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    Director's fees: Please sir, can we have some more?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Strategy
    The results of the annual director remuneration survey are in. (Read the media release here, and press reports here and here.) Fees have climbed about four per cent in the last twelve months, slightly ahead of CPI. The survey results also indicate that director workload has increased by 41 per cent over the same period.
    A cursory analysis suggests that the workload increase is, to a large extent, a consequence of increased compliance requirements: more rules and regulations. While a 'more work, more pay' argument is eminently justifiable, is it fair? Moves to increase directors' fees as a consequence of increased compliance workload may deliver an unintended consequence: a back-to-the-future experience. Boards are likely to become more defensive and cautious, contributing relatively little to what they are there for—the pursuit of company performance.
    Rather than peg directors fees to time and compliance activity, it might be more productive to ask whether company value (however that might be expressed) is growing as a consequence of board contributions. Many leading commentators (Bob Monks, Bob Garratt, Morten Huse and Richard Leblanc, amongst others) have suggested that boards need to become more strategic, by looking to the future. Yet statutes and regulations cannot be ignored. Boards and shareholders need to wrestle with this tension. Questions of strategy, decision-making, division of labour, accountability and ethics need to be debated and resolved. Ultimately, viable resolutions are most likely to emerge from a joint commitment to the long-term purpose of the company.
    The board needs to drive company performance in pursuit of shareholder wishes, while also ensuring that statutory and regulatory requirements are appropriately satisfied. If the board demonstrably leads the company forward, and does so in accordance with both the agreed purpose of the company and relevant statutes, shareholders are unlikely to baulk at proposals to reward the contributions of directors appropriately.
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    Health sector seminar: Board governance, a reality check

    Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Societal Wellbeing Strategy
    Every day, around the world, leaders in the health sector face a formidable challenge. On one hand, insatiable demands press in as people expect physical and mental health (foundational to our well-being). On the other, resources are limited—providers simply can't do everything. Consequently, tough choices need to be made, to ensure the appropriate services are delivered, efficiently and effectively. The complexity of the problem means 'best practice' answers are few and far between. However, progress should be possible if a clear sense of purpose, appropriate strategy and effective monitoring systems are all in place.
    The England Centre for Practice Development is hosting an interactive seminar on 11 September, to help health and social care sector leaders explore these key issues and challenges. I have been asked to facilitate the seminar, and to share insights from research and experience in boardrooms. Topics to be discussed include:
    • Lessons from the coalface ‘School of hard knocks’
    • Emerging international research
    • Keeping strategy on the agenda
    • Driving (the need for) efficiency and effectiveness
    • Ensuring accountability and performance
    • A pathway forward: An integrated strategy framework for boards
    If you are a board director or an executive of a clinical commissioning group or health provider; a policy maker; a researcher; or, an interested party, I encourage you to join the debate. 
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    On the sources (and a possible remedy) of so-called "governance failure"

    Accountability Ethics Governance Leadership Performance Research Strategy
    The much-storied scandals at FIFA, HSBC and Toshiba have highlighted a plethora of weaknesses in the way large companies are led and run. Fingers have been pointed and blame apportioned. Management has copped a fair bit of flak, but the board has not been immune either. While the media has had a field day, finger pointing and broad statements provide little comfort to those in pursuit of long-term performance. Remedies are required.
    Reputability has studied a number of failures recently(*), in pursuit of remedies. The analysis identified nine prominent categories of weakness, the first six of which were influential in the majority of failures:
    • Board skill and NED control
    • Board risk blindness
    • Defective information to or from board
    • Leadership on ethos and culture
    • Risk from incentives
    • Risk from complexity
    • Risk glass ceiling
    • Charismatic leader
    • Poor crisis management
    When these factors are considered holistically, the stark implication is that failure appears to be associated with board weakness in at least three areas (engagement, strategy and risk). If boards are to make effective contributions, these weaknesses need to be resolved. And therein lies a challenge: a return to first principles, and a different conception of corporate governance is likely to be necessary. Will boards embrace such a change in pursuit of better business performance? Let's hope so.
    (*) The full Reputability Report, entitled Deconstructing failure—Insights for boards, is available here.
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    The Toshiba case: Is it time to re-think our understanding of corporate governance?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Performance
    These seemingly innocuous statements are telling: Fix the compliance and the problem will be fixed. Yet history (Olympus, HSBC, FIFA, amongst many others) shows otherwise. Neither the 'monitor and comply' conception of corporate governance, nor the 'advise and monitor' variant espoused by many corporate governance codes and directors' institutes have achieved the desired outcomes. Yet, many boards dogmatically pursue such conceptions. 
    The problem seems to be more fundamental. The contemporary conception of corporate governance seems to be flawed. Consider these statements, which highlight the problem:
    How many more failures will it take to realise that additional layers of regulation and compliance-oriented boards that operate as policemen don't actually add value? How many more failures will it take to acknowledge that a new understanding of corporate governance and appropriate board practice might be appropriate? Emerging research seems to suggest that when boards adopt a strategic orientation, and corporate governance is re-conceived as a value-creating mechanism, increased performance is not only possible—it is potentially sustainable. Please get in touch if you'd like to know more.
    The now very public overstatement of profits at Toshiba (approximately US$1.22bn over six years) has led to the downfall of the chief executive, Mr Hisao Tanaka (below), and seven other senior managers, all of whom were also board directors. The share price has taken a 25 per cent hit and the company's reputation is in tatters. What a mess. At least there is a modicum of accountability and remorse, something sadly lacking in many other cases including HSBC and Lombard Finance. 
    Thankfully, people have begun thinking about what needs to change. So far, the response has followed a predictable course: The possibility of appointing independent directors to replace the disgraced directors has been mooted. Will this structural response be enough to fix the problem? Maybe, but I'm not convinced. Compliance responses rarely lead to sustainable change. (The compelling case is Sarbanes–Oxley: created post-Enron, it did little to prevent the GFC.) 
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    What makes a CEO succession plan appropriate?

    Accountability Decision Making Ethics Governance
    Picture
    Succession plans are an appropriate tool to mitigate risks associated with the departure of a key executive. However, they are not normally this prescriptive ("chairman...has taken over as CEO in accordance with the company's succession plan"). To name the chairman in the succession plan does not seem to be appropriate. It is hardly in the best interests of the company. What about other executives or an external candidate? While directors filling roles temporarily—and even gaining a permanent appointment—is not without precedent (Ralph Norris at Air New Zealand being one notable case), the decision of the Coalfire board to pre-empt a contestable process seems to be somewhat short-sighted.
    An appropriate chief executive succession plan usually outlines the process by which the board will approach the task of filling a vacancy, including how decisions about the appointment of an acting chief executive will be made and how the board will work with the acting chief executive in the interim. However, smart boards go further than this. They work hard to identify potentially suitable candidates from amongst the executive often many months (sometimes years) before the vacancy occurs. The Coalfire case is unusual in that the chairman was named in the succession plan. One presumes this decision was made when the board thought the chairman was the best and most suitable candidate. However, that decision was made at some point in the past. Whether the chairman continues to be the best candidate does not appear to have been tested. I wonder what the shareholders are thinking just now (*). 
    (*) My condolences to the family and friends of Rick Dakin at this time of his unexpected passing. This muse reflects on the decison-making and succession planning practices of the board both before and after the event of his passing. It is not intended to lessen Dakin's impact on the business nor the magnitude of his loss.
    Of all of the roles within a modern corporation, the role of chief executive probably ranks as 'the most important'. Although the board carries the ultimate responsibility for the performance of the company, the chief executive is the standard bearer—they hold and cast the company's vision. The chief executive is also accountable to the board for the implementation of the company's strategy. Consequently, the role is crucial to the long-term performance of the company—an unexpected departure can leave a company floundering while a replacement is sought.
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    International Governance Workshop: Reflections

    Conferences Decision Making Ethics Governance Leadership Research
    The second annual International Governance Workshop is complete. A small(ish) group of leading thinkers assembled at the Toulouse Business School in Barcelona to discuss and debate emergent research and to ask the "So what?" question. Overall, the presentations and papers were of a high standard, as was the discussion and debate that followed each paper. Also:
    • The organisers did a great job. Barcelona in June is like Goldilocks—not too hot and not too cold. The venues, both at TBS and those used for extra-curricular dinners, were conducive to good interaction between the delegates.
    • The highlight of the workshop (for me) was Silke Machold's keynote talk. She challenged much of the conventional thinking, and called both researchers and practitioners to re-think boards, board-practice and corporate governance expectations.
    • The discussion over wine in tapas bars and restaurants was something to be savoured. Even while socialising, delegates continued to think about the challenges facing companies and boards, and to explore options and scenarios to move from corporate governance towards the notion of a value-creating board.
    • The main theme (actually, challenge might be a better descriptor) that emerged from the workshop was 'change'. The nature of board research needs to change, from investigating isolated and observable attributes of boards and corporate governance activity, to studying boards themselves, both in situ and holistically. This presents a huge challenge for researchers, because it means that straightforward statistical analyses probably need to be replaced by more sophisticated techniques not unlike those used in sociology, psychology, behavioural economics and related fields.
    • The dominant logic of companies—maximisation of shareholder returns—probably needs to be reassessed in the light of wider stakeholder issues. This is not a call for Marxist or socialist-style interventions, but rather a recognition that shareholder maximisation to the exclusion of other logics is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer-term.
    While this conference was amongst the smallest (in terms of delegates) that I have attended in recent years, the quality of the discussion and debate was amongst the highest that I have experienced anywhere. Senior academics openly interacted less experienced researchers and other attendees in the discussions, to the extent that it was hard to tell who was who unless you looked at the titles on name tags.
    From small beginnings in 2014, the TBS team has a clear vision of what they want to achieve. This second workshop built on the first workshop (I am told, I did not attend the first one), which augers well for the future. I commend this workshop to all academics, consultants, advisors and serving directors with an interest in board practice and business performance.