The 10th European Conference on Management Leadership and Governance starts tonight with a welcome function for delegates. This year the conference is being hosted by VERN' University, in Zagreb, Croatia. I am rested after the long flight from New Zealand via London, and am looking forward to hearing about the latest developments in management, leadership and corporate governance research over the next two days. Please check back regularly if you are interested in the discussion. I will post session summaries here during the conference, and use the #ECMLG2014 hashtag on Twitter to announce new postings. The full conference programme is available here. If you are interested in a particular session, please let me know and I will do my best to attend and report on it for you.
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Does the question posed in the title of this musing have a straightforward, even profound‚ answer? I would have thought so. In fact, when I am asked this question—as happens on a fairly regular basis—my reply is that the purpose of business is to provide a return to the shareholders, whether by way of a dividend or a capital gain, or both. The shareholders own the asset (the business), so it seems fair that they receive a reward for making the asset available. I've thought this for the long time, on the basis that the shareholders are the ones that put up the money in the first place. Staff, suppliers and others receive payments for services rendered and products supplied at the time they are provided. However, if companies become selfish and get too greedy, by trying to maximise profit at the expense of almost anything else, as some do, then cries of protest can be expected from some quarters. Do cry-ers have a point? Maybe, but not if they are promoting some form of social engineering, whereby profits are distributed to others beyond the shareholder base. Businesses exist for the purpose of making money for their shareholders. They are not social clubs for a wide group of so-called stakeholders. Others disagree, I know, but the purpose of a for-profit business is to make a profit! Otherwise, the business would be a not-for-profit agency. It would seem to me that, in the context of an open market, those companies that achieve dominant positions are very good at what they do. Yet no business is exempt from the invisible hand. The self-regulating behaviour of the market described by Smith over 200 years ago remains in control. It will have an effect, perhaps sooner rather than later if boards and shareholders get too greedy with profit maximisation. So, back to the question. What is the real purpose of any business? To make a profit for its shareholders, and those that do this well, in an ethical manner, can and should expect to operate successfully for many years.
If you listen carefully, you can hear it. A drumbeat, almost inaudible at first but getting louder now, has been beating a new tune in corporate boardrooms: that directors need to get serious about strategy. If the recently published NACD Blue Ribbon Commission's report is any indication, the era of boards meeting to review past performance and satisfy their compliance obligations (as their sole responsibility) may be drawing to a close. While I was initially non-commital, the BRC should be applauded for its report, and the NACD congratulated for having the courage to commission it. That the BRC has produced a set of strong recommendations is great news for shareholders, the markets and other parties interested in effective corporate governance and the achievement of great company performance outcomes. However, the recommendations are not without consequences:
These consequences will place downward pressure on the number of boards that any given director can sit on at any one time, without doubt. Three concurrent board appointments is probably a reasonable maximum for any one director, and possibly two if one appointment was a chairmanship. However, that may introduce a whole new set of concerns, not the least of which might be requests—from directors more interested in earning than serving—to shareholders to increase the size of the directors' fees pool! Notwithstanding this, I hope directors and boards take heed of the calls to action—for they are beating loudly now. Finally, my current research work, and experience in practice, suggests that the calls to action make very good sense. They are likely to lead to better company performance outcomes—but if they are followed.
Earlier this week, the Chief Executive and two former directors of South Canterbury Finance, the failed finance company, faced Justice Heath to hear his verdict relating to New Zealand's largest ever fraud case. Some $1.6B was owed to creditors when SCF collapsed in 2010. Justice Heath found one director guilty on five charges, and he acquitted the other director and the Chief Executive on all of the charges they faced. In his decision (all 258 pages), the judge blamed the former chairman (Alan Hubbard, who was killed in a car crash some time after the collapse), who appeared to rule with a dominant hand.
What I cannot fathom in this case is how one director can be found guilty of knowingly making false statements and the chairman can be blamed for ruling with a dominant hand, yet another director was not found guilty. Clearly, the director adjudged to be guilty was not happy. The board is a collective of directors, so decisions should be decisions of the board—surely the prospectus was considered and approved by the board and not an individual? That the board is one is what we teach on the Institute of Directors' Company Directors Course and elsewhere. This judgement raises some interesting issues relating to the law (that I don't profess to understand) that are relevant for practice. I have requested a copy of Judge Health's decision, and plan to read it over the coming week, because clearly I am missing something. Acer Computer, once a strong and proud manufacturer and exporter of personal computer products, has been doing it tough lately. Record losses in the last few years, as the company has struggled to adjust its strategy to the shift from desktop computers to mobile devices, have seen the company chew through three chairmen in fairly quick succession. There have been arguments between the CEO and the board over strategy as well. What has gone wrong? Apart from missing the market shift to mobile devices, I wonder whether the company has run out of ideas and has become stale. The last three chairmen have been company stalwarts for example, steeped in the culture and history of the business. Realistically, how much fresh thinking would you expect to emerge in such environments?
Now the founder has stepped in. A outsider CEO has been appointed, for the first time, to lead the company—and to become the chairman in three years' time. This first part of this is good; it should see the introduction of some new strategic options, but only if the founder (who has come out of retirement to occupy the chair) allows it to be so. However, the second part—of anointing a leader three years before the fact, in an industry sector characterised by rapid change and tectonic shifts, is a huge call. I would have thought it made much more sense to recruit the new CEO and then recruit a new (and probably but not necessarily independent) chairman in twelve months' time. This would give the incoming CEO time to get underway, begin to deliver on the confidence the founder has placed in him, without the additional burden of preparing to add the chairman role at the beginning of year three. What say the new CEO is no good? What say a different skills and expertise mix is required to lead the board effectively in the future? The founder has, in effect, closed off the possibility of introducing new thinking around the board table—even though this seems to have been one of his aims. Complex businesses need highly capable leaders: two good heads are almost universally better than one. Keeping one's options open, to react and respond to changing market forces is smart. Painting one self into a corner is not. Notwithstanding this, the founder can exert influence as he wishes. My view—that the longer-term future of the business, and of the value to shareholders in particular, may have been better served with a succession plan that revolved around two separate appointments—probably doesn't count for much. What do you think? The rather sensitive matter of CEO pay has raised its head (again) today. Stories of ever-larger packages have appeared in the news columns with metronomic regularity in recent years. However, change may be on the horizon. According to the findings of a new survey conducted by Strategic Pay, one in four CEOs would take a pay cut if offered other benefits, including more time with family.
Clearly, some CEOs think that time is more important than money; that there is more to life than work. These findings suggest that the runaway train that is CEO pay may not be boundless after all, although some CEOs will dispute them, no doubt. However, knowledge of these results creates an opportunity for boards to initiate a much needed conversation—for the health of the CEO and the good of the company. I have just stumbled across a new conceptualisation of governance, one that looks great on the surface but may actually be troublesome underneath. It's called The Alternative Board.
The concept is that of "DIY governance", whereby owners and managers of small and medium businesses join a membership organisation to share ideas and provide support. Similar organisations abound in the market; BNI and Chambers of Commerce being two well-established examples. However, when one looks a little more closely, The Alternative Board has some unusual characteristics:
Membership of an organisation that provides assistance and collegial support is a good thing, although prospective members may baulk when they consider that this is not a classical break-even membership organisation that exists for the good of the members. The primary motivation seems to be the generation of profits for the owners—that's why franchises exist after all. Owners of smaller businesses that utilise a partnership or sole trader ownership structure can decide what they think about this and whether the proposition delivers value or not. Stepping past this first point, there is a larger and potentially more troublesome question for those who operate their business as a company. Advisors that perform tasks similar to those of boards of directors can be deemed to be directors. As such, well-meaning members may, unknowingly and unwittingly, become bound by the Companies Act (and amendments) and the legal duties of directors. Given these characteristics, and the implications of them, my recommendation to owners and managers who are considering whether or not to become members of The Alternative Board is this: Do your homework first. Caveat emptor. Decisions about major transactions, or matters that might be material to the future prospects of a company, are usually reserved for the board of directors. This is appropriate, because directors have a duty of care—to the company they govern and to the shareholders that own the company. In fulfiling their duties, directors must ensure they are adequately informed regarding the affairs of the company, so that decisions can be made in the best interests of the company and, ultimately, the shareholders. This all seems straightforward and tidy, but is it always so? Unfortunately not—well not at Hyundai anyway. Recently, the Hyundai board of directors approved a bid to buy a large and valuable parcel of land—without actually knowing the price! Claims by management that the bid price was "top secret" and therefore could not declared seem to have been accepted by the board: While boards of the three firms discussed and approved bidding for the plot in the capital's high-end Gangnam district to house a headquarters complex, hotel and automotive theme park, the bid price was not shared with directors as it was deemed to be confidential, three of the directors said. The Hyundai Motor and Kia Motors boards unanimously approved making a bid for the Korea Electric Power (KEPCO) land, two directors said. The making of strategically important decisions without vital information borders on reckless trading. That such a large transaction would be approved without knowledge of the price defies normal logic. That $8B of market value has been wiped off Hyundai should come as no surprise.
Why did the Hyundai board make the decision without knowing the bid price? If the board carries the ultimate responsibility for company performance and business value, it should know everything that is material to a decision. If information is missing, the board should insist on it being provided, and to defer any decision until the information is provided. That management thought that the board could not be trusted with knowledge of the bid price, and the board let management get away with it, is an indicator that there are some fundamental problems with the corporate governance systems at Hyundai. The directors need to take a good long look at themselves and the way they operate, and seriously consider whether they are fit to carry on. BAM2014 got underway this morning, with a light breakfast of croissants, pastries and coffee to welcome first-time attendees (a great way to help break the ice, thank you organisers!). A series of professional development workshops followed. Seventeen topics were offered, across two workshop sessions, before lunch including:
The workshop sessions were intentionally interactive, with the facilitators actively eliciting comments from, and the experience of, the delegates in attendance. I attended the cognitive mapping session (quizzically, not really understanding much about the topic) and the generating impactful research (hoping to pick up some tips for my own research) sessions. The cognitive mapping session was really helpful. It exposed me to a method of moving meaningfully from the vast quantity of data that is typically gathered in observations and interviews toward some meaningful conclusions. However, a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing, because I now realise that I may have missed a trick in my research analysis—something that I'll need to give some careful though to in the coming days. The impactful research session was aimed at researchers seeking external (funding) assistance to support their research. This session was of less interest to me as I plan to return to professional practice and advisory work. After the lunch break, several business and academic speakers will open the conference. They will address the conference theme: The role of the business school in supporting economic and social development. In my rather limited experience, one of the shortfalls of many business colleges relates to relevance. That business research conclusions often have limited practical application is an indictment on business schools and on the research process. This should be an interesting discussion. The 28th Annual British Academy of Management Conference starts in Belfast today. With over 700 delegates registered, 640 papers to be presented (at times over 20 parallel tracks!), the next three days promise to be very busy. My intention is to attend as many of the corporate governance papers as I can get to, strategy papers and a selection of others. I'll post reflections that various points over the next three days, and encourage those interested to follow the hashtag #BAM2014.
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