Tags

  • Published on

    Is corporate governance a framework, or something to be practiced?

    Accountability Complexity Corporate Governance Decision Making Director Development Language Tough Questions Value Creation
    Picture
    English can be a confusing language. The same word can have different meanings in different contexts (by 'bear', do you mean the animal, taking up arms, or putting up with someone; and is a 'ruler' a measuring instrument or a monarch?). Meaning and usage matters; more so because it is not static. Language evolves, whether by design or in response to an evolutionary development. Some refinements improve our ability to communicate effectively, others to defy logic.
    The understanding and usage of the terms 'governance' and 'corporate governance' are topical cases in point. While the term 'governance' is derived from the Greek root kybernetes meaning to steer, to guide, to pilot (typically a ship), a plethora of usages have emerged over time. Today, many different usages have become commonplace. These include the oversight of managers and what they do; the activities of the board; and the framework within which shareholders exert control and boards operate.  It is also used to describe the board itself ("we'll need to get the governance to make that decision"). ​The term has also been applied in an even broader context, the business ecosystem (i.e., system of governance). The most extreme example I have heard is, "Governance can mean almost anything, it is completely idiosyncratic; different for every organisation".
    Things are made worse when two related but distinct concepts are conflated. Consider the definition of corporate governance and the practice of corporate governance. The former is relatively stable. Eells (1960) coined the term, to describe the structure and functioning of the corporate polity (the board). Later, Sir Adrian Cadbury (1992) added that 'corporate governance' is "the means by which companies are directed and controlled". The fundamental principle here is that corporate governance is a descriptor—the activity of the board. Compare that with the practice of corporate governance--how a board enacts corporate governance when it is in session. The means by which boards consider information and make decisions can and must be fluid depending on the situation at the time.
    The wider context merits a brief comment—the rules under which companies and their boards operate (statutes, codes and regulations), and the consequential impact of the board's decisions. These are necessary, because they define the wider environment; what is allowed and what is not. In recent years, ​I've heard many people include regulations and codes within their understanding of corporate governance. Similarly with the consequential impact of the board's decisions beyond the boardroom. Are either of these corporate governance?
    If you'll allow a sporting analogy, it's important to distinguish between the rules of the game, the game as played, and the final score. All are necessary, but only one is the game. To embrace an all-encompassing understanding suggests that corporate governance is ubiquitous, extending across the entirety of the company's operations and the functions of management, leadership and operations—not to mention the wider system of rules of regulations. This, I am convinced, takes us close to the root of the confusion that besets many directors. Every time I'm asked, I invoke Eells and Cadbury. A framework of laws and regulations is necessary, for these define the operating boundaries. But they are not corporate governance. In asserting that corporate governance is the means by which companies are directed and controlled, Cadbury was saying that corporate governance is the descriptor for the work of the board. And work, straightforwardly, is something to be practiced. Let's not lose sight of these distinctions. The continued 'sloppy' use of language serves only one purpose: to obfuscate. 
  • Published on

    SEEing beyond ESG

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Performance Sustainability
    Picture
    ESG (environmental, social, governance), an indicator and measure of corporate priorities and performance, has become topical in business circles, very topical. Its emergence has coincided with a rising tide of concerns about the effects of the doctrine of shareholder maximisation, as espoused by Milton Friedman some fifty years ago. A bevy of academics, consultants and politicians have responded by jumping on a bandwagon; much has been written, arguments abound. The objective of much of this rhetoric seems to have been to establish a counterbalance to perceived excesses of capitalism (because capitalism is evil, apparently). 
    The idea of using a range of financial and non-financial measures to assess company performance is not new. It was normal practice until the early 1970s. But things began to change relatively quickly after Friedman's thesis was published. A broad church of managers, boards, shareholders and activists embraced the thesis (with evangelical zeal in some cases) to justify a primary, even exclusive, focus on profit maximisation. And with it, interest in other (non-financial) indicators of corporate performance waned—until the emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR)  and, more recently, ESG.
    ESG has gained an enthusiastic following. Many proponents have argued that the widespread adoption of ESG principles could redress some of the imbalances and inequities that have become apparent in recent decades. Is that reasonable? Is ESG all it is cracked up to be?
    Drucker's insight is salient (what gets measured gets managed), but the use of ESG as an appropriate measure of corporate performance doesn't sit that comfortably with me. Two things stand in the way:
    • First, only two of the three elements measure company performance (E and S illuminate a company's commitment to various environmental and social goals). The third, G, measures something else: the (supposed) performance of the governance function (i.e., the board).
    • Second, the ESG construct relegates economic performance to such an extent that it is not mentioned. But it remains important: economic performance is necessary if an enterprise is to endure over time.
    If ESG contains such flaws, what other options might provide a better (more complete) indication of enduring company performance?
    SEE (social, economic, environmental) merits close consideration. It reinstates the economic dimension to its rightful place, alongside the social and environmental dimensions. Thus, the three capitals that fuel sustained business performance, economic growth and societal well-being are re-united. If a company is to thrive over time (read: achieve and sustain high levels of performance, however measured), all three capitals need to be measured, managed and protected, as Christopher Luxon so ably asserted, in 2015. 
    And what of 'G'? Rightly understood, governance is about providing steerage and guidance (a lesson dating from the Greeks), the means by which companies are directed and controlled (hat tip to Sir Adrian Cadbury). As such, governance is a function performed—not a consequential outcome or result—and Drucker's maxim should be applied.
    So, to the courageous question: has the time to SEE beyond ESG arrived? I think so.
  • Published on

    Who decides whether interests are conflicted?

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Governance Leadership
    Picture
    A situation developing at Hutt City Council (a local council not far from where I live) is instructive for boards everywhere. It concerns a proposal to make a grant to Hutt Valley Tennis, a tennis club, to assist with the redevelopment of its tennis facility. The entity and the size of the grant, $850,000, are largely immaterial. What is significant about the matter is that one of the Hutt City councillors is married to the president of Hutt Valley Tennis (a potential conflict of interest, perhaps?), and that the decision required a casting vote by the Mayor to break a deadlock. The local newspaper has just reported the matter, and a newspaper columnist has chimed in offering an opinion as well.
    On the conflict of interest: Questions have been raised as to whether Councillor Milne had a conflict of interest, because his wife is the President of the organisation that stands to benefit from the proposal. Milne registered his interest but denied there was a conflict of interest because his wife is a volunteer, and neither he nor his wife has a financial interest in it. But financial interest is not the appropriate test. A more appropriate test is whether the person can reasonably be expected to make an independent and objective decision, or other factors might lead to bias. Hutt Valley Tennis identified a potential conflict, and Milne registered interest. Yet Milne proceeded to participate in the decision-making anyway. On this matter, Milne appears to have missed a vital point: perception is reality (i.e., conflicts are assessed by others, not self). If there was any doubt at all, caution should have been exercised. To argue that there was not an actual conflict is inappropriate, some might suggest arrogant. Better for Milne to have removed any doubt by excusing himself from the discussion (by leaving the room), especially as he had already declared an interest. He should not have participated in the decision either. Standing one step back, the Mayor is not beyond scrutiny in this matter. Why did he not ask Milne to leave the discussion, and why was Milne not excluded from the decision?
    On decision thresholds: Local councils, like company boards, make decisions in the collective. This means that every resolution results in either a 'yes' or a 'no' decision (notwithstanding any deferral or request for more information). In local government, the minimum threshold for a binding decision is typically a simple majority, with the Mayor holding a casting 'vote' in the cases of a deadlock. But is a sensible means of collective decision-making? What of the downstream effects and consequences? To proceed following a split decision raises all sorts of questions, not the least of which is the opposed councillors' commitment to uphold (or undermine) the decision. A better threshold is consensus, whereby every councillor (director, in the case of boards) has space to speak for or against a proposal, and debate points, on the understanding that they support the decision afterwards (because their warrant requires them to act in the best interests of the entire constituency). If consensus cannot be reached, it is better to defer the decision, pending more information and/or discussion. 
    Thankfully, the Hutt City Council has recognised the situation for what it is. The council has decided to nullify the initial decision and reconsider the proposal next week. Milne has announced that he will not participate.
  • Published on

    Advisory boards: A good thing, or no?

    Accountability Corporate Governance Effectiveness Entrepreneur Governance Tough Questions
    Several times in recent weeks, I have been asked about advisory boards. Individually, none of the requests are especially remarkable. But when several questions are posed in close succession (such as those listed below), by people in several different countries including Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Ireland, it may be timely (again) to review the phenomenon.
    • What is an advisory board?
    • I'm running a company and it's going gang-busters; but a consultant said I should set up a[n advisory] board. Why, and should I take this recommendation seriously?
    • What does an advisory board do anyway?
    • What is the relationship between an advisory board and a real board? 
    • Could you (me), given your 'governance expertise', chair my advisory board?
    The spate of enquiries set me thinking. Advisory boards have, at various times, been both topical and the source of much confusion and debate. But why the heightened level of interest at this time? Has the recently-published HBR article on shadow boards been a catalyst, or is something else going on? It's almost impossible to tell, except to observe that the person posing the question—usually an entrepreneur or a founding group—wants to know more. Either they've read or heard about advisory boards, or been advised by someone that they 'need' one (their accountant, a firm specialising in establishing advisory boards, some other consultant). The recommendation is typically justified on the basis that advisory boards are a stepping stone, "before taking on a full board". The implication is that the entrepreneur or founding group does not have to give up control. And therein lies a common misunderstanding: that an advisory board provides a bridge to, or is a substitute for, a board of directors. It is not (*).
    Before going any further, let's lay down some definitions:
    • A director is a person who acts as a director of a company and fulfils various (specified) duties, as defined in the [company] law. This definition is universal. Collectively, a group of directors is called a board of directors. Although the name (director) is reserved in the statute, the name itself is not as important as the function the person is performing. Regardless of the term used, if a person is doing things that a director would normally be expected to do, they can be deemed to be a director. If the entity is a company then it must have at least one director (some jurisdictions require at least two), which means it has a board already. But that is not to say that the normative practices of corporate governance (the provision of steerage and guidance, monitoring and supervising management, etc.) are apparent, or even necessary (most statutes do not mention the word 'governance').
    • An advisor is someone who is retained (typically from outside the company) to provide advice that the recipient may, at their sole discretion, accept or reject. In a company context, the person or group seeking the advice could be a manager, a company founder/entrepreneur, a director or the board of directors. Examples include a lawyer;  a coach; a tax, IT or AI specialist; or an industry expert.
    • An advisory board is a term of convenience that has entered the lexicon in the past decade or so, usually in the context of smaller size companies. It is typically used to describe a group of advisors who meet periodically—even regularly—to consider questions and provide advice.
    Turning now to the question posed in the title of this muse: Are advisory boards a good thing? The answer depends on the purpose and function of the group of advisors (let's not use the term 'board' just now):
    • ​If the group is formed to discuss a situation and provide specialist advice, that is little different from the retention of a lawyer or any other subject matter expert. This can be a good thing—depending on the quality of the advice provided, of course!
    • ​If the group meets regularly, and especially if meetings are conducted (or tasks performed) in a manner normally associated with a board of directors, then the group may be exposing itself to additional risks. Indicators include an advisory board charter, the appointment of a board chair, a regular meeting schedule with an agenda and minutes (which are subsequently checked and approved at a later meeting) and the consideration of reports produced by a manager (or management). If such indicators are present, the group may be, in the eyes of the law, acting as if it is a board of directors (and the duties and responsibilities that entails). Thus the terms 'deemed directors' and 'shadow board' prevalent in various jurisdictions.
    It's important to note that the 'deemed director' / 'shadow board' risk is borne by the advisor(s), not the manager, entrepreneur or company. But it is easily mitigated. Here are some suggestions:
    • ​When a manager (entrepreneur, director, board) seeks advice, advisors should request a terms of reference or an engagement letter that clearly defines the type of advice sought, and by whom; the advisory period; the expected deliverables; and the fee to be paid. After the advice is provided (or the advisory period lapses), the advisor(s) should be released.
    • The term 'advisory board' should not be used, ever. To do so implies regularity and conduct normally characteristic of a board of directors.
    • If external advice is required from several advisors, call the group for what it is, a group of advisors (or some other informal descriptor).
    • Meetings should be called and run by the manager (entrepreneur, director, board).
    • The person or group seeking the advice may elect to take notes for his/her/their own record, but these should not be described or circulated as 'minutes'.
    While this is not an exhaustive list of mitigations, they are globally applicable.
    The bottom lines? (Yes, there are two)
    • Managers (entrepreneurs, directors, boards) can and should continue to seek specialist advice from external parties from time to time.
    • Advisors should avoid being enthralled by the prospect of joining an advisory board—the risks are not worth it. Win the business, provide the advice, move on.
    (*) If the entity is a company, a board needs to be in place from day one, regardless of whether advice is sought from third parties or not. The role of the board (i.e., corporate governance) typically includes setting corporate purpose and strategy; policymaking; advising, monitoring and supervising management; holding management to account for performance and compliance with relevant statutes; and providing an account (from both a performance and a compliance perspective) to shareholders and legitimate stakeholders. The formality with which these functions are enacted is, appropriately, contextual. Click here for more information.
  • Published on

    Hallmarks of 'successful' directors

    Accountability Corporate Governance Decision Making Effectiveness Governance Performance Value Creation
    Picture
    In 2014, I observed that aspects of corporate governance and board work had not changed much in 25 years. Having just re-read the book that informed that conclusion (Making it Happen, by John Harvey-Jones), I've been reflecting on the relevance of the author's comments in today's world, especially ruminations on board effectiveness and three defining hallmarks of a successful director:
    • First, directors must feel responsible for the future of the company. When something goes wrong, you should feel a degree of worry and concern and want to contribute to its resolution.
    • Second, directors must be able to influence the general direction of both the board and its decisions. Diversity of thought is beneficial: groupthink (and other variants of #metoo thinking) has no place in a boardroom. You must be able to influence others to change their mind from time-to-time—and be prepared to consider other arguments and change your mind as well.
    • Third, a director's contribution must be constructive. Have you read and understood the board papers? Have you asked questions before the meeting. Are your comments during the meeting helpful or destructive? Do you challenge ideas with honesty, integrity and in good faith? Do you help move the debate forward, building on the ideas of others, or do you reiterate comments of others and foster ill-will?
    Are these hallmarks still applicable in today's fast-paced, technically-savvy world?
    Some commentators assert that board effectiveness is the result of compliance with corporate governance codes and various structural forms. Others, including me, place a heavier emphasis on the capabilities and behaviours of directors on the basis that the board is a social group: men and women who need to work together. (That is not to say compliance is inappropriate. It is necessary but it is not sufficient.)
    ​My recent observations and empirical research suggest that Harvey-Jones' hallmarks remain as relevant today as when they were first proposed, three decades ago. But that is just my view. What is your experience? ​
  • Published on

    Observations from interactions with 520 directors

    Accountability Conferences Corporate Governance Director Development Effectiveness Family Business Governance Performance Research Speaking Engagements
    Picture
    Today marks the beginning of a lull following a busy programme of international and domestic commitments since early February. Over a 110-day period, I have spent time in Australia (four times), England (twice), the US (twice), Germany (twice), Ireland, Sweden and Lithuania—and at home in New Zealand; interacting with over 520 directors, chairs and chief executives from 19 countries. Formal and informal discussions at conferences, seminars, masterclass sessions, education workshops, dinners, advisory engagements and board meetings were instructive to understanding what's currently top-of-mind for boards around the world. The following notes are a brief summation of my observations. I hope you find them useful.
    Diversity and inclusion: These topics continue to dominate governance discussions in many countries. But, and noticeably, the discourse has matured somewhat over the last six months. The frequency with which the rather blunt (and often politically-motivated) instruments of gender and quota is mentioned is starting to subside, as directors and nomination committees start to realise the importance of diverse perspectives and options to inform strategic thinking and strategising. Long may this continue, as board effectiveness is dependent on what boards do, not what they look like.
    Big data and AI: What a hot topic! Globally, boards are being encouraged by, inter alia, futurists, academics and consultants to get on board (if you'll excuse the pun) with the promise that developments in this area will change the face of decision-making and improve corporate governance. Some assert that these developments will obviate the need for board of directors in just a few years. The directors I spoke with agree that these tools can help managers make sense of complex data to produce information, even knowledge. But these same directors have significant reservations when it comes to strategic decision-making. Automated systems are poor substitutes for humans when it comes to making sense of (even recognising) contextual nuances, non-verbal cues and other subtleties. Unless and until this changes, the likelihood that boards will continue to be comprised of real people engaged in meaningful discussion remains high.
    Corporate governance codes: The number of corporate governance codes introduced in markets has been steadily rising over the last decade. Most western nations, and a growing number of Asian and developing nations, have implemented codes to supplement statutory arrangements. Many directors and institutions around the world continue to look to proclamations that the UK is the vanguard when it comes to corporate governance thinking and related guidance: the recently-updated UK corporate governance and stewardship codes are held up as evidence of good practice. While the quality of board work in the UK has improved over the last decade, a strong compliance focus continues the pervade director thinking—across the business community in the UK and beyond. The reason is stark: codes are little more than rulebooks. Further, rules don't drive performance, they define boundaries. The more time boards spend either complying with the rules or finding ways to get around them, the less time is left for what actually matters, company performance. In many discussions over the past few months, I've pointed people to the ground-breaking work of contributors such as Bob Tricker, Sir Adrian Cadbury and Bob Garratt. These doyens provided much-needed impetus to help boards understand their responsibility for company performance. The emergent opportunity for regulators and directors' institutions is to consider alternative responses to ineptitude and malfeasance: instead of creating more rules all the time, why not hold boards to account to the existing statutes, most of which seem to be eminently suitable?
    Best practice: Many individual directors (and boards collectively) are starting to move beyond 'best practice' as an aspirational goal. Further, directors and boards are demanding to hear educators and thinkers who are also practicing directors, not trainers delivering off-the-shelf courses. Context is everything. The evidence? When a director asks to explore the difference between theory and practice you know something in his prior experience has missed the mark. Practising directors know that the board is a complex and socially-dynamic entity, and that the operational environment is far from static. Directors' institutes, consulting firms and trainers need to stake stock and move beyond definitive 'best practice' claims, lest they be left behind and become monuments to irrelevance. Enough said.
    Governance remains a fashionable topic: ​If I had a dollar every time I've heard 'governance' promoted as a career in recent months, or the term used in discussions (including, sadly, often inappropriately), I would be really well off. But the act of invoking a term during a discussion is no panacea to whatever situation is being discussed. More capable directors are needed to contribute to the effective governance of enterprises, of that I am sure. But the established pattern of selecting directors from a pool of seemingly successful executives—as if a reward—is folly. The findings from a growing number of failure studies from around the world attest to this. The role of a director is quite different from that of a manager or executive. Managers and executives have hierarchical authority and decisions are made by individuals. In contrast, directors lead by influence and decisions are always collective. The challenge for those aspiring to receive a board appointment is to set their managerial mindset aside, to enable a more strategic mindset and commitment to the tenet of collective responsibility to emerge. 
    Picture
    Standing back from these interactions, the board landscape seems troubled. But I remain hopeful. Progress is being made (albeit more slowly than many would wish) and a pattern is slowly emerging. Increasing numbers of directors are acknowledging that the board's primary role is to ensure performance goals are achieved, and that the appropriate motivation for effective boardroom contributions is service, not self. 
    The challenge is to press on. If the number of requests from those wanting to understand what capabilities are needed in directors, what boards need to do before and during board meetings, and desirable behavioural characteristics is any indication, boards are getting more serious about making a difference—and that points to a brighter future. If a tipping point can be reached, arguments centred on board structure and composition that have dominated the discourse can be consigned to their rightful place: history. I look forward to that day.