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    ICMLG Conference: Post-conference summary

    I've just arrived home after a demanding but highly enjoyable trip to attend the ICMLG Conference in Bangkok. On the long flight back to New Zealand I found myself reflecting on the conference overall. Here's a selection of what I wrote down in my notebook:
    • While diverse in topic, research methodology and scope, the general calibre of papers and presentations was impressive. ACI did a great job pulling together and running the conference.
    • Input-output research designs and quantitive data sets continue to dominate the research landscape, despite qualitative data and empirical data being more well suited to understanding and explaining social dynamic phenomena (like governance).
    • The case study approach appears to be gaining ground as a credible methodology for governance and leadership research.
    • Those researchers who are using qualitative methods are attempting to move from purely descriptive (exploratory) studies towards explanatory studies. (One of my objectives in attending ICMLG was to gain a better understanding of contemporary research methodologies.)
    • Relatively few researchers are investigating the link between governance and company performance.
    • I met some wonderful people! The conference was a melting pot of cultures. People from many different nations, religions and cultures were in attendance—a true "global village".
    Overall, I learnt a lot and the investment was well worthwhile. ICMLG 2014 will be at Babson College in Boston, Mass. On the strength of this year's conference, expect to see me in Boston in 2014!
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    ICMLG Conference: Reflection #6

    Gender diversity: a new competitive advantage?

    Manasi Shukla (Bangkok University) and Aurilla Aurelie Arntzen (Buskerud University, Norway) presented a conceptual paper which explored gender diversity in management and systems design as an important element for competitive advantage.

    They outlined the challenges many women face, whereby many systems and products are designed by men, without any significant consideration for female cognitive or physical elements. They suggested that a woman's response to "design shortfalls" is to dismiss or avoid using a particular product.

    Shukla and Arntzen tentatively proposed a leadership practices inventory, to assist organisations design for, and accommodate, the needs of women. They asserted that organisations that take such steps have the opportunity to secure a competitive advantage in the marketplace. This is an interesting assertion—one that merits further research via the analysis of empirical data to determine if/how the practices they suggest are indeed significant. I look forward to reading more about this in the future.
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    ICMLG Conference: Reflections #3

    Management attitudes toward currency hedging in a dynamic environment

    Worasinchai (Bangkok University, Thailand) investigated the relationship between management attitudes and hedging risks in foreign exchange transactions. She analysed data gathered from semi-structured interviews, and presented an interesting theoretical model created to inform best practice to assist firms, trading partners and central government trading with Thai firms.

    Worasinchai concluded—for large Thai firms and firms trading with Thai firms at least—that management attitude has an important impact on the strategic choices that a firm makes when considering currency hedging. She found that more conservative attitudes seem to be associated with a longer-term planning horizon. When asked about risk and subsequent performance, Worasinchai acknowledged this work is yet to be undertaken. If progress can be made in this area, and relationships and correlations between hedging, risk and subsequent company performance identified, then the prospect for a more stable global trading environment may well await.
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    On compensating directors...

    Should directors receive performance-based pay for their contributions?

    This is an interesting question. Performance-based pay has become commonplace amongst senior executives and sales staff in the last decade or so. The model is straightforward: perform well (by achieving agreed objectives) and get paid a commission, be awarded stock or receive recognition via some sort of bonus. Performance standards are generally set by a more senior manager. The system seems to work reasonably well. However, an increasing trends in recent years is the implementation of similar performance based reward systems in the boardroom. But is this smart? Do performance-based pay systems motivate the "right" behaviours amongst directors?

    Whereas management and staff are directly responsible for implementing strategy and achieving performance goals that are determined by a more senior party, the Board is not. In addition to their role being quite different (to determine strategy, monitor performance and manage risk), the link between what Boards do and company performance is tenuous, at best. Simply, we do not understand how Boards contribute to performance. Further, Boards are endogenous—they largely set their own agenda and determine the company's objectives. In establishing performance-based pay systems for themselves, Boards are immediately conflicted. One way of ensuring performance-based payments are made is to set artificially low targets (for example). I'm not sure this is a good way of maximising company performance, or motivating healthy behaviours, but it is a way of being paid(!)

    My preference is towards rewarding directors through fixed fee payments for their contribution. If they are contributing, they receive their fee. This would be the default. However, if they are not contributing effectively, this should become known through a formal Board review process. Shareholders should have access to review documentation, and only re-appoint directors that are contributing. 

    This sounds remarkably easy on paper, however the topic of today's muse is hotly contested amongst practitioners and academics alike. What's your view?
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    What does "becoming tech-aware" actually mean for Boards?

    Over the last 6–12 months, a steady stream of articles, blogposts and on-line discussions calling for Boards to become more "tech-aware" have appeared. I've read many of these, and have concluded that the drivers for many can be grouped into one of two categories:
    • IT Managers and technology professionals have become frustrated that their reports and their proposals to implement new systems are not understood or approved by the Board.
    • Boards have been caught out (often at considerable cost to the company through project failure, customer impact or balance sheet stress) because they've approved technology programmes or investments that fail to deliver as promised, or simply are not aligned with agreed corporate objectives.

    The time to bridge the chasm between what the Board needs from IT and what IT delivers has long-since past. Calls for Boards to become tech-aware need to be addressed. However, there appears to be a problem that needs to be called out: what does "becoming tech-aware" actually mean? And how does a Board achieve such a state? Rather than simply call out the problem, or brow-beat directors with standards (ISO 38500, for example), companies need to make progress on these questions. Several options are available.

    Seek IT-expertise when making new Board appointments: The recruiting of IT-experts (former CIOs for example) can provide an immediate gains, particularly to help Boards understand trends, and reports and proposals from management. However, this option can backfire if appointees are inclined towards detail, jargon-laced statements, and the ardent promotion of the latest trends and fads.

    Require the CEO and management to ensure all papers (reports and proposals) explicitly state business and strategic impacts: This is an outstanding option, and one that all Boards and CEOs should actively pursue. If management wants support for investments, then it is their responsibility to package proposals in such a way that the risks are made plain, and that impact on business performance and strategic goals is made explicitly clear. Boards have a role to play, by specifying how information needs to be presented in order to be most useful.

    Boards request and schedule presentations from external specialists: The pace of technology change—and the business and strategic impacts that follow—continues unabated. If Boards are to maximise the value of the organisation effectively, they need to understand emerging trends and developments. Rather than secure this knowledge from staff (and run the risk of only hearing what management wants to say), Boards should seek contributions directly, just as they (should) seek any other strategic market comment, risk or audit advice. The goal is to gain a broader perspective, to inform the debate and the selection of strategic options.

    It should go without needing to be said, but for completeness, these options are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a combinatory approach, with all three options in place, is likely to raise the chances of a strong outcome.
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    Local Councils: You need to resolve your #corpgov conflicts

    The ugly face of conflicted interests in local council governance raised it head in Wellington again today. In September, I suggested that it was time for Councils (and Councillors) to resolve the conflict of interest that exists when they appoint themselves to subsidiary company boards.

    This morning, the Dominion Post published a front page article stating that Wellington City Councillors had voted to axe perks for board appointments. This sounds like a step in the right direction, however the decision will only become effective from the next term! Further, Councillors can (and probably will) still appoint themselves to plum roles. This smacks of cronyism and the feathering one's nest for personal gain.

    It's disappointing that the Council has not bitten the bullet by moving immediately to appoint independent directors to the Boards of subsidiary companies. The appointment of independent directors, through a robust appointment process, will achieve at least three positive outcomes:
    • Remove the conflict of interest that exists when Councillors appoint and pay themselves
    • Ensure the best possible skills are recruited to maximise business performance
    • (Begin to) restore public confidence in civic administration