Every day, news stories and articles from a plethora of sources arrive in my email inbox and news reader software. The deluge is self-inflicted—I need to read widely for my doctoral studies. Mind you, having a voracious appetite for general knowledge doesn't help much!

Every now and again, an article seems to lift itself off the screen, seemingly to attract extra attention as my eyes scan down the headings. Today, one such article was the "Top 100 global thinkers for 2012" list, published by Foreign Policy magazine. I looked at the FP list, because I was fascinated to know whether Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma or the Pakistani student Malala Yousafzai featured anywhere. To my surprise (and delight) both appeared in the top ten.

It seems that, in 2012 at least, global influence is strongly correlated with politics and activism. With one exception (Sebastian Thrum—a computer scientist who has been working on the driverless car), the top ten are all activists or politicians fighting for various causes. It's not until you read further down the list that musicians, economists and business people start to appear.

The point of this muse? Perhaps if you aspire to become globally influential, you should turn to politics in a volatile state, or embrace a vital cause. But most people motivated by these endeavours couldn't care less about fleeting appearances on "influence" lists. Rather, their primary motivation is the cause they've chosen the invest their hearts and souls in, and the enduring impact of their efforts. And therein lies a lesson for us all, as we ponder our role in society and contribution to it.

What role should governance (especially Boards) play in sport? Should sporting codes be governed any differently than commercial businesses or not-for-profit agencies? 

These questions are raised from time-to-time—often by the media and commentators, and especially when a team or code is not doing so well. Yet another case was reported today, this time concerning New Zealand Cricket. Dion Nash is reported as saying "the board is failing in its duty to lead the game in the right direction." Such criticisms are not new. The challenge is in finding and implementing the remedy.

The moving parts that make up a sporting code are familiar—a board, administration, management, players (called workers, employees, volunteers in other contexts), spectators (customers, consumers). In my view, sporting codes are just another form of organisation, albeit with goals specific to their context. Therefore, they should embrace [sound] organisational constructs and practices, including governance.

Dion Nash's call for the NZC Board to take control of the sport's destiny (and ultimately the Black Caps' performance) via sound top-level planning (strategy) has much merit. The development of strategy is now widely accepted in academic circles to be a major task of the Board. To do this effectively, Boards need to be comprised of people who understand the market and emerging trends, and understand and participate in the development of strategy. In NZC's case, that means appointing suitably knowledgeable and competent people to the Board, and soliciting well-structured contributions from various specialists.

The time to act is now. But will the NZC Board be so bold as to make the necessary governance adjustments—for the good of the game?

Last week, I was invited, with 16 others, to help review a Competency Framework being proposed by the Institute of Directors. I commend this initiative, aimed at raising the bar. While competency of itself does not guarantee that any director will be effective, it is a move in the right direction.

Last week, I was invited, with 16 others, to help review a Competency Framework being proposed by the Institute of Directors. I commend this initiative, aimed at raising the bar. While competency of itself does not guarantee that any director will be effective, it is a move in the right direction.

During the wide-ranging discussion, several participants suggested that governance should be professionalised, like medicine, accountancy, law and several other professions. I support these calls—strongly. Why? Well, stories like this get under my skin. While the majority of directors fulfil their legal and ethical responsibilities well, sadly there are a few bad eggs that discredit governance in the public's eyes.

The mechanism would be relatively straightforward, involving perhaps:

• entrance tests (competency, references and interviews)
• maintenance of professional standards (on-going education)
• periodic re-registration (two- or three-yearly)
• tiering (a general registration, and a higher level for directors of large, widely-held or publicly-listed companies)
• a disciplinary tribunal (with teeth and a propensity to act)

The Institute's optional accreditation scheme provides a useful starting point, but it falls short because participation is optional. In my opinion, governance must be professionalised, with a robust body and process not dissimilar to medicine (Colleges of Practice, Medical Council of New Zealand, Disciplinary Tribunal). Perhaps then the concerns expressed in the article—that directors can dodge bans—will become a thing of the past. Here's hoping.

An outstanding Editorial appeared in our local newspaper, the DominionPost, today. The editorial highlights the significant conflict of interest that exists when local government politicians are appointed to the boards of Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs). The appointment of local councillors—many of whom lack sound governance expertise, and all of whom are conflicted as the editorial argues—must stop. 

Councils and local communities would be far better off if independent directors were appointed to the boards of CCOs (and held accountable through normal shareholder and fiduciary processes). Independent, commercially astute directors would focus entirely on their role of acting in the best interests of, and maximising the performance of, the company. In so doing, the returns to shareholders would more than likely improve over what would otherwise be possible with a highly conflicted Board.

PS: I disagree with one sentence towards the end of the Editorial "...over time, superior systems will produce superior results." No. Governance is a complex and socially dynamic phenomenon. Over time, superior systems should produce superior results. 

A seemingly small—but ultimately quite significant—statement emerged from the corporate governance sector this week. The CEO of one of New Zealand's larger companies went on record when announcing the company's annual result. He stated that his directors must act in the best interests of the company (not the shareholder).

Meridian chief executive Mark Binns said the company would take time to evaluate the situation but would ultimately come to a decision that was in the best interests of Meridian Energy Limited. ''The obligations of the directors are very clearly set out in companies law and the Companies Act, that is to act in the best interests of the company.''

This was a refreshing statement, because most directors and executives (in New Zealand) incorrectly believe their role is to act in the best interests of the shareholder. Research conducted in 2010 by Dr James Lockhart indicated that the majority of directors in New Zealand simply do not understand their legal obligations. The New Zealand Company Act is quite clear: directors must act in the best interests of company. Well done, Mr Binns.

The role the judicial system plays in the governance ecosystem—dealing with fraudulent directors, company failures and company liquidations—eats me up. So much value is lost through inappropriate boardroom behaviours and decisions. And shareholders are left to pick up the pieces (and in far too many cases, bury them). Commonsense tells us that it is far better to avoid danger than pick up the pieces afterwards. But how can and should boards improve their performance to avoid fraud or failure events?

Carly Fiorina, an experienced director and previously CEO of ICT giant HP, wrote an interesting piece today. You can read it here. She made some insightful observations:

• Too many Board members serve too long
• Too many board members go along to get along
• Dominate voices and cliques can reduce decision-making quality
• Some board members don't understand the business
• Some board agendas are too full

• Conduct self-assessments and performance reviews
• Institute term limits
• Make board appointment process transparent
• Make board (and particularly decision-making) processes transparent
• Shareholders should hold board accountable (through questions)

While Carly's comments reflect her US-centric experience, most of the observations and antidotes are equally applicable in other countries, including New Zealand. Notice most of Carly's antidotes relate to process and behaviour, and not to director competence (competence is addressed in antidote one only). Carly's call to hold boards accountable is on the money—because boards hold the ultimate responsibility for the performance of the organisation. 

In my experience, the challenge most boards face in this regard is one of implementation. How does one implement an effective governance framework that improves the prospect of good company performance and holds directors accountable? The recently updated The Four Pillars of Governance Best Practice (published by the Institute of Directors in New Zealand) provides a very useful starting point. This document provides useful best practice guidance and a clear code of practice—all aimed at helping directors and boards avoid the sort of carnage (and the expensive involvement of the judicial ecosystem) that we read about far too often in the newspapers. I commend it to all directors and CEOs.