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    REDUX: Towards a 'strategic board'

    Many commentators—academics and practitioners—agree that corporate governance is complex and difficult to get right. In the context of maximising business performance, boards must satisfy many demanding (and competing) priorities including shareholder expectations; legal and compliance requirements; the management of risk; the determination of future direction; and, the hiring (and sometimes firing) of the chief executive. Directing is a busy job, and it is one that takes time and commitment to do well. The steady stream of boardroom 'fails' in recent years (HSBC and Christchurch City Council amongst many others) and indiscretions (FIFA) suggests many boards are not doing their job as well as they need to. Why is this?
    • Are director's schedules too full to give each board the necessary time and effort?
    • Are boards defaulting to the arguably 'easier' task of performance monitoring, and disregarding strategy and future value?
    • Are directors simply not asking the right questions?
    • Is the safety of consensus thinking suppressing the debating of diverse options?
    Many aspects of boards and board practice have been studied in recent decades including structure, composition and boardroom behaviour in an effort to understand how boards work and how they might contribute to performance. Independent directors have been held up as being crucial to boards maintaining distance from the chief executive and to the effective oversight of performance. Gender (and other) diversity has been promoted heavily in many quarters. The forming of a strong team through high levels of engagement and desirable behaviours has also been explored. As yet, none of the research has exposed any conclusive results in terms of increased company performance and value creation.
    Imagine what board meetings might be like if the focus changed. They'd probably last longer. Directors would read their papers before meetings, and they would be actively engaged. There may be heated discussions. Necessarily, directors would sit on fewer boards. But perhaps, if boards were bold enough to change their focus, they might become more effective. Perhaps. Here's hoping.
    The original version of this muse, posted in December 2012, is available here.
    The prevailing theory of board–management interaction (agency theory) that underpins much of the current understanding of how boards work (or should work) appears to be flawed. It assumes that management is opportunistic and cannot be trusted and, therefore, needs to be closely monitored. Yet none of the structural provisions based on the theory (independence, incentives, various structures) have been causative to increased performance, despite considerable effort over many years.
    Rather than continue to dogmatically pursue a flawed model, we need to move on. The goal posts need to be shifted—from a focus on compliance, structure and composition to a focus on value creation. The notion of a strategic board suggests a focus on future performance and strategy; on high levels of engagement to understand the business and the market; on critical thinking and an independence of thought; and, on robust debates which explore a wide range of strategic options (diversity of thought being considered crucial to avoid consensus thinking). 
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    Directors: Are you paying attention?

    This call might not be popular in some quarters. However, emerging research appears to suggest that attentiveness (by way of active engagement in board practices, and strategic management tasks in particular) is crucial if directors are to have any hope of making a difference to the future prospects of the company they are charged with governing.
    If teamwork and effectiveness in the boardroom is important to you, it is likely to be important to your colleagues as well. Does your board have an established protocol on such matters? If not, a good starting point might be to schedule a discussion at an upcoming board meeting. 
    The board is the ultimate decision-making body in every company—it holds the mandate to optimise company performance in accordance with the wishes of shareholders, and it is the shareholders to whom the board must provide an account for their actions (or inaction). This is a weighty responsibility, especially when you consider the plethora of internal and external factors that can affect company performance. 
    Yet some directors seem to be more interested in collecting appointments than in adding value. Things can change in the blink of an eye. Consequently, directors need to be attentive (by guarding against distractionstiredness and having too many irons in the fire especially) if they hope to fulfil the responsibility delegated to them by shareholders.
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    Is it time to accelerate your company's success?

    If any of these questions triggered a thought in your mind, then perhaps we should talk. I will be in the UK in 1–11 September (for speaking engagements including the results of my latest research). If you would like to learn more about board practice, corporate governance, strategy and value creation, please get in touch so we can schedule a discussion. I'd be glad to learn about your business and understand how I can help. 
    • Are you eager to realise the potential of your UK-based business?
    • Do you have a robust strategy in place to drive the future success of your business?
    • How is your board of directors performing? 
    • Would you like to see more value from your board?
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    EURAM'15: So, what about outside directors?

    I had the pleasure of chairing a corporate governance topic session at EURAM this year, in which three papers on outside directors were presented. Each of the studies were fascinating. The first one explored director motivations, and the other two added emerging market contexts (China and India):
    • Axel Walther, Germany, presented a very interesting paper about the motivations of non-executive directors and board effectiveness. While many board researchers limit their investigations to a limited range of established board–management interactions theory (including most often agency theory), Walther and his colleagues incorporated organisational behaviour and psychology literature and theory in an effort to understand director motivations. This inter-discipline approach offers exciting possibilities for board research. While the results of the case research are preliminary, they did demonstrate that the motivational drivers of non-executive directors are complex, and that a straightforward split between intrinsic and extrinsic factors is somewhat simplistic. A more subtle differentiation is needed. The team has identified some possibilities. More analysis is now underway, to try to dig deeper into the data to try to isolate triggers to various motivations. From there, it may be possible to re-approach the original question, of the relationship between director motivations and board effectiveness.
    • Wenxuan Hou Hou, a Chinese national living and studying at University of Edinburgh, has been investigating non-executive directors in Chinese firms. Prior studies of director behaviours have reported mixed results. Wen decided to extend the research into an unstudied area—behaviour relating to dissenting director decisions. In China, voting in public company boardrooms must be made public. Thus any dissenting votes should be identifiable. Interestingly, the analysis conducted by Wen showed that a tiny percentage of the decisions made by Chinese boards included any dissenting votes, suggesting the voting tended to be unanimous. Wen concluded that it was unlikely that all directors agreed with proposals all of the time, but that other factors including 'power' and 'cultural norms' were likely to be moderating the decision preferences of directors. This raised the question of alignment. Were directors just following the leader (the chairman or the chief executive), or were they genuinely in agreement in proposals requiring decisions. Wen couldn't answer that question. However, he did say that further (qualitative) research might reveal what is actually going on. I suspect direct observations within Chinese boardrooms will be required, but that prove to be a difficult challenge!
    • Tara Shankar Shaw reported the findings of his quantitative study of data collective from Indian companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE500). Shaw wanted to find out whether institutional theory might offer explanatory support for any relationship between non-executive directors and firm performance. The audience pricked up their ears, because it sounded as though Shaw might be going to reveal a cause-and-effect relationship from the data. However, and to Shaw's credit, causality was not claimed (straightforward causality is rare in natural science and unheard of in social science). Rather, he reported mixed results (as would be expected in a quantitative study of this type). Shaw study was helpful, in that it added to the growing list of studies that challenge suggestions that any given board structure or composition is conducive, let alone causal, to firm performance.
    Perhaps the strongest message from this session was one that wasn't explicitly stated: that statistical analyses of quantitative data can only ever reveal correlations between variables (attributes) of interest—because variable measure change, not reasons. My hope is that researchers start to move beyond simply counting things, and soon. Precious research time would be far better spent collecting primary data, ideally from inside boardrooms, to understand what boards actually do, and then to draw conclusions from there.
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    EURAM'15: Corporate governance, firms and boards of directors

    Two interesting papers, that explored various aspects of chairman effectiveness and CEO succession, were presented during the late-morning session of the first day of EURAM2015:
    • Tien Nguyen, a doctoral candidate from the University of Sydney, presented preliminary results of her research on the influence of board chairman on firm performance. She suspected that share ownership was material to any influence, so designed a quantitative study to analyse some industry data. The preliminary analysis (which considers share ownership, tenure, prior industry experience and intra-industry networks) suggests the prior industry experience and share ownership are crucial to firm performance. However, Nguyen qualified her comments that the analysis is incomplete and that the results will be limited to correlations not explanations. For that a new [qualitative] study will be required, to look at 'how' and 'why' influence in exerted by the chairman, and the conditions under which such influence might be effective.
    • Ljiljana Erakovic, Associate Professor at the University of Auckland, described the findings of a recent case study which explored CEO succession at New Zealand's flagship airline, Air New Zealand. She and her team interviewed all of the directors that have served over a twelve year period, to understand how CEO succession was handled and to provide guidance to boards. The analysis of the interview data identified that a clearly defined and agreed recruitment process; and strong cultural fit between the candidate and the company; and, the early on-boarding of prospective external candidates into senior roles (almost as a try-before-you-buy) appeared to be crucial to the successful appointments and tenures of CEO's Sir Ralph Norris, Rob Fyfe and, most recently, Christopher Luxon. Erakovic suggested that the learning from this case is that chances of successful CEO appointments are enhanced if boards focus their attention on a few key things, including starting into the succession and recruitment process early, as early as eighteen months before the outgoing CEO leaves the company.
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    IGW'15: What place does regulation have in #corpgov?

    The session that followed the challenging commentary of Silke Machold explored the place and role of regulation in corporate governance and, more specifically, in decision-making:
    • Ilya Okhmatovsky, a Russian based in Canada, observed that much attention and scrutiny on corporate governance usually follows scandals and abuses from within the boardroom. However the regulatory response that inevitably follows—hard law and additional compliance requirements—rarely results in better decision-making or company performance outcomes. In fact, the direct regulation of decision-making appears to be impractical (and potentially, nonsensical) because it constrains board autonomy and innovation, and it often leads to another round of subversive activity. Okhmatovsky suggested that a balance between external regulation (to outlaw certain actions and conduct) and internal policies (aligned to the purpose of the company) is more likely to lead to the performance outcomes desired by boards and shareholders. He has recently commenced a study to determine whether his hypothesis is supported in reality, or not. I look forward to reading the results in due course.
    • Jean–Phillipe Denis, a Parisian scholar, asked whether the company failures experienced around 2000 (Enron, Worldcom, etc.) and 2007–2008 (GFC) were, in fact, predictable events Drawing on the title of the movie, Denis looked back to the future. He suggested that equity inevitably becomes overvalued, and that many boards, shareholders and regulators do not learn from the past as they should. Further, Denis noted that provisions built on an agency theory of board–management interaction did not prevent the circa–2000 failures. Nor did the responses to those failures (Sarbanes–Oxley) prevent the GFC. Consequently, what hope should we have that the most recent set of measures (Dodd–Frank and UK Corporate Governance code, amongst others) might prevent failures in the future?
    Neither speaker argued for more regulation, not did they argue for less. Rather, the challenge was a call to learn from the past and to do things differently. The thought-provoking proposal left delegates with much to ponder.