I've been involved in several discussions about risk management recently, including one at a Business Leaders Forum hosted by Grant Thornton. Most of the discussions have centred on the struggles that Boards face in managing risk—and more specifically, ensuring they are adequately informed. In listening to people, I've discovered many Boards struggle in this area. 

• How do Boards know all relevant risks are being notified?
• How big (or small) should risks be before they are reported? What is relevant?

Let's tackle the second question first. In most organisations, management has the responsibility to implement strategy. Therefore, they also have the responsibility to identify and manage risk. In doing so, management should raise (with the Board) all risks that have the potential to compromise their implementation of strategy—together with mitigation plans. Anything with a strategic impact should be reported. If Boards are not receiving relevant risk information, they should go looking for it.

That leads nicely to the first question. In my [direct though anecdotal] experience, most risk information tends to arrive via management. Though the common pathway, it is not without its problems. Many Risk Managers report up though the CEO. Even external Auditors tend to be retained by the CFO and report via the CEO. And therein lies the problem. Who decides what gets reported to the Board? Why would a CEO notify a risk that exposes him/her to extra work and/or uncomfortable questions from the Board? Oh, the foibles of human nature... 

Whereas most Boards receive risk information via the CEO, several of the high performing Boards that I've worked with seek and debate risk information directly—from staff, customers, outside advisors. They also do so in the context of strategy. Boards that open several channels are more likely to be adequately informed and, consequently, be better positioned to assess strategy implementation and ensure risks are managed effectively.

Boards need to ensure that they are adequately informed, and the best way to do that is to work directly with a range of internal and external sources. While this approach sounds straightforward, it has the potential to cause angst amongst management if not handled well. The CEO should be kept fully informed of risk discussions, and, ideally, be present when external advisors make presentations to the Board.

One final point. If risk mitigations are not being implemented effectively, and the achievement of strategy is being compromised as a result, then the Board should replace the CEO.

Against a backdrop of greed, examples of New Zealand companies taking a strong ethical stand and "doing the right thing" are starting to emerge. This week, Keith Turner, Chair of publicly-listed company Fisher & Paykel Appliances was reported as saying that his approach was to resist trading (in FPA shares) while the Board was debating and commercially analysing ideas that could have material value implications. This strong ethical stance—based on what is best for the company—bodes well for the somewhat sullied reputation that governance boards have suffered recently.

Well done FPA Board, your ethical stance is an example that others should follow.

A seemingly small—but ultimately quite significant—statement emerged from the corporate governance sector this week. The CEO of one of New Zealand's larger companies went on record when announcing the company's annual result. He stated that his directors must act in the best interests of the company (not the shareholder).

Meridian chief executive Mark Binns said the company would take time to evaluate the situation but would ultimately come to a decision that was in the best interests of Meridian Energy Limited. ''The obligations of the directors are very clearly set out in companies law and the Companies Act, that is to act in the best interests of the company.''

This was a refreshing statement, because most directors and executives (in New Zealand) incorrectly believe their role is to act in the best interests of the shareholder. Research conducted in 2010 by Dr James Lockhart indicated that the majority of directors in New Zealand simply do not understand their legal obligations. The New Zealand Company Act is quite clear: directors must act in the best interests of company. Well done, Mr Binns.

The role the judicial system plays in the governance ecosystem—dealing with fraudulent directors, company failures and company liquidations—eats me up. So much value is lost through inappropriate boardroom behaviours and decisions. And shareholders are left to pick up the pieces (and in far too many cases, bury them). Commonsense tells us that it is far better to avoid danger than pick up the pieces afterwards. But how can and should boards improve their performance to avoid fraud or failure events?

Carly Fiorina, an experienced director and previously CEO of ICT giant HP, wrote an interesting piece today. You can read it here. She made some insightful observations:

• Too many Board members serve too long
• Too many board members go along to get along
• Dominate voices and cliques can reduce decision-making quality
• Some board members don't understand the business
• Some board agendas are too full

• Conduct self-assessments and performance reviews
• Institute term limits
• Make board appointment process transparent
• Make board (and particularly decision-making) processes transparent
• Shareholders should hold board accountable (through questions)

While Carly's comments reflect her US-centric experience, most of the observations and antidotes are equally applicable in other countries, including New Zealand. Notice most of Carly's antidotes relate to process and behaviour, and not to director competence (competence is addressed in antidote one only). Carly's call to hold boards accountable is on the money—because boards hold the ultimate responsibility for the performance of the organisation. 

In my experience, the challenge most boards face in this regard is one of implementation. How does one implement an effective governance framework that improves the prospect of good company performance and holds directors accountable? The recently updated The Four Pillars of Governance Best Practice (published by the Institute of Directors in New Zealand) provides a very useful starting point. This document provides useful best practice guidance and a clear code of practice—all aimed at helping directors and boards avoid the sort of carnage (and the expensive involvement of the judicial ecosystem) that we read about far too often in the newspapers. I commend it to all directors and CEOs. 

I agree with Baker and Mowbray. Governance is a socially dynamic phenomenon, with many variables and much complexity. Numerous researchers and practitioners have investigated structural and composition factors over many years. More recently, world-class governance researchers, including Leblanc, Huse and Nicholson, have investigated behavioural and process factors. To date, the research findings have been inconclusive, and causality with performance is yet to be established.

Despite flights of fancy from some commentators, slow progress by researchers, and much frustration all round, the search for a link between governance and company performance is of enormous practical importance. Therefore, efforts to understand the mechanisms within the governance phenomena, and any relationship with company performance, must continue. However, the research agenda much be changed. Attention must move away from consideration of individual characteristics—toward a holistic consideration of governance—if further insights are to be gained and any clear understanding is to be achieved.

My doctoral research efforts attempt to build on Leblanc and Nicholson's work. I plan to use a longitudinal multiple-case study approach (to understand the processes, behaviours and dynamic interactions within the governance system) to focus on the way Boards make decisions. Strategic decision-making has been postulated to be an important factor in the governance–performance relationship. If this is correct, a link between a strategic decisions and subsequent improved company performance should be apparent, after some longitudinal delay. The challenge will be to determine whether or not strategic decision-making can be attributed to the Board.

So where does this leave us? I certainly don't have any silver bullets, and progress is likely to be frustratingly slow. Boardroom diversity is important, however I suspect a focus on decision-making and related factors will reveal more about board performance than arguments about the number of women at the board table. Let's push on.