Tags

  • Published on

    (Mis)counting the cost?

    Accountability Complexity Decision Making Effectiveness Integrity Tough Questions
    Picture
    Like many people, I've been reading reports of the spread of COVID-19, and the impact it is clearly having on both the health and well-being of communities, and the economy. The number of confirmed cases is growing. Daily reports in New Zealand show confirmed and probable cases (April 3: 772 cases, 96 probable). Globally, the number of deaths attributed to COVID-19 also continues to climb, even though the vast majority of the deceased had comorbidities.
    Stepping beyond the human elements for a moment (anxiety, cabin-fever, ambivalence, physical distancing), aspects of the reportage have confused me (and others as well, I know), to the point I wonder about the underlying motivations of some of the reporters.
    ​Consider the case count: How many people have or have had COVID-19 in New Zealand? The following data lifted from the Ministry of Health website:
     
    Cases
    Probables
    Total
    April 2
    723
    74
    797
    April 3
    772
    96
    868
    The New Zealand media is reporting the total (797, 868) as the number of cases of COVID-19 in New Zealand. But, when the Ministry of Health's criteria is applied (definition of a probable case, here), the actual number of cases is the lower number (723, 772). The WHO, too, is reporting these same official numbers.
    The question that emerges from this analysis is straightforward: Why does the media persist in overstating the case count? Is it ineptitude, bias, or something more sinister?
    Fatalities: Official reports from around the world have been clear: many (most, but perhaps not all) of the patients who have died had comorbidities at the time of death. Was COVID-19 actually the cause of all the reported deaths (as the media has implied), or was it a contributory factor alongside other factors?
    In and of themselves, these misrepresentations by the media are probably of little consequence—until you consider that they may be indicative of a bigger problem that does merit attention.
    If New Zealand is to climb out of the hole it is now in, some bold decisions are needed. Decision-makers need to think strategically, not tactically. There is widespread agreement that the social and economic costs of the measures currently being taken in New Zealand in response to the COVID-19 outbreak are going to be very high. The effects of the community lockdown, widespread economic destabilisation and imposition of high levels of sovereign debt will probably linger for a long time. They may be generational.
    ​The decision to stop was easy; it has been made (although questions remain over whether the border is actually closed). The looming decisions concern when and how to restart. Ultimately, the quality of these decisions will be, to a large extent, dependent on the quality of evidence presented. If the government is to expedite the economic recovery, it needs to set ideology and worst-case models aside, and enlist seasoned, non-partisan critical thinkers to analyse the raw data, draw rational conclusions and present pragmatic recommendations. Without this, the real cost will continue to climb; a winter of discontent indeed.
  • Published on

    Sunlight, and the insolvency line

    Accountability Corporate Governance Effectiveness Governance Tough Questions
    Picture
    The global onset of the COVID-19 virus has precipitated a wide range of reactions in the community, from ambivalence to anxiety. Many governments have stepped in to support their citizens. Some have imposed community-wide lockdowns and social distancing protocols in an effort to break the spread of the contagion; others have implemented rigorous testing and quarantine regimes to identify and isolate those affected.
    Business leaders have been considering their options too. Working from home has become a 'thing', as has the use of video conferencing and other online tools. Amongst the many responses, one in particular caught my eye this week: proposals by the directors' institutes of several countries—notably Australia, New Zealand and Britain, and Germany and others as well—to temporarily suspend director liability in the case of insolvency.
    Superficially, this sounds like a reasonable idea. When a force majeure event strikes, the impact on sales, working capital and jobs may be very significant. The effect may be immediate, especially if the company is prevented from trading due to a lockdown. If the affected company cannot restructure its cost base, draw on financial reserves or secure finance quickly, business continuity will be at risk. Insolvency may follow, and all jobs will be lost. Thus goes the argument. But on the flip side (there always is one), the suspension of director liability and allowance to trade whilst insolvent may open the door for abuse, despite the honourable intention of keeping the economy functioning. ​
    Insolvency has always been a red line for boards and companies. This proposal makes it porous, by absolving directors of responsibility for trading while insolvent. Some questions worth considering as lawmakers assess the proposal:
    • What is an acceptable level of insolvency, both in financial terms and time?
    • How will the suspension of liability provisions be monitored and policed?
    • How will any suspected abuses be detected and dealt with?
    • How will the judiciary distinguish between a crisis-induced insolvency, and one resulting from recklessness?
    • When the COVID-19 scare has run its course and a level of normalcy is reached again, will the proposed provision be removed, promptly and in full? Or will a further period of grace be allowed?
    ​While a force majeure event can catch even the most well-run companies out, those with strong balance sheets and highly-engaged boards are better placed to respond well. They probably do not need the protection of the proposed provision, because they are more likely to have a robust risk assessment and mitigation framework in place, and strategic risks will have been assessed at most board meetings. ​But those companies being run close to the wire, or with inadequately engaged boards or weaker systems, may be caught flat footed. And if they are, what then? Should directors be protected, or be held to account? ​
    Lawmakers need to tackle these types of questions, and resolve ambiguities thoroughly. If they don't, expect scurrilous directors to exploit the inevitable loopholes—to defend against other, board-induced, problems such as ineptitude, incompetence, negligence or malfeasance, for example. ​
    Enquiry is appropriate, regardless of the catalyst, because sunlight, as they say, is a great disinfectant.
  • Published on

    Hiding in plain sight

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Effectiveness Governance Performance
    A kerfuffle has broken out on the East Coast of the US, between Lucian Bebchuk, an esteemed professor at Harvard University, and Martin Lipton, partner at New York law firm Wachell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Specifically, Lipton has mounted a strong attack on an article published by Bebchuk (a critical examination of 'stakeholder governance'). That Lipton has objected should not be surprising. After all, he is a lawyer with vested interests and he has a long record of promoting stakeholder governance.
    This is what Bebchuk asserted:
    Stakeholderism, we demonstrate, would not benefit stakeholders as its supporters claim. To examine the expected consequences of stakeholderism, we analyze the incentives of corporate leaders, empirically investigate whether they have in the past used their discretion to protect stakeholders, and examine whether recent commitments to adopt stakeholderism can be expected to bring about a meaningful change. Our analysis concludes that acceptance of stakeholderism should not be expected to make stakeholders better off. 

    Furthermore, we show that embracing stakeholderism could well impose substantial costs on shareholders, stakeholders, and society at large. Stakeholderism would increase the insulation of corporate leaders from shareholders, reduce their accountability, and hurt economic performance. In addition, by raising illusory hopes that corporate leaders would on their own provide substantial protection to stakeholders, stakeholderism would impede or delay reforms that could bring meaningful protection to stakeholders. Stakeholderism would therefore be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders it purports to serve and should be opposed by those who take stakeholder interests seriously.
    Lipton's counter to these assertions was strident:
    We reject Professor Bebchuk's economic, empirical and conceptual arguments. They are ill-conceived and ignore real-world challenges companies and directors face today.

    As we have discussed, new laws—such as federal legislation of the type proposed by Elizabeth Warren—are likely to sweep far too broadly and risk substantial destruction of corporate value. They are also unnecessary if companies and investors embrace stakeholder capitalism as contemplated by The New Paradigm and as adumbrated by the actions Professor Bebchuk condemns.

    We recommend that companies and boards monitor and review their stakeholder and ESG profiles as a matter of increasing priority, and engage regularly with their major investors on these issues.
    This debate exposes something awkward—that when partisans announce their views people react, especially if they denounce other perspectives. This tactic may well pique interest and sell column inches, but it rarely results in viable outcomes that can be sustained over time. 
    My own research, and experience both as an advisor and serving company director, suggests that either-or argumentation, a characteristic of determinism, is deeply flawed. To pursue profit as an exclusive goal inevitably results in selfishness and inequity. Similarly, the pursuit of priorities espoused by ESG proponents introduces a another, and not insignificant, risk—of exposing the companies and the economy more generally to an 'Icarus moment'. 
    Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of Blackrock, summed things up well in his January 2019 letter:
    Profits are in no way inconsistent with purpose—in fact, profits and purpose are inextricably linked. Profits are essential if a company is to effectively serve all of its stakeholders over time—not only shareholders, but also employees, customers, and communities. Similarly, when a company truly understands andexpresses its purpose, it functions with the focus and strategic discipline that drive long-term profitability. Purpose unifies management, employees, and communities. It drives ethical behaviour and creates an essential check on actions that go against the best interests of stakeholders.
    Fink's position highlights that a balanced perspective is probably 'best'. But how might it be achieved? The pathway may be hiding in plain sight. If the board is to fulfil its duty to ensure value is created over time, it needs to look well beyond selfish interests and motivations. This means considering the wider context within which the company operates, creating a viable strategy, determining appropriate 'performance' measures and only then governing accordingly. 
    Bebchuk was brave to call out the messianic assertions of the stakeholder capitalism camp. Perhaps Lipton might take stock, and meet with Bebchuk—the purpose being to explore the nuances of each other's views, in search of a more balanced understanding of the purpose of companies and role of the board.
  • Published on

    Leading from the boardroom: a collective imperative

    Accountability Boardcraft Corporate Governance Decision Making Effectiveness Governance Leadership Research
    Picture
    Leadership is topical in most spheres of human endeavour; companies are no exception. To encourage others to achieve great things is the stuff of effective leaders. The most successful are widely-lauded. But leadership can take many forms, of course. Cast your eye over the last 100 years or so and you'll discern leadership in action in different ways. The era of the titan (Rockerfeller, Carnegie and Morgan being notable examples) saw leaders exert control over companies powerfully. The emergence of the management class in the inter-war years saw the emphasis change, the efficient operation of companies came to the fore. Since the turn of the century and the entry of corporate governance into the business lexicon, leadership has taken another form: the oversight of companies from the boardroom.
    Often, perhaps typically, leadership is understood to be an individual endeavour; a person exerting influence. But leadership has a collective dimension too—the board of directors is an instructive case. While individuals (directors, trustees) contribute to board discussion and process, it is the board (not directors) that decides. Leadership in this context is, exclusively, collective.
    Collective leadership requires a different approach. Directors need to work together to reach consensus for a start. This article has some more great tips that boards may wish to consider as they seek to lead effectively:
    • Good leaders focus more on character than ability. Where does your board recruitment practice put its energy?
    • Effective leaders are open to learning from others. When did your board last undertake a professional development session, together?
    • Effective leaders are marked out by a spirit of appreciation and thankfulness. Does your executive team know that you appreciate their work and the results they achieve? What about staff, clients and other stakeholders?
    • Effective leaders are self-aware. Does your board assess this, or is hubris a problem?
    • Effective leaders choose to get on the solution side very quickly. To dwell on problem definition and compliance is to vote for stasis not progress.
    How does your board measure up? More pointedly, does your board even know the effect of its decisions? Nearly thirty years ago, the challenge of explaining board influence over company performance was famously described by Sir Adrian Cadbury, a doyen of corporate governance, as being "a most difficult of question". Thankfully, some progress has been made in recent years, as researchers have entered the boardroom to conduct long-term observational studies of boards in session, and leaders such as Charles Hewlett have shared insights from their experience. While robust explanations remain elusive, one thing is now clear: neither the structure nor composition of the board is a direct predictor of its effectiveness, let alone company performance. If boards are to contribute effectively in the future, they need think, act and behave differently.
  • Published on

    Advisory boards: A good thing, or no?

    Accountability Corporate Governance Effectiveness Entrepreneur Governance Tough Questions
    Several times in recent weeks, I have been asked about advisory boards. Individually, none of the requests are especially remarkable. But when several questions are posed in close succession (such as those listed below), by people in several different countries including Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Ireland, it may be timely (again) to review the phenomenon.
    • What is an advisory board?
    • I'm running a company and it's going gang-busters; but a consultant said I should set up a[n advisory] board. Why, and should I take this recommendation seriously?
    • What does an advisory board do anyway?
    • What is the relationship between an advisory board and a real board? 
    • Could you (me), given your 'governance expertise', chair my advisory board?
    The spate of enquiries set me thinking. Advisory boards have, at various times, been both topical and the source of much confusion and debate. But why the heightened level of interest at this time? Has the recently-published HBR article on shadow boards been a catalyst, or is something else going on? It's almost impossible to tell, except to observe that the person posing the question—usually an entrepreneur or a founding group—wants to know more. Either they've read or heard about advisory boards, or been advised by someone that they 'need' one (their accountant, a firm specialising in establishing advisory boards, some other consultant). The recommendation is typically justified on the basis that advisory boards are a stepping stone, "before taking on a full board". The implication is that the entrepreneur or founding group does not have to give up control. And therein lies a common misunderstanding: that an advisory board provides a bridge to, or is a substitute for, a board of directors. It is not (*).
    Before going any further, let's lay down some definitions:
    • A director is a person who acts as a director of a company and fulfils various (specified) duties, as defined in the [company] law. This definition is universal. Collectively, a group of directors is called a board of directors. Although the name (director) is reserved in the statute, the name itself is not as important as the function the person is performing. Regardless of the term used, if a person is doing things that a director would normally be expected to do, they can be deemed to be a director. If the entity is a company then it must have at least one director (some jurisdictions require at least two), which means it has a board already. But that is not to say that the normative practices of corporate governance (the provision of steerage and guidance, monitoring and supervising management, etc.) are apparent, or even necessary (most statutes do not mention the word 'governance').
    • An advisor is someone who is retained (typically from outside the company) to provide advice that the recipient may, at their sole discretion, accept or reject. In a company context, the person or group seeking the advice could be a manager, a company founder/entrepreneur, a director or the board of directors. Examples include a lawyer;  a coach; a tax, IT or AI specialist; or an industry expert.
    • An advisory board is a term of convenience that has entered the lexicon in the past decade or so, usually in the context of smaller size companies. It is typically used to describe a group of advisors who meet periodically—even regularly—to consider questions and provide advice.
    Turning now to the question posed in the title of this muse: Are advisory boards a good thing? The answer depends on the purpose and function of the group of advisors (let's not use the term 'board' just now):
    • ​If the group is formed to discuss a situation and provide specialist advice, that is little different from the retention of a lawyer or any other subject matter expert. This can be a good thing—depending on the quality of the advice provided, of course!
    • ​If the group meets regularly, and especially if meetings are conducted (or tasks performed) in a manner normally associated with a board of directors, then the group may be exposing itself to additional risks. Indicators include an advisory board charter, the appointment of a board chair, a regular meeting schedule with an agenda and minutes (which are subsequently checked and approved at a later meeting) and the consideration of reports produced by a manager (or management). If such indicators are present, the group may be, in the eyes of the law, acting as if it is a board of directors (and the duties and responsibilities that entails). Thus the terms 'deemed directors' and 'shadow board' prevalent in various jurisdictions.
    It's important to note that the 'deemed director' / 'shadow board' risk is borne by the advisor(s), not the manager, entrepreneur or company. But it is easily mitigated. Here are some suggestions:
    • ​When a manager (entrepreneur, director, board) seeks advice, advisors should request a terms of reference or an engagement letter that clearly defines the type of advice sought, and by whom; the advisory period; the expected deliverables; and the fee to be paid. After the advice is provided (or the advisory period lapses), the advisor(s) should be released.
    • The term 'advisory board' should not be used, ever. To do so implies regularity and conduct normally characteristic of a board of directors.
    • If external advice is required from several advisors, call the group for what it is, a group of advisors (or some other informal descriptor).
    • Meetings should be called and run by the manager (entrepreneur, director, board).
    • The person or group seeking the advice may elect to take notes for his/her/their own record, but these should not be described or circulated as 'minutes'.
    While this is not an exhaustive list of mitigations, they are globally applicable.
    The bottom lines? (Yes, there are two)
    • Managers (entrepreneurs, directors, boards) can and should continue to seek specialist advice from external parties from time to time.
    • Advisors should avoid being enthralled by the prospect of joining an advisory board—the risks are not worth it. Win the business, provide the advice, move on.
    (*) If the entity is a company, a board needs to be in place from day one, regardless of whether advice is sought from third parties or not. The role of the board (i.e., corporate governance) typically includes setting corporate purpose and strategy; policymaking; advising, monitoring and supervising management; holding management to account for performance and compliance with relevant statutes; and providing an account (from both a performance and a compliance perspective) to shareholders and legitimate stakeholders. The formality with which these functions are enacted is, appropriately, contextual. Click here for more information.
  • Published on

    Hallmarks of 'successful' directors

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Effectiveness Governance Performance Value Creation
    Picture
    In 2014, I observed that aspects of corporate governance and board work had not changed much in 25 years. Having just re-read the book that informed that conclusion (Making it Happen, by John Harvey-Jones), I've been reflecting on the relevance of the author's comments in today's world, especially ruminations on board effectiveness and three defining hallmarks of a successful director:
    • First, directors must feel responsible for the future of the company. When something goes wrong, you should feel a degree of worry and concern and want to contribute to its resolution.
    • Second, directors must be able to influence the general direction of both the board and its decisions. Diversity of thought is beneficial: groupthink (and other variants of #metoo thinking) has no place in a boardroom. You must be able to influence others to change their mind from time-to-time—and be prepared to consider other arguments and change your mind as well.
    • Third, a director's contribution must be constructive. Have you read and understood the board papers? Have you asked questions before the meeting. Are your comments during the meeting helpful or destructive? Do you challenge ideas with honesty, integrity and in good faith? Do you help move the debate forward, building on the ideas of others, or do you reiterate comments of others and foster ill-will?
    Are these hallmarks still applicable in today's fast-paced, technically-savvy world?
    Some commentators assert that board effectiveness is the result of compliance with corporate governance codes and various structural forms. Others, including me, place a heavier emphasis on the capabilities and behaviours of directors on the basis that the board is a social group: men and women who need to work together. (That is not to say compliance is inappropriate. It is necessary but it is not sufficient.)
    ​My recent observations and empirical research suggest that Harvey-Jones' hallmarks remain as relevant today as when they were first proposed, three decades ago. But that is just my view. What is your experience? ​