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    Essential qualities of a director?

    Recently, an article was posted on the ICSA: The Governance Institute website, describing 5 essential qualities of a non-executive director. The author lists the following five 'core qualities' and suggests these need to form the basis of evaluations when companies are appointing non-executive directors:
    • Big picture thinker
    • Governance knowledge
    • Independent mindset
    • Ambassador potential
    • Energy and commitment
    This is a good list and several of the items are intuitively appealing. However, having read the article a few times now and compared these suggestions with the findings from my own research and others elsewhere, I am not sure all of these qualities are actually 'essential'. This set me thinking, leading to some supplementary questions:
    • Why have these five qualities been singled out?
    • The fourth quality, 'ambassador potential', stands out as being somewhat different from the others. While some level of ambassadorial capability is desirable in the chairman (because they are usually the spokesman), I struggle to understand why it might be crucial in directors who do not speak for the company. The quality may be more usefully categorised as a desirable item.
    • The title of the article suggests these are essential qualities of non-executive directors. But what of executive directors? Do they possess different qualities? The law makes no distinction between executive and non-executive directors. If a board is to be effective, big picture thinking; knowledge of board practices (i.e., governance knowledge); an independent mindset; and, energy and commitment are more likely to be essential qualities for all directors.
    • What of other qualities that have been suggested as being highly important including competence (to understand the business of the business and complex information); the ability to deal with ambiguity and change; vigorous debate; and, teamwork and trust, for example?
    • Though not stated explicitly, the use of 'essential' implies these qualities are universally applicable. Given the complex and socially dynamic nature of corporate governance, companies and markets, is this reasonable?
    • How might possession of these qualities translate into a beneficial impact on business performance?
    Though progress has been made in recent years, these questions demonstrate our knowledge abut boards is far from complete. We still have much to learn about how boards actually work; how they should work; and, crucially, whether boards can influence company performance through the decisions made in the boardroom (or not). If answers to these very difficult questions can be found, they will probably have significant implications including perhaps to a new understanding of corporate governance and updated guidance for board practices, director recruitment and on-going director development. While some directors may struggle to come to terms with such implications, the flow-on effects for sustainable business performance, economic growth and societal well-being are likely to be significant.
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    Making an impact on performance, from the top

    One of the great challenges all business leaders face is the question of how to make an impact on the overall performance of the firm they lead. Boards are no exception. Effective boards are comprised of capable people who assess situations, make strategic decisions, and oversee management to ensure goals are achieved.
    The challenge of leading well and making an impact on business performance is very real, especially in today's environment of fluid work patterns and declining levels of employee loyalty. Boards are responsible for company performance, yet they do not run companies directly (that is the job of the chief executive). How might boards respond to ensure firm performance goals are actually achieved?
    Here are some considerations:
    • Boards need to accept that responsibility for overall business performance lies with them, not the chief executive.
    • The overall purpose of the business (i.e., its reason for being) must be both clearly defined (board responsibility) and well communicated (chief executive responsbility).
    • A carefully crafted strategy (to achieve the purpose) needs to be developed (ideally, by the board and management, together) and implemented.
    • Business systems and processes need to be optimised to expedite effective collaboration; teamwork; and, ensure the information that people need to do their job effectively is available when they need it. 
    The importance of this last consideration should not be underestimated: if employees cannot collaborate effectively because crucial information is missing or hard to access, overall performance will suffer—period. The impact on employee morale, productivity and the bottom line is likely to be very significant.
    The board needs to know how the business is performing relative to the agreed strategy, and the whether expected outcomes and associated benefits are being achieved (or not). Financial reports only tell part of the story. Employee engagement is an important though often overlooked indicator. If your board isn't sure whether employees are fully engaged, it needs ask the chief executive some probing questions; request a staff engagement survey; seek regular updates from senior managers (in addition to the chief executive); or, pursue some combination of these and other options (*). If employee engagement is low or any inconsistencies are discovered, weak information flows or ineffective collaboration within the company and/or with customers are likely to be contributing factors—a starting point for further investigation and subsequent decision-making.
    (*) Boards that lack direct expertise to actively pursue these suggestions themselves should seek independent advice from a seasoned expert, to help them understand what might be possible, establish benchmarks and inform future board decisions. A long-time colleague of mine, Michael Sampson, is one such person. He is an expert in the fields of workforce collaboration, teamwork and new approaches to work. Michael also speaks at conferences around the world and has written several books​I commend him to you.
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    Corporate governance in the UK: What is the real problem?

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    When Theresa May went on record recently, the key message for boards was that they needed to pull their socks up lest additional structural measures including employee directors become a requirement for UK companies. Much of the commentary was aimed at the boards of publicly-listed companies, in an attempt to curb (perceived and real) corporate excess in the form of excessive remuneration; hubris; and, a flagrant disregard of some stakeholders. 
    Today, ICSA: The Governance Institute announced that it had written to the Prime Minister calling for the boards of privately-held companies to be held to the same levels of accountability and disclosure as publicly-listed firms. This request seems perfectly reasonable, especially as the UK Companies Act 2006 applies to all companies.
    The UK statute is clear: directors (actually, boards because it is boards that make decisions) are required to  consider the long-term consequences of their decisions and the impact on employees and the community. Good practice suggests that boards should, amongst the things, keep shareholders informed (through the board's annual report to shareholders) of its activities.
    ICSA is right to raise the issue, but will enforced compliance with codes of practice fix the problem?
    If boards act within the law and in accordance with codes of practice as they pursue business objectives, then letters such as the one written by ICSA should not be necessary. But they don't. Some directors and boards take liberties. Enough examples have come to light in recent years (e.g., HSBC, FIFA, Volkswagen, Fonterra, Solid Energy, Toshiba and, most recently, BHS) to suggest that some boards knowingly run close to or beyond boundaries defined in law. But where does the real problem lie? Is it with the law, the principles-based codes of practice; the directors themselves; or, something else entirely?
    Consider this: The road toll has not declined as a direct result of increased enforcement measures but rather a change of behaviour—drivers choosing to driver safer vehicles more carefully. Are boards any different? If boards are analogous to drivers, probably not. Unless and until boards make a conscious decision to embrace company performance as an important priority, and to do so in accordance with both established law and published codes of practice, I suspect the media will continue to be gainfully employed.
    Finally, shareholders have an important and oft overlooked contribution to make. Recent experience suggests that greater care is needed in the appointment process, to ensure only suitably capable directors who are intent on acting in the best interests of the company are appointed to boards. In addition, shareholders should not overlook their right to hold directors to account including dismissing those who fail to discharge their legal duties or exercise requisite care and attention.
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    Come hither employee directors?

     British Prime Minister, Theresa May caught the attention of many recently when she raised the possibility of requiring companies to reserve positions on company boards for employee directors. This proposal, which was suggested amongst other measures as a means of curbing perceived corporate excess in the UK, has received a mixed response, including support from the Institute of Directors and wonderment from others.  
    Increased diversity has been associated with improved decision quality, so including employee directors at the board table should be to the organisation's advantage, shouldn't it? On the surface, yes. However, experience tells us that one of the very real challenges of reserving places on boards, be it via a gender-based quota mechanism (e.g., Norway) or to provide a voice for an interest group (e.g., parent representatives on school boards), is that people bring baggage. Representation is a problem: candidates appointed because they meet the representation criteria often struggle to act in the best interests of the organisation when they take their position at the table.
    The conflict (of interest) that employee directors face is even tougher to manage because it is directly personal. On one hand, employee directors are paid to perform work and implement strategies, while on the other they are expected to make decisions in the best interest of the company. Decisions made in the boardroom may not be to the employees advantage (e.g., to close a loss-making division, resulting in job losses). To expect an employee director to subordinate their personal and collegial interests in favour of what might be best for the company is likely to be a tall order; it may not even be realistic.
    Yet the German experience (one of the most successful economies since World War II) suggests that the inclusion of employee directors can be made to work. But the German system of corporate governance is framed on the notion of two-tier boards, and employee directors sit on upper (supervisory) board not the executive board where the important strategic decisions are made. Also, supervisory boards normally only meet a few times each year, meaning the focus is more directly one of oversight, in a manner not dissimilar to an annual general meeting of shareholders in the unitary system. 
    If the corporate excess that May has called out is to be corralled (as it should be), the underlying basis of corporate governance (the means by which companies are directed and controlled) should be reviewed. A holistic review is needed to ensure the addition of specific measures (e.g., representative positions) does not inadvertently introduce other problems like suboptimal decision-making. Any review needs to extend beyond board structure and composition to the behaviour of directors and the activities of boards. Directors themselves also need to take responsibility for their actions; invest time understanding the business of the business; and, take their commitment to act in the best interests of the company seriously. I've written and spoken about this many times in the past. If directors embrace these suggestions, enforced structural provisions (e.g., representative groups) may no longer be required. But this relies on directors behaving well and doing 'the right thing', a reliance that has a chequered history.
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    Poor corporate governance or plain fraud? Where's the line?

    South Africa's flag carrier, South African Airways, has hit turbulence. Severe turbulence. The airline, which is in financial trouble as a result, most probably, of some poor decisions in the past, has been negotiating a debt refinancing package. However, the package reportedly contains some unusual characteristics (read: extremely high fees). Now, a staff member has blown the whistle; the board has been called out; and, the matter is being investigated. 
    Even a cursory inspection suggests that something is amiss, and badly so. Problems that seem to stem from poor decision-making at the top of the organisation appear to be endemic. Whether the underlying driver is greed, hubris, corruption, ineptitude or something else remains to be seen. Regardless, South African Airways is in trouble. The board appears to be missing in action and the 'corruption' word has been mentioned making situation very messy, to say the least. 
    Sadly, SAA is not an isolated case. Recently, Sir Philip Green fell from grace; and, it was not that long ago that FIFA, Toshiba and Volkswagen suffered 'setbacks'. It's little wonder that hard working people have any time for boards of directors. The sources of governance failure are well-storied. However, the natural response—hard law—has done little to improve things (because people who want to generally find their way around things that inhibit them). Different measures are required, perhaps starting with culture, values and purpose. Board appointment processes also need to change. Unless and until 'bad eggs' are exorcised from boardrooms and held to account, the actions of a few will, no doubt, continue to make life hard for the rest of the director community.
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    On purpose, strategy, execution: Together is best

    Last week, I had the privilege of spending an entire day with the directors and executives of a highly-regarded architectural practice. The large practice has developed a great reputation over several decades for creating 'meaningful' architecture—buildings and spaces that 'fit' the surrounding environment, and that people enjoy living and working in. The job at hand was to facilitate a strategy development workshop, working with eleven capable and motivated men and women to select a course to guide the further growth and development of the practice. In essence, the day was about looking up and looking out.
    Using the StratCross framework and summaries of PESTEL and SWOT analyses completed prior to the workshop, we got stuck in. Before we knew it, the time was 4:30pm and the intense but enjoyable workshop was over. As we packed up, several directors indicated that the workshop had been "hugely valuable", "challenging" and "galvanising", and that they were looking forward to seeing the fruits of their labour. On the way home, my thoughts wandered, reflecting on the day and why it had been so much fun. Here's a few observations that came to mind. You may find useful for your next retreat or planning session:
    • All of the attendees had a comprehensive understanding of both the business of the business and the wider environmental context within which the practice operates. They had done their homework—and demonstrably so. Also, and unlike some boards that I have worked with, everyone wanted to be in the room and to make a contribution. These two factors were foundational to creating an environment which encouraged the informed, healthy debate that seemed to flow naturally throughout the day.
    • Directors (especially) were quick to latch on to the importance of the first question, "Why does the business exist?" It was as if they knew that if strategy is built without a clear and agreed purpose, the resultant output (i.e., the strategy) would be reduced to, simply, a collection of activities. 
    • The attendees recognised that many architectural projects take several years from initial ideation to completion, and some can take more than ten years. Consequently, a long-term view is necessary. This spilled over to the discussion of how far ahead the strategy should look. The group was happy to look more than ten years out, on the basis that goals would take time to realise and the proviso that the resultant strategy was not prescriptive (it was not) and that it was reviewed regularly. 
    • During the afternoon, a couple of the attendees (one director and one manager that I noticed, there may have been more) voiced a desire to build action plans and get underway. They said liked what they saw at the high-level but were concerned that the good work could be for nought unless clear action plans were developed and a commitment to execution ensued. Others agreed this was vital.
    • Despite some of the managers operating at fine levels of detail in their day-to-day work, the group as a whole agreed that "less is actually more helpful". Why write 20 or 30 pages of detail when 3–5 pages can actually provide a more holistic understanding? This demonstrated a clear awareness that strategy is a 'big picture' activity, and that detailed action plans and operating budgets are supporting documents that are the responsibility of managers. 
    • Finally, together is best. Every the director and executive was 'present' in the room throughout the day. Also, there was no sense of 'us and them' nor any visible expression of 'power'. Rather, the attendees worked together collaboratively, functioning as a group of peers committed to achieving an outcome. Compare that with common practice, which suggests that distance and a clearly-defined separation between board and management is appropriate.
      (Note: The action of one manager who collected everyone's phone as the workshop started may have contributed to this. If nothing else, her action triggered a bit of light-hearted banter to kickstart the day!)
    So, overall it was a good day, with some observations to boot. While most attendees came away hopeful of an even brighter future for the practice, they also realised that, despite a coherent strategy (to be written up in the coming days) and a commitment to execution once approved, success is not automatic—unlike the arrows in the picture imply. A realistic way to end the day.