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    On Wells Fargo: Actions and consequences? 

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Research
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    The storied fall from grace of Wells Fargo continues to produce fodder for both informed discussion and speculation. And rightly so. Much can be learned from this case, of a once-proud bank that started believing its own press, and then breaching ethical and legal boundaries. To maintain a fictitious facade undermines the confidence that many private citizens place in banks.
    The first, and most important learning is that when trust is eroded—regardless of whether through illegal and immoral actions or more simply ineptitude—consequences typically follow. In Wells Fargo's case they have, well mostly. The bank's share price and reputation have both taken a hit: mistrust being a heavy burden.
    Now, the results of an independent investigation into the fake accounts scandal have been published. The report is comprehensive (it is nearly 100 pages long). The stated goal of the investigation was to identify the root causes of "sales practice failures", so that "these issues can never be repeated and to rebuild the trust customers place in the bank". So, what was discovered?
    Expectedly, operational failings were uncovered. ​The report lays much of the blame on the shoulders of the then chief executive, Mr Stumpf. This is appropriate because the chief executive is the person who is normally responsible for operational performance, in accordance with both approved strategy and policy. Changes to personnel and practice have been made.
    ​What is perhaps surprising however, is what is not reported. The board does not appear to have looked in the mirror. Yes, the roles of chairman and chief executive have been separated and allocated to two different people—but what of the board's engagement in effective oversight of management? The board of directors knew of the sales practice failures as early as 2014. Remedial actions were (supposedly) taken in 2015, and management reported these were working. But who checked?
    That the board knew about the problem and remedial actions were supposedly taken is clear. What is far less clear is whether the board satisfied itself that the actions had in fact been taken and/or that the desired effects had been achieved. Sadly this is not uncommon. That the board trusted management, and blindly so it would seem, does not excuse the board from the consequences of the scandal that followed.
    The board-commissioned independent review has shone the light brightly on management. Problems have been identified and actions taken. This is good. Now, one significant step remains: the board should have a good long look in the mirror. 
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    Twelve months on: How much progress have we made?

    Accountability Decision Making Diversity Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Research Tough Questions
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    Just over twelve months ago (6 January 2016 to be exact), I wrote this muse, a reflection on both the state of corporate governance and the usage of the term. At that time, confusion over the use of the term 'corporate governance' was common, and the profession of director was shadowed somewhat by several high profile failures and missteps. The blog post seemed to hit a nerve, triggering tens of thousands of page views and searches within Musings; many hundreds of comments, questions, debates and challenges (including some from people who took personal offence that the questions were even asked); and, speaking requests from around the world. That many people were asking whether corporate governance had hit troubled waters and were searching for answers to improve board effectiveness was reassuring.
    That was twelve months ago. How much progress has been made since?
    At the macro level, seismic geo-political decisions; the rise of populism and the diversity agenda; and, risks of many types, especially terrorism and cyber-risk have altered the landscape. Also, new governance codes and regulations have been introduced to provide boundaries and guidance to boards. Yet amongst the changing landscape something has remained remarkably constant: the list of corporate failures or significant missteps emanating, seemingly, from the boardroom continues to grow unabated. Wynyard Group and Wells Fargo are two recent additions; there are many others.
    Sadly, companies and their boards continue to fail despite good practice recommendations in the form of governance codes and (supposedly) increasing levels of awareness of what constitutes good practice. This is a serious problem: it suggests that, despite the best efforts of many, progress has been limited. Clearly, ideas and recommendations are not in short supply, but what of their efficacy—do they address root causes or only the symptoms? And what of the behaviours and motivations of directors themselves, and the board's commitment to value creation (cf. value protection or, worse still, reputation protection)?
    That the business landscape is and will continue to be both complex and ever-changing is axiomatic. If progress is to be made, shareholders need to see tangible results (a reasonable expectation, don't you think?), for which the board is responsible. If the board is to provide effective steerage and guidance, it needs to be discerning, pursuing good governance practices over spurious recommendations that address symptoms or populist ideals. How might this be achieved? 
    An important priority for boards embarking on this journey towards effectiveness and good governance is to reach agreement on terminology, culture, the purpose of the company and the board's role in achieving the agreed purpose. If agreement can be reached, at least then the board will have a solid foundation upon which to assess options, make strategic decisions and, ultimately, pursue performance.
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    On corporate governance: The importance of a common understanding

    Accountability Ethics Family Business Governance Performance
    Corporate governance—the concept and the practice—has been the subject of much debate over the past two or three decades, especially as researchers, shareholders and the public have sought to make sense of the extent and meaning of the term and the appropriate role of the board.
    A cacophony of ideas and understandings have now pervaded our academies and directors' institutes (including that the scope of corporate governance extends well beyond the boardroom to include the whole of the organisation). As a concequence, the appropriate role of the board is not clear. Is it one of oversight and control, or is the pursuit of performance more important? The answer to this question is dependent on one other: What exactly is corporate governance? Many directors have become confused about these questions and, as a result, the appropriate role and contribution of the board.
    Thankfully, a straightforward answer is at hand.
    The term 'corporate governance' was coined just 56 years ago by Richard Eells, an academic. He used the term to describe "the structure and functioning of the corporate polity" (the board of directors). Sir Adrian Cadbury added that corporate governance is "the means by which companies are directed and controlled". In other words, corporate governance is an overarching term to encapsulate what boards (should) do as corporate goals are pursued. Corporate governance frameworks (such as those proposed by Tricker and Garratt) provide the underlying detail: they describe how the board should steer and guide the company it is responsible for governing. 
    Directors expecting to make effective contributions in 2017 and beyond would be well-advised to consider this what–how distinction very carefully: a common (and agreed) understanding is crucial if the board is to work harmoniously and decision-making is to be effective.
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    EIASM'16: Day one summary

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Research
    The 13th edition of the Corporate Governance Workshop convened by the European Institute of Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) was hosted by SDA Bocconi in Milano, Italy. Approximately 50 leading thinkers and researchers from over 20 countries gathered to explore emerging trends in the fields of board practice and corporate governance. Nearly 50 presentations were accepted onto the two-day programme. Highlights from three of the papers presented on the first day are summarised here (highlights from the second day are posted in a separate summary):
    • Alessandro Merendino (Coventry University) opened the conference with a very interesting presentation on the subject of the governance of mega-events. His case (the 2016 Rio Olympics) provided some very interesting insights about how mega-events are governed. The analysis of 43 in-depth interviews (with very senior managers and board members) revealed considerable structural complexity, partially dictated by political drivers at both the country and the Olympic Games organisation levels. Surprisingly (given a clear purpose was established—to deliver the Games), the primary focus of the system of corporate governance lay firmly on the monitoring end of the conformance–performance. However, when other factors including that the roles of president of Rio16 and the chairman of the board were held by the same person, and the other board directors were appointed by the chairman are factored in, the strong compliance focus is perhaps less surprising. The preservation of personal reputation appears to have been a far more significant moderator of the behaviour and decision-making than the successful delivery of the Games. Given these insights, it is little wonder why the pre-Olympic planning often runs late, and the Games invariably end up costing far more than originally anticipated (leaving the host city with a long-term debt burden). Consequently, those considering 
    • Jari Melgin (Finland) delivered a powerful paper that revealed some great insights about decision rights and where power actually lies (in the boardroom or the executive suite?). Thresholds of decision rights determine the boundaries of power between board and management. If decision thresholds are too lax for example, boards may not properly represent shareholder interests. Similarly, if decision thresholds are too tight or too extensive, then powers transform boards into management teams. He summarised the results of an extensive research project. A core funding was that the  power to make decisions (of various types but especially strategic decisions) has 'formal' (stated decision rules: what is supposed to happen) and 'real' (what actually happens) characteristics. Decision control can be stratified into hard law, soft law (codes, etc), articles (company specific rules) and board rules layers. Melgin concluded that 'board rules' are especially significant because they provide guidance to the board in the case that a decision fits within the boundaries of hard and soft law and articles but the basis and delegation (for the decision) is still not clear.  
    • Joanna Pousset (Barcelona) presented an interesting talk on conflict amongst corporate elites (i.e., between directors and the chief executive). Using the largest construction company in Europe (VINCI), Pousset described a series of conflicts that have entered the public domain, in an attempt to understand the intrinsic motivations of boards and executives during times of conflict. Pousset conducted an extensive analysis of media reports to build a picture of each conflict (there were several). She concluded that CEO duality (whether the CEO and chairman roles were held separately or by the same person) was a material factor. This finding was in stark contrast with a large body of research that shows that CEO duality is not a reliable indicator of board or board performance, at any level. That the analysis had arrived at this point was worrisome. Why the chairman or CEO was not approached for their perspective, even to support or refute the analysis, beggared belief.
    In sum, the day revealed a mix of interesting insights and concerns. In particular, one long-held concern (that many researchers continue to conduct research based on the analysis of publicly-available quantitative data) was upheld. Why researchers continue to investigate boards and corporate governance from a distance (outside the boardroom) is a mystery to me. If we are to truly understand what boards do, how decisions are made and influence is exerted by boards from and beyond the boardroom, then researchers need to adopt the recommendations of others: that direct observations are crucial to the gaining of reliable insights.
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    Wells Fargo: Is "We're sorry" sufficient?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership
    You must give newly appointed Wells Fargo Chief Executive Officer Tim Sloan credit. No sooner had disgraced former CEO John Stumpf left the building, Sloan delivered a speech to all employees to apologise for the scandal that had beset the company. That Sloan delivered an apology  is a good first step on the path towards redemption (the company boasts a long and proud history), even though "we're sorry for the pain" appears to be an apology for the angst employees faced rather than the fake accounts action itself. 
    Two things are especially notable in this case:
    • The board has been remarkably silent. This scandal rocked the entire firm, not to mention confidence in the banking sector. Why has the board not been more visible? Yes, Stumpf is gone. But why has the chairman not spoken yet? Did the board know of the decisions and activities that perpetrated the scandal? If so, why has accountability not reached to the boardroom? If not, why not? To be ignorant of something this big suggests the board may have not been making adequate enquiries. Were probing questions being asked of the chief executive, or was the boardroom a more passive environment?
    • The appointment of an insider (Sloan is a 29-year company veteran) to the position vacated by Stumpf (and to the board) is curious to say the least. Sloan would have been aware of the fake accounts scandal. An 'Acting Chief Executive' appointment (to provide leadership while a full recruitment process proceeded) would have been a better move. The appointment certainly raises questions about the level of due diligence and the recruitment process the board utilised prior to making the appointment.
    That Stumpf's (and now Sloan's) boss has both remained silent and appointed from within is very telling. 
    (Note to the Wells Fargo board: If you want to talk further, in total confidence, here are my contacts details.)
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    Poor corporate governance or plain fraud? Where's the line?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Performance
    South Africa's flag carrier, South African Airways, has hit turbulence. Severe turbulence. The airline, which is in financial trouble as a result, most probably, of some poor decisions in the past, has been negotiating a debt refinancing package. However, the package reportedly contains some unusual characteristics (read: extremely high fees). Now, a staff member has blown the whistle; the board has been called out; and, the matter is being investigated. 
    Even a cursory inspection suggests that something is amiss, and badly so. Problems that seem to stem from poor decision-making at the top of the organisation appear to be endemic. Whether the underlying driver is greed, hubris, corruption, ineptitude or something else remains to be seen. Regardless, South African Airways is in trouble. The board appears to be missing in action and the 'corruption' word has been mentioned making situation very messy, to say the least. 
    Sadly, SAA is not an isolated case. Recently, Sir Philip Green fell from grace; and, it was not that long ago that FIFA, Toshiba and Volkswagen suffered 'setbacks'. It's little wonder that hard working people have any time for boards of directors. The sources of governance failure are well-storied. However, the natural response—hard law—has done little to improve things (because people who want to generally find their way around things that inhibit them). Different measures are required, perhaps starting with culture, values and purpose. Board appointment processes also need to change. Unless and until 'bad eggs' are exorcised from boardrooms and held to account, the actions of a few will, no doubt, continue to make life hard for the rest of the director community.