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    Regulatory interventions to drive better outcomes: A bridge too far?

    Accountability Corporate Governance Integrity Sustainability Tough Questions
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    The practice of corporate governance has garnered much attention over the past couple of decades; curiosity about boards growing each time news of a corporate failure and serious misstep becomes public. While those with axes to grind are quick to jump on their hobbyhorses, failure studies indicate that suggestions of hubris, malfeasance, narcissism, ineptitude, incompetence and poor engagement are not without basis.
    More recently, a wider group of so-called stakeholders and claimants have raised their voices, arguing that companies are having a negative effect on a range of social and environmental concerns. The ESG initiative, established in 2005 to put pressure on boards to report their activities and performance more fully, has become a movement (even an industry for personal and professional gain in the eyes of some). 
    On the weight of evidence presented in the media, it would be easy to conclude that practices of companies, and the system that underlies modern commerce—capitalism—are detrimental to sustainable life and wellbeing. Firing shots at boards and companies is easy, because they are visible and command media attention. But are such responses justified? What if the assumptions and motivations that underpin investor, regulator and activist critiques are flawed, or the bases for regulatory interventions ill-advised?
    Some companies deserve criticism, of course. They should be called out and held to account. But many (most) operate within their means. Unsurprisingly, the boards of some reputable companies are reportedly pushing back on the expectations of some institutional investors, which, they say, have become over-prescriptive and formulaic. Alongside, some boards say new disclosure reporting rules being introduced, by the FSB Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) amongst others, are counterproductive—for they add costs without any apparent benefit.
    Together, this begs an awkward question: Are the actions of some, who claim to be acting in the name of sustainability and a fairer society, actually an attempt to exert power and control for their own purposes? And, if so, are current attempts to establish regulations to enforce certain practices on companies reasonable or are they a bridge too far? It is little wonder that relationships between some boards and shareholders are starting to fracture, and society is becoming tribal.
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    Are TLCs important, or are they NMP?

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Governance Integrity Performance Strategy Sustainability Tough Questions
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    The opportunity to embrace a transport technology that is cleaner, quieter and considerably cheaper to operate (than petrol or diesel alternatives) is attractive—once the initial purchase price hurdle leapt. The purported benefits seem to be significant, but does the reality match the rhetoric? As with any proposal to embrace system-level change, the costs of moving from one technology to another are far from trivial. If an assessment is to be complete, the total lifetime costs (TLCs) need to be considered; that is, the sum total of all costs incurred over a product/system’s lifetime (includes manufacture, operation, disposal).
    In the case of electric vehicles, what of the economic, environmental and social costs of extracting metals for battery ingredients; logistics and manufacturing; replacement of batteries when they are spent; battery disposal; and, of upgrading the power generation and distribution network to provide adequate electrical power to recharge batteries? Many of these are being quietly ignored, it seems. Not my problem, some argue, as if out of sight is out of mind. This short article argues that when the TLCs are factored in, the benefits associated with a seemingly compelling technology (in this case the adoption of electric powered vehicles and other devices with battery power packs) may not be as great as what has been claimed.
    And so to the purpose of this muse, which is not to argue the benefits or otherwise of adopting electrically powered vehicles. Rather, it is to table an issue often overlooked by board of directors considering so-called strategic projects: total lifetime costs.
    When faced with a strategically-significant proposal, boards first need to check for alignment, by testing whether the proposal is contributory to the corporate strategy (spoiler alert: often linkages are tenuous). Assuming it is, directors should satisfy themselves that total lifetime costs have been included. Only then can the question of whether the recommendation should be embraced or rejected be debated.
    Why might this be important? Directors are duty-bound to act in the best interests of the company. That means taking all relevant information into account. 
    If boards ignore externalities, or abuse the social, environmental and economic capitals consumed in the operation of the company, the governed company is unlikely to endure over the longer term. And in so doing, directors may be exposing themselves, unwittingly, to legal challenge as well.
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    Morally-accountable governance?

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Integrity Performance Tough Questions
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    Much has been made in recent weeks of the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Social and mainstream media has been awash with commentary, both about the situation on the ground, and of various moral and ethical issues arising, not to mention significant geopolitical and balance of power impacts. 
    The Western world has rallied in support of Ukraine. Governmental–, corporate– and community–level responses have been announced and taken including accepting refugees, providing humanitarian support, and organising fund-raising and community support. Governments have imposed economic and trade sanctions as well. Many companies have decided to withdraw from the market. Others have chosen to remain, for a variety of reasons. Some, who initially held the line, have subsequently changed their mind after feeling the effects of a backlash. Directors have resigned from boards too, signalling they have no interest in continuing to serve on the boards of Russian companies. ​
    To say the situation is fluid and outlook is uncertain is an understatement. In cynefin–speak,  the appropriate descriptor is 'chaotic', meaning rapid response is appropriate: searching for the 'right' answers is futile. 
    Despite the ambiguity and uncertainty, directors must continue to make decisions, to govern. In a crisis, most boards, rightly, focus on the here and now. Strategy and strategic initiatives are put to one side, and accountability may languish too. All available resources are applied to understanding and stabilising the situation.
    But after the heat has subsided and the situation is brought under control, boards need to take stock. They owe a duty of care (to themselves but also shareholders and legitimate stakeholders), for both their actions and those of management. Were the decisions made and actions taken during the crisis appropriate given the information to hand and prevailing situation at the time?
    The review may find the board operated within statutory and regulatory boundaries, and that decisions taken in averting the crisis were reasonable. But what if decisions and actions are found to have crossed moral or ethical boundaries? Where should accountability lie? The question of moral accountability cuts across  personal and professional reputation, organisational culture, and market confidence.
    And to the future, where should the board's moral compass point, what conduct is appropriate, and how should the board's actions be assessed?
    • ​What moral standard should directors be held accountable to (if any)?
    • What might morally-accountable governance look like, in practice?
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    The blame game

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Diversity Effectiveness Ethics Governance Integrity Leadership Performance
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    News of a new variant of the coronavirus emerged this week. B.1.1.529 (now Omicron, a moniker assigned by the World Health Organization) was first isolated by scientists in South Africa. Already, it has been detected in several neighbouring countries and in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Czechia, Hong Kong, Germany, Australia and Israel. Governments are reportedly “scrambling to protect their citizens from a potential outbreak". These responses are supposedly to protect but also, undoubtedly, to buy time.
    Given the experiences since the coronavirus disease was first detected and subsequently declared to be a global pandemic, the reactions to the latest variant are hardly surprising. News agencies and social media commentators have been up to their usual antics; newsfeeds are abuzz. Fear is a powerful catalyst, of course. But reliable guidance to indicate whether Omicron is more or less contagious, and more or less virulent, is yet to emerge. For example, the two cases in Australia are asymptomatic and both people are fully vaccinated. A calm response is needed.
    Another interesting aspect of the current situation is the response to those who first alerted the world to what they had discovered. When virologists in South Africa openly shared the results of their advanced gene sequencing tests, others (especially in so-called advanced economies) were quick to point the finger. They accused several countries in southern Africa of being the source of the outbreak, and ostracised them by banning travel—even from countries with no recorded cases—demonstrating the blame game is alive and well.
    Effective leaders (boards) do not get caught up in the blame game. They take another path:
    • They think strategically and dynamically;
    • they seek multiple perspectives, and consider a wide range of options and possibilities;
    • they are proactive, formulating plans ahead of time to ensure they and those around them can respond well to various scenarios that might emerge, including scenarios that are difficult or even impossible to predict;
    • they document plans, response options and desired outcomes into risk management frameworks; and,
    • they communicate openly with others.
    Then, having prepared and decided upon a course of action, effective boards remain engaged. They keep their eyes open, scanning for weak signals that might portend danger. If danger strikes, they engage immediately and fully—supporting the executive response but remaining calm at all times.
    Is your board well-equipped to lead in an event that threatens the company’s prosperity or viability? And what is the likelihood it will oversee an appropriate response? Will it work calmly with the executives as a conjoint team to assess the situation and activate an appropriate response, or will it remain aloof and descend into finger pointing (perhaps because directors are more interested in protecting their personal reputation)? If there is any chance of the latter, consideration should be given to replacing the board with directors who are prepared to take their duties more seriously.
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    Governance: A lesson from tennis

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Governance Integrity Performance Rules
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    Tennis is a wonderful game; almost anyone can play. From schoolchildren to elite professional players, the sport is exhilarating; the excitement is often palpable. 
    One of the reasons tennis is attractive is that it is straightforward. The boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable play are, usually, well marked. The ball is served, and if is returned and bounces within the boundaries, play continues. If not, the score is adjusted and play is restarted with another serve. But, neither the net nor the lines play the game, players do; winning or losing is the result of two players (or four, if doubles) having played against each other within the playing space. ​
    The distinction in tennis between the rules, the playing of the game, and the score at the end has strong parallels in governance. 
    Boards are charged with playing the game (that is, governing—providing steerage and guidance, in pursuit of an agreed goal) within the boundaries of various statutes, regulations and policies (the rules). The 'result' is company performance, which is usually reported in the annual report and any other reports to legitimate stakeholders. ​As with the distinction in tennis, neither the statutes or regulations, nor the annual report are the game. The 'game' is governance, and it is played by the board. Statutes and regulations are necessary, without doubt, but they are no more governance than rules are tennis.
    Another facet of tennis is the player ranking table, which identifies comparisons between players at a population level. The very best players feature at the top; lesser players, further down. Positioning on the ranking table can be a source of motivation for players (to train harder, to embrace various tactics to improve their performance, for example), But position alone does not improve playing standards, player skill or on-court conduct. 
    And so it is with boards and governance. The position a company occupies on a ranking table (adherence to corporate governance standards or ESG metrics, for example) provides a comparative indication of how the company measures up against others. But that is all—to read in more is folly. The likelihood of ranking companies by corporate governance scores improving standards [compliance], for example, is about as tenuous as ranking tennis players improves player conduct. Why so? Standards and rules are thresholds; boundaries that distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable. Nothing more, and nothing less.
    Tennis players wanting to improve their game focus on fitness, technique, strategy and tactics. Similarly, companies intent on improving performance need to focus their attention and efforts on purpose, strategy and execution.
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    (Mis)counting the cost?

    Accountability Complexity Decision Making Effectiveness Integrity Tough Questions
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    Like many people, I've been reading reports of the spread of COVID-19, and the impact it is clearly having on both the health and well-being of communities, and the economy. The number of confirmed cases is growing. Daily reports in New Zealand show confirmed and probable cases (April 3: 772 cases, 96 probable). Globally, the number of deaths attributed to COVID-19 also continues to climb, even though the vast majority of the deceased had comorbidities.
    Stepping beyond the human elements for a moment (anxiety, cabin-fever, ambivalence, physical distancing), aspects of the reportage have confused me (and others as well, I know), to the point I wonder about the underlying motivations of some of the reporters.
    ​Consider the case count: How many people have or have had COVID-19 in New Zealand? The following data lifted from the Ministry of Health website:
     
    Cases
    Probables
    Total
    April 2
    723
    74
    797
    April 3
    772
    96
    868
    The New Zealand media is reporting the total (797, 868) as the number of cases of COVID-19 in New Zealand. But, when the Ministry of Health's criteria is applied (definition of a probable case, here), the actual number of cases is the lower number (723, 772). The WHO, too, is reporting these same official numbers.
    The question that emerges from this analysis is straightforward: Why does the media persist in overstating the case count? Is it ineptitude, bias, or something more sinister?
    Fatalities: Official reports from around the world have been clear: many (most, but perhaps not all) of the patients who have died had comorbidities at the time of death. Was COVID-19 actually the cause of all the reported deaths (as the media has implied), or was it a contributory factor alongside other factors?
    In and of themselves, these misrepresentations by the media are probably of little consequence—until you consider that they may be indicative of a bigger problem that does merit attention.
    If New Zealand is to climb out of the hole it is now in, some bold decisions are needed. Decision-makers need to think strategically, not tactically. There is widespread agreement that the social and economic costs of the measures currently being taken in New Zealand in response to the COVID-19 outbreak are going to be very high. The effects of the community lockdown, widespread economic destabilisation and imposition of high levels of sovereign debt will probably linger for a long time. They may be generational.
    ​The decision to stop was easy; it has been made (although questions remain over whether the border is actually closed). The looming decisions concern when and how to restart. Ultimately, the quality of these decisions will be, to a large extent, dependent on the quality of evidence presented. If the government is to expedite the economic recovery, it needs to set ideology and worst-case models aside, and enlist seasoned, non-partisan critical thinkers to analyse the raw data, draw rational conclusions and present pragmatic recommendations. Without this, the real cost will continue to climb; a winter of discontent indeed.