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    Director's fees: Please sir, can we have some more?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Strategy
    The results of the annual director remuneration survey are in. (Read the media release here, and press reports here and here.) Fees have climbed about four per cent in the last twelve months, slightly ahead of CPI. The survey results also indicate that director workload has increased by 41 per cent over the same period.
    A cursory analysis suggests that the workload increase is, to a large extent, a consequence of increased compliance requirements: more rules and regulations. While a 'more work, more pay' argument is eminently justifiable, is it fair? Moves to increase directors' fees as a consequence of increased compliance workload may deliver an unintended consequence: a back-to-the-future experience. Boards are likely to become more defensive and cautious, contributing relatively little to what they are there for—the pursuit of company performance.
    Rather than peg directors fees to time and compliance activity, it might be more productive to ask whether company value (however that might be expressed) is growing as a consequence of board contributions. Many leading commentators (Bob Monks, Bob Garratt, Morten Huse and Richard Leblanc, amongst others) have suggested that boards need to become more strategic, by looking to the future. Yet statutes and regulations cannot be ignored. Boards and shareholders need to wrestle with this tension. Questions of strategy, decision-making, division of labour, accountability and ethics need to be debated and resolved. Ultimately, viable resolutions are most likely to emerge from a joint commitment to the long-term purpose of the company.
    The board needs to drive company performance in pursuit of shareholder wishes, while also ensuring that statutory and regulatory requirements are appropriately satisfied. If the board demonstrably leads the company forward, and does so in accordance with both the agreed purpose of the company and relevant statutes, shareholders are unlikely to baulk at proposals to reward the contributions of directors appropriately.
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    Internships: a vehicle for getting aspiring directors up to speed?

    Accountability Governance Performance
    The ‘profession’ of company direction seems to be beset with an interesting challenge: how can or should aspiring directors be introduced to boardrooms without compromising the quality of oversight and effectiveness of the board? A range of responses have been tried, with varying degrees of success. Might internships be a viable option? Thanks to the folk at Ethical Boardroom, I've had the honour of contributing to the debate. Click here to read to commentary, published in the Summer issue of Ethical Boardroom magazine.
    If you'd like to know more, or to engage a hearty debate, please get in touch.
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    On the sources (and a possible remedy) of so-called "governance failure"

    Accountability Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Research Strategy
    The much-storied scandals at FIFA, HSBC and Toshiba have highlighted a plethora of weaknesses in the way large companies are led and run. Fingers have been pointed and blame apportioned. Management has copped a fair bit of flak, but the board has not been immune either. While the media has had a field day, finger pointing and broad statements provide little comfort to those in pursuit of long-term performance. Remedies are required.
    Reputability has studied a number of failures recently(*), in pursuit of remedies. The analysis identified nine prominent categories of weakness, the first six of which were influential in the majority of failures:
    • Board skill and NED control
    • Board risk blindness
    • Defective information to or from board
    • Leadership on ethos and culture
    • Risk from incentives
    • Risk from complexity
    • Risk glass ceiling
    • Charismatic leader
    • Poor crisis management
    When these factors are considered holistically, the stark implication is that failure appears to be associated with board weakness in at least three areas (engagement, strategy and risk). If boards are to make effective contributions, these weaknesses need to be resolved. And therein lies a challenge: a return to first principles, and a different conception of corporate governance is likely to be necessary. Will boards embrace such a change in pursuit of better business performance? Let's hope so.
    (*) The full Reputability Report, entitled Deconstructing failure—Insights for boards, is available here.
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    The Toshiba case: Is it time to re-think our understanding of corporate governance?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Performance
    These seemingly innocuous statements are telling: Fix the compliance and the problem will be fixed. Yet history (Olympus, HSBC, FIFA, amongst many others) shows otherwise. Neither the 'monitor and comply' conception of corporate governance, nor the 'advise and monitor' variant espoused by many corporate governance codes and directors' institutes have achieved the desired outcomes. Yet, many boards dogmatically pursue such conceptions. 
    The problem seems to be more fundamental. The contemporary conception of corporate governance seems to be flawed. Consider these statements, which highlight the problem:
    How many more failures will it take to realise that additional layers of regulation and compliance-oriented boards that operate as policemen don't actually add value? How many more failures will it take to acknowledge that a new understanding of corporate governance and appropriate board practice might be appropriate? Emerging research seems to suggest that when boards adopt a strategic orientation, and corporate governance is re-conceived as a value-creating mechanism, increased performance is not only possible—it is potentially sustainable. Please get in touch if you'd like to know more.
    The now very public overstatement of profits at Toshiba (approximately US$1.22bn over six years) has led to the downfall of the chief executive, Mr Hisao Tanaka (below), and seven other senior managers, all of whom were also board directors. The share price has taken a 25 per cent hit and the company's reputation is in tatters. What a mess. At least there is a modicum of accountability and remorse, something sadly lacking in many other cases including HSBC and Lombard Finance. 
    Thankfully, people have begun thinking about what needs to change. So far, the response has followed a predictable course: The possibility of appointing independent directors to replace the disgraced directors has been mooted. Will this structural response be enough to fix the problem? Maybe, but I'm not convinced. Compliance responses rarely lead to sustainable change. (The compelling case is Sarbanes–Oxley: created post-Enron, it did little to prevent the GFC.) 
  • Published on

    Success attributed to board: Lessons for all

    Accountability Decision Making Governance Leadership Research Strategy
    How valuable is a board of directors to the performance of the business it governs? Does it influence business performance; or does it act as a policeman, "simply" monitoring the chief executive; and, do we even know? Many have attempted to answer this question. More often than not, the responses have been based on statistical analyses of secondary data (surveys, questionnaires, public data). Descriptions of what actually occurs in the boardroom typically remain hidden. Insights from direct observations of boards in action or from first-hand interviews are rare, so it pays to take note when they become available—as occurred when Nigel Bamford, chief executive of fireplace manufacturer Escea went on record this week. His comments, reported here, provide some interesting insights for boards to consider:
    The Bamford interview provides a much-needed glimpse into the boardroom of a successful company. However, and thankfully, the Escea experience is not unique. The insights are consistent with emerging research about what boards need to do if they are to exert influence on business performance. Consequently, important questions for your own board to consider include:
    • The Escea board meets monthly, for two hours per meeting. Despite this small amount of time spent together, the board manages to monitor past performance and look ahead. This suggests that the chairman has a disciplined approach to meeting protocol, and that the board has at least one eye on the future success of the business.
    • The board is comprised of directors with "a whole range of different perspectives and different disciplines". Decision quality appears to have benefited as a consequence.
    • That the board is comprised of three company founders and two external directors suggests that technical independence (as promoted in many corporate governance codes) is not necessary for board effectiveness including effective decision-making.
    • The emphasis in Bamford's comments is on debate and diversity of thought. Gender and other forms of observable diversity were not mentioned.
    • The Chief Executive expects the board to 'add value' by challenging proposals and driving the decision-making process.
    • A one-size-fits-all approach to board practice and corporate governance is not appropriate.
    • While the Escea board looks ahead, strategy was not explicitly mentioned. Whether the board works with management on the development of strategy, or critiques strategic options and proposals presented by management is unclear.
    Bamford's final comment is perhaps the most telling. "In time, a board is useful for all businesses of reasonable scale and ambition." Two important lessons emerge from it:
    • Formalised boards and board practices are helpful once ambitious (growth oriented) businesses have achieved reasonable scale, and if attention is focussed on the future.
    • Formalised board structures and practices are not always necessary (beyond statutory requirements), especially very small businesses where the same person or group of people both own the company shares and manage the business. Meet your statutory requirements but don't burden the business with unnecessary corporate governance and board practices. They are not required.
    • How might the insights discussed here help your board lift its performance in pursuit of business success and value creation?
    • Might a discussion at your next board meeting, to consider the appropriateness of your current board practices be useful? 
  • Published on

    An interesting twist in the Hanover Finance case

    Accountability Decision Making Governance Performance
    The demarcation between the responsibilities of directors and promoters and those of shareholders was made plain in the Hanover Finance case today. The Financial Markets Authority filed a civil suit against six named parties (five directors and one shareholder), following the collapse of the business several years ago, and a decision by the Serious Fraud Office to abandon criminal charges. The FMA has been pursuing the parties for a couple of years. Now, today, an $18M out of court settlement has been announced. However, there is a catch.
    Five of the six parties (the directors, excluding the named shareholder) were named. The sixth party, well-known businessman Eric Watson, refused to admit he was a promoter of the company (as claimed by the FMA). Consequently, he has avoided being named as a party to the settlement. Thus, the decision demonstrates the distinction between the responsibilities of directors (to make decisions and bear consequences) and those of shareholders (liability is limited to loss of equity).
    One final point. The response of the directors was interesting, to say the least. The directors continue to deny any liability for wrong-doing—even though they agreed to the settlement. Huh? A company has failed. The directors knowingly made major decisions including the issuance of prospectus documentation and they promoted the prospectus. Agreement to settle (funded by insurers, no doubt) implies culpability at some level you would think. Yet liability is denied. Doesn't that sound a bit odd?