Tags

  • Published on

    On succession planning: Yes, but three years out?

    Governance Leadership Management Performance Strategy
    Acer Computer, once a strong and proud manufacturer and exporter of personal computer products, has been doing it tough lately. Record losses in the last few years, as the company has struggled to adjust its strategy to the shift from desktop computers to mobile devices, have seen the company chew through three chairmen in fairly quick succession. There have been arguments between the CEO and the board over strategy as well. What has gone wrong? Apart from missing the market shift to mobile devices, I wonder whether the company has run out of ideas and has become stale. The last three chairmen have been company stalwarts for example, steeped in the culture and history of the business. Realistically, how much fresh thinking would you expect to emerge in such environments?

    Now the founder has stepped in. A outsider CEO has been appointed, for the first time, to lead the company—and to become the chairman in three years' time. This first part of this is good; it should see the introduction of some new strategic options, but only if the founder (who has come out of retirement to occupy the chair) allows it to be so. However, the second part—of anointing a leader three years before the fact, in an industry sector characterised by rapid change and tectonic shifts, is a huge call. I would have thought it made much more sense to recruit the new CEO and then recruit a new (and probably but not necessarily independent) chairman in twelve months' time. This would give the incoming CEO time to get underway, begin to deliver on the confidence the founder has placed in him, without the additional burden of preparing to add the chairman role at the beginning of year three. What say the new CEO is no good? What say a different skills and expertise mix is required to lead the board effectively in the future? The founder has, in effect, closed off the possibility of introducing new thinking around the board table—even though this seems to have been one of his aims. 

    Complex businesses need highly capable leaders: two good heads are almost universally better than one. Keeping one's options open, to react and respond to changing market forces is smart. Painting one self into a corner is not. Notwithstanding this, the founder can exert influence as he wishes. My view—that the longer-term future of the business, and of the value to shareholders in particular, may have been better served with a succession plan that revolved around two separate appointments—probably doesn't count for much. 

    What do you think?
  • Published on

    The Alternative Board: caveat emptor

    Governance Leadership Management Performance
    I have just stumbled across a new conceptualisation of governance, one that looks great on the surface but may actually be troublesome underneath. It's called The Alternative Board.

    The concept is that of "DIY governance", whereby owners and managers of small and medium businesses join a membership organisation to share ideas and provide support. Similar organisations abound in the market; BNI and Chambers of Commerce being two well-established examples. However, when one looks a little more closely, The Alternative Board has some unusual characteristics:
    • The organisation is actually a franchise business headquartered in the USA
    • A press release issued today states that members "act as boards of directors for each other"

    Membership of an organisation that provides assistance and collegial support is a good thing, although prospective members may baulk when they consider that this is not a classical break-even membership organisation that exists for the good of the members. The primary motivation seems to be the generation of profits for the owners—that's why franchises exist after all. Owners of smaller businesses that utilise a partnership or sole trader ownership structure can decide what they think about this and whether the proposition delivers value or not.

    Stepping past this first point, there is a larger and potentially more troublesome question for those who operate their business as a company. Advisors that perform tasks similar to those of boards of directors can be deemed to be directors. As such, well-meaning members may, unknowingly and unwittingly, become bound by the Companies Act (and amendments) and the legal duties of directors.

    Given these characteristics, and the implications of them, my recommendation to owners and managers who are considering whether or not to become members of The Alternative Board is this: Do your homework first. Caveat emptor.
  • Published on

    Hyundai: navigating along a pot-holed road

    Governance Leadership Performance
    The rather smooth road along which Hyundai has been travelling in recent years just got bumpy:
    • Yesterday, reports emerged of some rather shonky decision-making in the Hyundai boardroom, whereby a major land transaction was approved by the board, even though it did not know the ($10B!) price tag. The market reacted by stripped $8B off the value of the company's shares. Strike one.
    • Today, it was the workers turn. Over three-quarters of the workforce walked off the job, in protest. The union had been negotiating employment terms and conditions, and had been stonewalled by "cost issues". It now turns out the cost issues may have been related to the land transaction. Strike two.

    Claims (that the land purchase will enhance brand value) and counter-claims (that the Chairman wields outsized influence) are circulating. Whereas the company has performed well in recent times, things may not have been as rosy on the inside as they seemed to be from the outside. Clearly, Hyundai has struck a nasty section of potholed road. The board and shareholders face some difficult decisions:
    • Will the directors admit their rather large mistake and at least offer their resignations?
    • Will the management team, who successfully pulled the wool over the board's eyes, now respect the authority of the board?
    • Will the shareholders step in and shake-up the board?

    One hopes the shareholders, board and management might set their egos and inherent response (save face) to one side, to create and implement a plan to repair a now-damaged brand image. This nasty series of potholes will not be fatal to Hyundai's long-term prospects if the three parties act quick and smartly, and do so together as one. However, if they don't strike three may not be too far away.
  • Published on

    And so the CEO remuneration escalator continues...upwards

    Governance Leadership Performance Societal Wellbeing
    The latest round of annual reporting in New Zealand confirms that the size of CEO remuneration packages are continuing to track upwards. Reports from SkyTV, Ebos and others suggest that the now well-established trend shows no signs of slowing down.

    The concept of executives (actually, all staff) receiving remuneration commensurate with their performance and the value they add to the corporation sits comfortably with me. However, the steady spiral upwards of CEO packages, at what seems to be an unchecked rate, may be the harbinger of a longer term problem: that any linkage between the package, actual performance and market forces is lost. If boards are truly focussed on the optimisation of performance in accordance with the wishes of shareholders, then boards need to ask the following three questions every year:
    • Is value being delivered by the CEO? 
    • What is the company prepared to pay for that value?
    • Are alternative CEOs available if the incumbent declines any package offered?

    I am sure that the first and second questions are being asked by boards: the evidence is in the packages. However, I suspect the third question gets much attention. If a board was exploring its options, the likelihood of being captured by the CEO (or their reputation at least) should be much lower. While easy answers are unlikely to exist, boards need to grapple with these matters, by asking and acting on all three questions. Until they do, the law of supply-and-demand is likely to prevail, and the upward trend is likely to continue unabated, possibly to the detriment of long-term shareholder value.
  • Published on

    Where should the accountability benchmark be placed?

    Governance Leadership Performance
    Corporate boards and executive managers have endured some criticism of late, as yet another wave of reports of incompetence, fraud and hubris have reached the public domain. Some directors have been lambasted for their actions, while others have avoided any direct consequences. Clearly, this raises an interesting question of consistency. Where should the accountability benchmark for acceptable director performance be placed? 

    My sense is that directors need to think very carefully about why they are appointed and what duties they must fulfil having accepted any appointment. All directors have a duty of care and a duty of loyalty—to the company or to the shareholders (depending on the jurisdiction) and not to themselves. This means that the director role is a servant role, of serving the best interests (of the company/shareholders). In fulfilling these duties, directors need to ensure they are adequately informed and well-intentioned, lest the wool is pulled over their eyes or they make decisions that are not consistent with their duties. The role of the director bears a weighty responsibility, so directors need to take their appointments seriously. Most do, but some, clearly, flout the boundaries of moral and ethical acceptability. 

    Directors need to be beyond reproach, and clear demarcations of what is acceptable—and what is not—need to be established. The challenge, of course, is holding directors to this level of performance, in the public domain and through any legal processes that may be required.
  • Published on

    Outsource the board? I don't think so.

    Governance Leadership Performance
    The contentious topic of board performance seems to be getting more and more attention in the popular press. The attention is great, because boards are responsible for company performance, in accordance with the wishes of owners, and they need to be held accountable. However, not all of the discussion is helpful. For example, this provocative article appeared in the Economist recently. While the article was well-written, the proposal it contained—to outsource the board—was irksome. I remember tweeting about it at the time.

    The board is a proxy for absentee owners, to represent their interests. Why any owner (shareholder) would allow a board to (re)outsource what is, in effect, an arrangement that is already outsourced is beyond me. If the board is not delivering the results the owners want it should be replaced, not outsourced. Thankfully, an influential commentator has provided this rejoinder to Schumpter's article, and in so doing reintroduced some much needed balance and a modicum of sensibility.