News of Emmanuel Faber's dismissal as executive chairman of Danone, a French food conglomerate, has caused quite a stir. Mr Faber, a fervent proponent of stakeholder capitalism and ESG, had led the company for seven years. Since 2017, he has held both the chair and chief executive roles (a situation disfavoured by many investors, academics and advisors due to concentration of power risk). Though charismatic and influential, the record shows that company performance has languished under Mr Faber's leadership, and staff turnover increased too. Clearly, something was amiss.
Sustained pressure from activist investors, disgruntled by Danone's performance (relative to its competitors, over several years), finally elicited in a response. The Danone board decided to separate the chairman and chief executive roles; Faber would remain chairman of the board and a new chief executive would be recruited. But this attempt by Faber to placate the activists while also retaining power was received poorly. Faber was, in the eyes of the activists, a lead actor and, therefore, a big part of the problem. He had to go they thought. Realising this, the board ousted Faber.
Proponents of both stakeholder capitalism and shareholder capitalism have taken Faber's demise as an opportunity to come out from their respective corners to argue the merits of their favoured ideology. The purpose of this muse is not to add to that discourse; it is to consider another matter brought in to view by the case at hand: that of misalignment.
If a Chief Executive acts against the direction of the board (or without the board's knowledge), or if a board is disunited over a strategically important matter (purpose or strategy, especially), company performance (however measured) will inevitably suffer. Danone is a case in point.
Matters of misalignment, either amongst directors or between the board and chief executive, need to be resolved promptly. Similarly, if purpose and strategy are clear, coherent and agreed, but subsequent implementation is poor or ineffective (the saying–seeing gap), the board probably has a leadership problem. Attempts to satisfy all interests—appeasement—rarely achieve satisfactory or enduring outcomes, as Neville Chamberlain discovered in 1938–1939.
Directors need to be alert (individually and collectively, as a board); united in their resolve to pursue agreed goals; and, their tolerance for underperformance must be low. If the board is complacent in the face of misalignment or poor strategy execution, and it does not act, it becomes part of the problem. Sooner or later, shareholders will notice, and it is reasonable to expect they will act, to protect their investment.
Have you ever wondered what it would be like to travel in a plane without any knowledge of where you might be headed? While this prospect may excite some, the idea of flying without a destination or purpose in mind beggars belief for most people.
Successful air travel is predicated on knowing the destination; a precursor to the pilot creating a flight plan to make the journey and arrive safely. Air travel is, generally, safe and straightforward when this principle is applied. But things can go wrong, and if they do, pilots must be ready to respond well. For that, years of training and accumulated experience are vital. And vigilance too: continuously reading onboard and external signals to verify progress, and to spot and respond to any emerging problems.
Successful governance is directly analogous. Knowledge of the destination and how to get there (purpose and strategy) is vital, as is constant monitoring of both the general direction (to verify progress is being made towards the desired goal) and the current situation (to detect any emerging problems).
Boards are, in general, reasonably good at reading and understanding the current situation. But they are not nearly as good when it comes to general direction. Knowledge and agreement around the ultimate goal, how to get there and how progress might be measured remains problematic. If directors and boards lack clarity on these matters, their ability to govern well and ensure the performance of the company into the future is lost. The consequential risks are high. Chances are, the board and the company will be knocked around—moving but not making progress, just like a cork in a washing machine.
Does your board have this in hand?
Recently, during a meeting with a company director, I was asked if I'd be interested in seeing the company’s production facilities, to provide context for an upcoming assignment. Context is everything, so I gladly accepted the offer. As we walked, we chatted about a wide range of things. At one point, I asked how things were going since the board's decision to embrace a strategy to become a higher-performing business. His response was as telling as it was succinct:
They say ‘high performance’, but all I see is ‘average’.
The melancholic admission was unexpected, but not surprising. Apparently, the most recent board report showed that staff turnover had been creeping up, and engagement scores were trending downwards. And yet the atmosphere in the boardroom was sanguine when I visited. Clearly, something was amiss.
This vignette highlights one of the great challenges in business—strategy execution; ensuring that strategy planned becomes strategy executed. Regardless of the motivation for creating them, intentions and strategies are not worth the paper they are written on if desired outcomes are not achieved.
When things go wrong, the problem can often be traced back to one or both of two things: lack of will (the "won't" barrier), and lack of know-how (the "can't" barrier). Both are indicators of a failure of leadership; a failure to equip staff, and motivate and engage them to embrace the call to action. But the root cause may lie elsewhere. If strategy implementation is OK but expected outcomes do not follow, the problem is more likely to be one of governance. This is because ultimate responsibility for organisational performance [outcomes] stops in the boardroom, not the executive suite. Some may challenge this, on the basis that the executive is responsible for running the business and implementing the strategy. They are, but for the avoidance of doubt, responsibility of determining purpose, setting overall strategy and ensuring results are achieved lies with the board of directors. There’s no getting away from it: the buck stops at the top.
If there is a gap between what the board says it wants, and what is subsequently observed as reality, the likelihood of great outcomes is low. The ‘saying–seeing’ gap must be bridged, and the board needs to own this.
Here are some questions the board may wish to consider:
So, to the direct question: Is your board across this?
We live in a fast-paced world, where the only constant seems to be change itself. Nine months ago, messages promoting the latest and greatest scheme (or product or idea) bombarded our senses daily, imploring us to embrace something better. Hope prevailed. Now, with the outbreak and impact of coronavirus, the situation is quite different.
Despite the ebbing and flowing of seasons and circumstances, even the onset of crises, some things remain remarkably constant; stable despite great turbulence and the best intentions of enthusiastic advocates to move things along. The corporate boardroom is one such example.
Earlier this year, during the early days of the coronavirus, I re-read Making it Happen, Sir John Harvey-Jones' reflections on leadership. Harvey-Jones, a successful businessman and industrialist, was perhaps best known for leadership of British firm ICI, culminating in his chairmanship from 1982 to 1987. His insights are timeless; arguably still relevant today, 32 years after they were first written. To illustrate the point, here is a selection of salient comments Harvey-Jones made about boards in 1988:
Do any of these points sound familiar? They probably do, because, sadly, many of Harvey-Jones' observations are still prevalent today. Given the duties of directors, why are some boards still reluctant to embrace change when circumstances change, or a crisis strikes?
Is it time your board took stock, not only of the company's strategy and business model, but of itself?
The professionalisation (sorry, a horrible word) of governance has been a topic of discussion for many years. Some directors, when describing what they do, prepend the adjective form of the word, to indicate their full-time paid work is a [company] director, and to indicate their commitment to 'professional' standards (the implication being that some are not). Others abhor such usage.
Many directors are diligent and highly engaged in their work. So why the felt need to professionalise? Studies of company and board failures reveal a consistent pattern of contributory factors, including hubris and overconfidence among directors; low levels of board-management transparency; lack of a critical attitude, genuine independence, appropriate expertise and relevant knowledge in the boardroom; and, tellingly, low levels of commitment by directors. Consequently, public confidence is mixed.
If the practice of governance is to become highly regarded, standards need to be lifted and applied. But can or should governance (that is, the practice of directing) be elevated to the status of 'profession', as medicine, law and accountancy are? And what, exactly, is a professional director? How is one different from an 'ordinary' director (or any other type of director)? What difference might professionalism make? Are better outcomes any more likely? In considering these questions, let's first define some terms:
Individuals wanting to become a medical doctor, for example, must first successfully complete several years of university-level training, after which they become a trainee intern, are provisionally registered and start to practice. A commitment to the Hippocratic oath is necessary. Doctors are also required to formally register with an approved institution, pass professional member- and fellow-level exams and complete approved professional development (on-going). Usually, a formal disciplinary process is available if an individual is found to have flouted professional standards. Law is similar, and accountancy too. On this measure, it's clear that doctors (and lawyers and accountants) are professionals; stakeholders (patients, clients) can have confidence in their work.
But what of directors and governance? Two observations are relevant. First, almost anyone can become a director, and do so with no training! In most jurisdictions, any person over a specified age (18 years old in New Zealand), who is not an undischarged bankrupt nor is before the courts, may become a director. That's it! There is no mandatory training requirement, nor is membership of a professional body or ongoing professional development necessary. Second, many directors' institutions around the world have, over the past few decades, sought to promote governance as a profession. Their good work has resulted in charters being established, and members being invited to commit to ongoing professional development and to operate in accordance with a code of ethics. But these well-intended efforts have been met with mixed success to date. Optionality seems to be part of the problem. Variable quality training programmes, and ambiguity around the primary purpose of the institution appear to have been contributing factors too.
If governance is to become recognised as a profession, as many have argued is needed, minimum standards need to be instituted, and optionality withdrawn. Prospective directors should be required to complete approved (formal) training and pass exams; serve as an intern; gain (and maintain) formal membership of an approved institution; and commit to continuing professional development. Flawed understandings of the role of the director and what corporate governance is and how it should be practiced need to be corrected too, and the power games, hubris and ineptitude apparent in some boardrooms rectified.
But, in the end, the question of professionalising governance remains contentious. Some experienced directors don't see the need, believing they are competent. Others don't want to be scrutinised. And some directors and observers continue to argue fervently in favour, because they think the likelihood of better outcomes should be much higher.
What do you think?
I returned today from two overnight trips (both were to attend board meetings, meet shareholders and discuss various company matters with management). It was great to get out and about again—to sit together around a board table, meet staff and see the businesses operating following the constraints imposed by the Covid-19 lockdown.
While I was away, a Netherlands-based colleague sent a note saying she'd just started reading through Musings, from the beginning. Why someone would go back and read all of my writings since March 2012 is beyond me, but she has chosen to do so. She said that while many writings resonated, one piece in particular stood out as being as relevant today as when it was first written, in 2012.
Amongst other things waiting for my attention [having arrived overnight] was this article, originally posted by Tony Schwartz on the HBR Blog Network. The article set me thinking. Why are we, in this so-called modern age of productivity, so busy trying to fit so much in to our lives? We use electronic diaries to keep track and save time, but they've come to rule our lives. We seem to be constantly running; going faster, but getting nowhere.
Chantal's comment, and my subsequent re-reading of this piece, set me thinking once again about the impact of speed and busyness on decision quality.
How can any director make effective contributions in the boardroom if they are so busy, or moving so quickly, that they do not have time to consider the wider context? The prospect of an electronically-enabled world sounds enticing to many. But is it built on a solid foundation? Are board decisions any better than before?
Directors owe a duty of care to ensure the enduring success of the company governed. For that, they need to create space to think deeply and critically about longer-term options. They ignore this maxim at their peril.
Earlier this week, I had the privilege of framing a discussion on board decision-making with a group of board directors and Digoshen Impact Partners. (Digoshen is a global learning platform to empower experienced and aspiring directors.) The following comments summarise the key points mentioned during this week's session.
At the core, the board of director's main job is to ensure the performance of the enterprise it governs. For that, the board needs to consider information, ask questions and make decisions, strategic decisions. This sounds straightforward. But many boards struggle; and more so in a highly-dynamic environment. For example:
Given these research findings, it's little wonder effectiveness is low. The seemingly unending trail of missteps and company failures tells a sorry story. But boards have options; they hold the ultimate decision-making power and, therefore, are by no means powerless. Boards intent on achieving high levels of decision effectiveness may wish to embrace the following suggestions (discussed during the session):
One final point. Boards are social groups that operate within a stratified social setting, the company and more broadly the wider marketplace. Thus, the actions and outcomes that follow are contingent on many external factors. Things can (and do) change quickly. Therefore, boards need to keep their eyes open, to ensure they have contextually relevant information to hand to make an informed decision; and to remain diligent after the decision, to ensure the expected benefits of the decision are in fact realised.
This musing is based on a session summary I co-authored (original posted on the Digoshen website).
Last week, Scott Arrol, CEO of NZHIT (New Zealand's peak body for those involved the digital health sector), got in touch to ask a few questions about the contribution of boards during times of crisis—a topical subject! The primary challenge for boards in such times is working out how to respond. The playbook that may have served well in the past is, probably, of little use now that the operating context has been flipped on its head. Despite this, the board remains responsible for business performance, so respond it must.
During our conversation (which was recorded, see below), we touched on the following points:
If you'd like to explore any of these or related points further, please get in touch.
The rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus has shaken communities and commercial activity around the world, to the very core. Since late February, strict restrictions on human movement both between countries and, now, within communities have been imposed, in the hope of containing the virus and, in one case, of eradicating it. The scale of the impact on lives, social structures and economic activity has yet to be measured, but it will be large, I suspect. The scars will remain tender for some time in many cases.
Unsurprisingly, many people have been inventive in response to the situation they now find themselves in. Neighbours are meeting at a distance, and internet traffic has grown exponentially as people have taken up online entertainment options and relied heavily on social media to keep in touch with each other. All of this is to be expected; humans are social beings, after all.
The vacuum left from the pausing of economic activity has been filled by creative thinkers and opportunists offering all manner of webinars, 'best practice' check lists and other forms of guidance to help individuals, groups and businesses reconfigure their lives and businesses. The Internet is now awash with them. Some are well-informed and helpful, but most of the ones I've seen are little more than attention-seeking noise.
My own work patterns have changed too, mainly as a result of the restrictions on movement now in place. These include using electronic communications tools such as video conferencing in place of in-person board, coaching and other client meetings; and the telephone and email to keep in touch with colleagues and clients. The following points summarise my experiences as I have sought to govern at distance this past month:
One final point. These are my experiences. Some may be familiar, others less so. Regardless, if you have any questions or comments, please get in touch. If you are prepared to add your experiences, as similar or different as they may be, I'd be delighted to hear them and am sure others would be too. Please leave a reply below.
The global onset of the COVID-19 virus has precipitated a wide range of reactions in the community, from ambivalence to anxiety. Many governments have stepped in to support their citizens. Some have imposed community-wide lockdowns and social distancing protocols in an effort to break the spread of the contagion; others have implemented rigorous testing and quarantine regimes to identify and isolate those affected.
Business leaders have been considering their options too. Working from home has become a 'thing', as has the use of video conferencing and other online tools. Amongst the many responses, one in particular caught my eye this week: proposals by the directors' institutes of several countries—notably Australia, New Zealand and Britain, and Germany and others as well—to temporarily suspend director liability in the case of insolvency.
Superficially, this sounds like a reasonable idea. When a force majeure event strikes, the impact on sales, working capital and jobs may be very significant. The effect may be immediate, especially if the company is prevented from trading due to a lockdown. If the affected company cannot restructure its cost base, draw on financial reserves or secure finance quickly, business continuity will be at risk. Insolvency may follow, and all jobs will be lost. Thus goes the argument. But on the flip side (there always is one), the suspension of director liability and allowance to trade whilst insolvent may open the door for abuse, despite the honourable intention of keeping the economy functioning.
Insolvency has always been a red line for boards and companies. This proposal makes it porous, by absolving directors of responsibility for trading while insolvent. Some questions worth considering as lawmakers assess the proposal:
While a force majeure event can catch even the most well-run companies out, those with strong balance sheets and highly-engaged boards are better placed to respond well. They probably do not need the protection of the proposed provision, because they are more likely to have a robust risk assessment and mitigation framework in place, and strategic risks will have been assessed at most board meetings. But those companies being run close to the wire, or with inadequately engaged boards or weaker systems, may be caught flat footed. And if they are, what then? Should directors be protected, or be held to account?
Lawmakers need to tackle these types of questions, and resolve ambiguities thoroughly. If they don't, expect scurrilous directors to exploit the inevitable loopholes—to defend against other, board-induced, problems such as ineptitude, incompetence, negligence or malfeasance, for example.
Enquiry is appropriate, regardless of the catalyst, because sunlight, as they say, is a great disinfectant.
Thoughts on corporate governance, strategy and effective board practice; our place in the world; and, other things that catch my attention.