a young director who had recently joined the board started using the term. To that point, my father thought that directors governed and provided direction, and he was not alone.
    Picture
    A search back in time reveals that Eells (a researcher) was the first to use the term—in 1960—to describe the functioning of the polity (the board). Then, silence reigned until 1977 when the term appeared in HBR and subsequently in 1980 in academic journals. Yet since 2000, when the term entered the public's consciousness (perhaps as a result of media reports of hubris, incompetence, moral failures and fraud amongst directors), usage has exploded.
    ​Today, the term's usage has become so commonplace and distorted that a correction is needed.
    ​Corporate governance--the act of steering, guiding and piloting—describes what boards [should] do when in session. It does not describe and is not a proxy for the board itself, nor any other party or activity outside the boardroom. Regulators (to set rules), proxy advisers (lobbyists on behalf of shareholders and other interests), and shareholder meetings (communications) are all important, but none is corporate governance.
    Rob Campbell, your call to address this misunderstanding is both timely and most welcome. Directors institutes, business schools and consultants should take note, lest the expectations of the market, regulators and shareholders—not to mention directors themselves—wander further away from their original purpose, which is to pursue business performance in the best interests of the company and on behalf of shareholders.
  • Published on

    The 'perfect' board size??

    Accountability Governance Leadership Performance
    What is the 'perfect' size for a board of directors? The debate has waxed and waned for years. Shareholders, nominating committees, researchers and boards themselves have asked a range of questions as they have tried to address the conundrum:
    • ​How many directors are required to get the work of the board done?
    • What is the ideal balance between quality and quantity?
    • At what point does cost become a burden (vs. value)?​
    Answers to these questions have proved to be elusive. The reason? Context. Every situation that boards need to consider is, to some extent at least, unique. Consequently, a broad range of skills and expertise is needed in the boardroom, to address different issues that come up at different times. A configuration that works well for one situation may not work well elsewhere. Consider these vignettes:
    • What about a small board of three or four directors? One small board that I was on (four directors) was great at making decisions quickly, which was helpful for the fast-moving context within which the high-growth company operated. However, we really struggled when one director was absent. On several occasions, we found ourselves reaching for external help because vital skills were not present at the table. The board discussed the matter at length. A decision was made to petition the shareholders for a larger director's fees pool, a cheaper and more effective option that paying external advisors for assistance. Sadly, the petition was never presented: the company was acquired soon thereafter.
    • What about a bigger board, to deal with a range of complex issues? Last year, I was asked to evaluate a board with eighteen (yes, eighteen) directors. When they were asked about board meetings and board practices, the directors said that meetings "took forever", that group dynamics were "overly complex" and that several directors were "passengers": clues that something was wrong. After further discussion, including the desire to move in a new direction (purpose and strategy were MIA), one of the recommendations to emerge was to ask shareholders to consider reducing the board size to nine directors, via a 24-month transition period of fourteen directors. The recommendation was accepted, and both board effectiveness and company performance improved as a result.
    These two cases demonstrate some of the typical challenges faced by small and large boards. While the best answer to the title question is 'it depends', a sweet spot does exist. Boards with between six and nine directors is about right—as Tracy Hickman reports—because board effectiveness seems to peak somewhere in this range. My research suggests bears this out. Boards with fewer than six directors have great dynamics and decisions are generally made quickly. However, small boards often struggle to deal with an array of strategic options, decisions and monitoring tasks. In contrast, group dynamics start to become unwieldy when the board size reaches double digits. Big boards are also expensive to run and the risk of passenger-directors increases markedly!
    ​If you'd like to know more about how to improve board effectiveness, or want to schedule a board review, please get in touch.