Tags

  • Published on

    Boardroom behaviours: What role culture?

    Accountability Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Strategy
    I've been reading back through some older Musings this week, to review (and smile at) ideas that were front-of-mind a couple of years ago. Which ones have been superceded or discredited; which has been forgotten; and, which are still topical?
    This one, on boardroom motivations and habits, appears to still be topical today—perhaps even more so than when it was written in April 2012. How so? I was party to a discussion on boardroom behaviour today and a question of culture was raised. To what extent might culture drive conduct and ultimately business performance? The results of a recent survey conducted by Grant Thornton suggest that culture is a huge factor in corporate governance and strategy. There is much evidence to suggest that good business performance is an outcome of 'good' culture (here's one piece).
    However, culture is complex. Consequently, when one of the discussants said that a senior leader at ASIC is looking for policies and procedures to support [a positive] culture in boardrooms I was bemused, to say the least. How might one successfully codify—much less 'legislate'—culture, in pursuit of good conduct and presumably good business performance? 
    A long time ago, Drucker famously said that culture eats strategy for breakfast. Might the corollary be that a well-written code of ethical conduct that is periodically discussed, agreed and pursued by directors trump any attempt to 'legislate' any particular culture into being?
    Compliance-based regimes rarely achieve much more than to incur expense, resentment and, sometimes, avoidance. That is well-known. However, while codes are by no means fool-proof they can be helpful if every director 'signs up' and willingly embraces them. My research suggests that the key lies with director behaviour and social interactions in the boardroom, not the code per se. 
    That said, why all boards that are serious about creating a positive culture both within the boardroom and the wider business they govern have not implemented a suitable code of conduct is beyond me. It is a matter of accountability. Perhaps boards that decline to travel this path have not realised that the fish rots from the head!
  • Published on

    Director's fees: Please sir, can we have some more?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Strategy
    The results of the annual director remuneration survey are in. (Read the media release here, and press reports here and here.) Fees have climbed about four per cent in the last twelve months, slightly ahead of CPI. The survey results also indicate that director workload has increased by 41 per cent over the same period.
    A cursory analysis suggests that the workload increase is, to a large extent, a consequence of increased compliance requirements: more rules and regulations. While a 'more work, more pay' argument is eminently justifiable, is it fair? Moves to increase directors' fees as a consequence of increased compliance workload may deliver an unintended consequence: a back-to-the-future experience. Boards are likely to become more defensive and cautious, contributing relatively little to what they are there for—the pursuit of company performance.
    Rather than peg directors fees to time and compliance activity, it might be more productive to ask whether company value (however that might be expressed) is growing as a consequence of board contributions. Many leading commentators (Bob Monks, Bob Garratt, Morten Huse and Richard Leblanc, amongst others) have suggested that boards need to become more strategic, by looking to the future. Yet statutes and regulations cannot be ignored. Boards and shareholders need to wrestle with this tension. Questions of strategy, decision-making, division of labour, accountability and ethics need to be debated and resolved. Ultimately, viable resolutions are most likely to emerge from a joint commitment to the long-term purpose of the company.
    The board needs to drive company performance in pursuit of shareholder wishes, while also ensuring that statutory and regulatory requirements are appropriately satisfied. If the board demonstrably leads the company forward, and does so in accordance with both the agreed purpose of the company and relevant statutes, shareholders are unlikely to baulk at proposals to reward the contributions of directors appropriately.
  • Published on

    Want to learn about emerging corporate governance and board practice themes?

    Conferences Governance Leadership Performance Speaking Engagements
    Is effective corporate governance and board practice, in pursuit of high business performance, an important priority for you and your colleagues? If so, please read on. 
    From 1 September, I will be meeting with directors, executives and researchers in several UK cities (London, Wolverhampton, Leeds, Dublin, Belfast and Canterbury) to discuss the role of the board in influencing business performance. While the schedule for my eleven-day visit is fairly full, some gaps remain for additional meetings. Please get in touch if you wish to meet or have a private chat. Alternatively, you may wish to introduce yourself at one of these public events:
  • Published on

    Internships: a vehicle for getting aspiring directors up to speed?

    Accountability Governance Performance
    The ‘profession’ of company direction seems to be beset with an interesting challenge: how can or should aspiring directors be introduced to boardrooms without compromising the quality of oversight and effectiveness of the board? A range of responses have been tried, with varying degrees of success. Might internships be a viable option? Thanks to the folk at Ethical Boardroom, I've had the honour of contributing to the debate. Click here to read to commentary, published in the Summer issue of Ethical Boardroom magazine.
    If you'd like to know more, or to engage a hearty debate, please get in touch.
  • Published on

    On the sources (and a possible remedy) of so-called "governance failure"

    Accountability Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Research Strategy
    The much-storied scandals at FIFA, HSBC and Toshiba have highlighted a plethora of weaknesses in the way large companies are led and run. Fingers have been pointed and blame apportioned. Management has copped a fair bit of flak, but the board has not been immune either. While the media has had a field day, finger pointing and broad statements provide little comfort to those in pursuit of long-term performance. Remedies are required.
    Reputability has studied a number of failures recently(*), in pursuit of remedies. The analysis identified nine prominent categories of weakness, the first six of which were influential in the majority of failures:
    • Board skill and NED control
    • Board risk blindness
    • Defective information to or from board
    • Leadership on ethos and culture
    • Risk from incentives
    • Risk from complexity
    • Risk glass ceiling
    • Charismatic leader
    • Poor crisis management
    When these factors are considered holistically, the stark implication is that failure appears to be associated with board weakness in at least three areas (engagement, strategy and risk). If boards are to make effective contributions, these weaknesses need to be resolved. And therein lies a challenge: a return to first principles, and a different conception of corporate governance is likely to be necessary. Will boards embrace such a change in pursuit of better business performance? Let's hope so.
    (*) The full Reputability Report, entitled Deconstructing failure—Insights for boards, is available here.
  • Published on

    The Toshiba case: Is it time to re-think our understanding of corporate governance?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Performance
    These seemingly innocuous statements are telling: Fix the compliance and the problem will be fixed. Yet history (Olympus, HSBC, FIFA, amongst many others) shows otherwise. Neither the 'monitor and comply' conception of corporate governance, nor the 'advise and monitor' variant espoused by many corporate governance codes and directors' institutes have achieved the desired outcomes. Yet, many boards dogmatically pursue such conceptions. 
    The problem seems to be more fundamental. The contemporary conception of corporate governance seems to be flawed. Consider these statements, which highlight the problem:
    How many more failures will it take to realise that additional layers of regulation and compliance-oriented boards that operate as policemen don't actually add value? How many more failures will it take to acknowledge that a new understanding of corporate governance and appropriate board practice might be appropriate? Emerging research seems to suggest that when boards adopt a strategic orientation, and corporate governance is re-conceived as a value-creating mechanism, increased performance is not only possible—it is potentially sustainable. Please get in touch if you'd like to know more.
    The now very public overstatement of profits at Toshiba (approximately US$1.22bn over six years) has led to the downfall of the chief executive, Mr Hisao Tanaka (below), and seven other senior managers, all of whom were also board directors. The share price has taken a 25 per cent hit and the company's reputation is in tatters. What a mess. At least there is a modicum of accountability and remorse, something sadly lacking in many other cases including HSBC and Lombard Finance. 
    Thankfully, people have begun thinking about what needs to change. So far, the response has followed a predictable course: The possibility of appointing independent directors to replace the disgraced directors has been mooted. Will this structural response be enough to fix the problem? Maybe, but I'm not convinced. Compliance responses rarely lead to sustainable change. (The compelling case is Sarbanes–Oxley: created post-Enron, it did little to prevent the GFC.)